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Abstract 
Attaching monetary values to non-market outcomes, goods and services has become a 
critical part of policy evaluation across OECD countries. The HM Treasury Green 
Book, the core policy evaluation guidance in the UK, requires that projects and 
policies be assessed using Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), which compares the benefits 
and costs of a policy in monetary terms and hence requires valuation of the outcomes 
of a policy. Outside of public policy, the private sector is also increasingly interested 
in valuing the outcomes of their activities to measure the social value that they 
generate. However, valuing non-market goods such as education, health, crime, 
environment, and heritage is difficult because they are not traded in markets. 
Wellbeing Valuation (WV) is a relatively new method, first developed in 2002. There 
are a number of technical problems with the method related to the statistical 
estimation methodology and a number of issues that have not been explored in full 
such as how to interpret the values. This has restricted the method’s use in policy 
evaluation to date.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the WV 
approach and to improve the methodology so that it can be applied robustly in CBA, 
policy evaluation and in social value studies. I do this by developing a complete 
theory of WV and a new set of technical criteria to be used to assess the rigour of WV 
studies. I then develop a new statistical method for WV, the Three Step Wellbeing 
Valuation (3S-WV) method, and demonstrate how it solves for the main technical 
issues and improves the values and results derived from the method. I also provide a 
new framework for interpreting values derived from WV. I showcase the new 3S-WV 
method on a case study to value the non-pecuniary benefits of employment. 
 
This thesis also contains an Addendum that was requested by the examiners, 
which should be read together with the thesis. The Addendum contains 
clarifications, changes and additions to Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.  
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1. Setting the scene: the role of monetary valuation in policy analysis 
 
This thesis is about monetary valuation and how we can value non-market goods and 
services such as education, the environment, health, crime, and social capital. This is 
an important question for research because it tells us how these types of goods, 
outcomes and services benefit the public. The fundamental aim of government policy 
evaluation is to assess whether public funds are spent on activities that provide the 
greatest benefits to society (Hausman and McPherson, 2006). Policy evaluation makes 
up an important part of the activities and budget of most OECD governments. 
Arguably, nowhere is this more so than in the United Kingdom (UK), where HM 
Treasury plays a key role in verifying the effectiveness of different policy 
interventions and provides formal guidance on policy evaluation.  
 
In the UK, all new policy proposals generally require HM Treasury approval, usually 
given on the basis of a formal Business Case. The business case is a management tool 
which synthesises the results of all the necessary research and analysis needed to 
support decision making in a transparent way1.  Business cases are composed of five 
aspects: 
 
i. The Strategic case sets out the rationale for the proposal, it makes the case for 
change at a strategic level. 
 
ii. The Economic case assesses the costs and benefits of the proposal to 
society as a whole, and spans the entire period covered by the proposal. 
 
 
1 HM Treasury. Assessing Business Cases ‘A Short Plain English Guide’. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1906
09/Green_Book_guidance_short_plain_English_guide_to_assessing_business_cases.pdf 
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iii. The Commercial case is concerned with issues of commercial feasibility and sets 
asks whether the proposed solution be effectively delivered through a workable 
commercial deal. 
 
iv. The Financial case looks at issues of affordability, and sources of 
budget funding for the project. 
 
v. The Management case is concerned with the deliverability of the proposal in 
terms of the project management involved.  
 
Although all five aspects are important, the economic case is “the essential core of the 
business case” 2 and this is because it is where the outcomes of the intervention are 
explicitly analysed and policies are assessed or ranked in terms of their worthiness 
(the other four cases relate to the issue of viability of the policy rather than to its 
worthiness). In theory, under this framework policies are determined through the 
economic case and then assessed whether they are viable (and hence can be 
implemented) using criteria set out in the other four aspects of the business case. 
 
Guidance for assessing the economic case is set out in the HM Treasury Green Book 
manual (2018), which stipulates that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) should be used. 
This entails measuring all of the benefits and costs to society associated with the 
policy intervention in monetary terms. The preferred option is the one that has the 
highest net social benefits over the full life of the policy and its legacy.  
 
CBA also has a significant and often dominant role in policy analysis in many other 
OECD countries. For instance CBA has a long history in the US, where it was first 
implemented in the 1930s by the US Army Corp of Engineers. Until that point 
evaluations of pubic investments were almost completely ad-hoc. The Flood Control 
Act of 1936 mandated that projects be assessed in terms of their benefits and costs 
and only those with positive net benefits should be implemented. In the US, the use of 
CBA at the federal level significantly increased with the issuance of two Executive 
 
2 HM Treasury (p.5). Assessing Business Cases ‘A Short Plain English Guide’. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1906
09/Green_Book_guidance_short_plain_English_guide_to_assessing_business_cases.pdf 
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Orders in 1981 and 1994 (respectively by President Reagan and President Clinton), 
confirming the government’s commitment to CBA in regulatory decision-making3 
and its key role has continued to this day (Sunstein, 2018). Elsewhere central 
financing departments in Canada, Australia and New Zealand have produced their 
own technical guidance on CBA and the Green Book manual has been translated in to 
other languages by many foreign governments.  
 
The demand for valuation is now also increasingly coming from the private sector, 
where social value is a hot topic. Organisations such as Marks and Spencer and 
Siemens have made efforts to quantify their impacts on local communities and 
through corporate social responsibility (CSR) and this often includes assessing how 
much value they have generated for society. Elsewhere the Social Value Act, 
which came into force on 31 January 2013, requires people who commission public 
services to think about how they can also secure wider social, economic and 
environmental benefits. The Act is intended to help commissioners get more value for 
money out of procurement. The result is that all major construction companies now 
need to demonstrate the social impact and value of their projects alongside the 
economic benefits when bidding for work and all key companies in the sector now 
have dedicated social value teams (e.g. Morgan Sindall, Lendlease, and Kier). Whilst 
private sector companies do not usually use the Treasury Business Case model and 
CBA, they do require information on the value of non-market goods, services and 
impacts and hence require robust valuation methodologies. Since the private sector 
effectively follows the Government’s lead in this area I will focus on Government 
guidelines and in particular the Green Book and the methods that underlie it, namely 
CBA, but recognise that the issues raised and the contributions developed in this 
thesis are also highly relevant and applicable to the private sector as well. 
 
CBA has its roots in welfare economics, a branch of economics that uses 
microeconomic theory and techniques to evaluate questions surrounding optimal 
resource allocation from a full societal perspective. CBA starts from the premise that 
 
3http://community.amstat.org/chicago_chapter/calendar/20052006/may52006conference/downloadpres
entationshistoryofcostbenefitanalysis 
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the only morally-relevant good is human welfare – welfare is the only thing that can 
make claims on our resources and hence decisions should aim to maximise welfare. In 
this sense CBA is a welfarist approach to policy analysis (Hausman and McPherson, 
2006). Furthermore, CBA is consequentialist. That is, it stipulates that it is the 
outcomes of an action that matter and get counted, rather than anything to do with the 
intention or process of the action, in so far as the intentions and processes have no 
impact on the outcomes of an action. 
 
CBA, thus, assesses policies in terms of their outcomes for welfare. This is done by 
comparing the negative outcomes (costs) to the positive outcomes (benefits), where 
costs relate to losses in welfare and benefits relate to gains in welfare due to the 
intervention. The key process in CBA is to convert all outcomes related to the 
intervention in to the same metric so that the costs and benefits can be compared on a 
like-for-like basis. CBA does this through conversion of all outcomes on to a 
monetary scale. In theory any metric could be used but monetisation allows us to 
compare outcomes to the implementation costs, which are in financial monetary terms 
from the start and which tend to make up a large part of the costs of an intervention. 
Monetisation is also useful as it allows decision makers to assess the overall impacts 
of an intervention in terms that they will be familiar with since return on investment 
figures and other metrics used in business and organisational decision making are 
usually set out in financial or monetary terms.  
 
Monetary valuation is therefore a core component of modern-day policy evaluation 
and so it is critical that we have robust methods for valuing outcomes, goods and 
services and that we continue to develop new methods. Since CBA is welfarist and 
absolutist about this, the key point in CBA is that the money metric/value must only 
represent impacts or changes in welfare associated with the outcomes of the 
intervention. In theory a monetary value is, therefore, simply a measure of how 
people’s welfare changes. How this could be measured in theory and in practice was 
the centre of debate in policy evaluation in the 1800s when the idea of valuation was 
first put forward. It found its solution when CBA was formally conceptualised as an 
offshoot of welfare economics (Backhouse, 2002). John Hicks’ theory of valuation – 
first developed in the 1930s - now sets the fundamental theoretical basis of valuation 
in economics and CBA. The theory, in a nutshell, states that the monetary value of 
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some outcome, good or service is the amount of money that would be required to have 
the same effect on someone’s welfare. Hicks developed two basic measures of value 
known as compensating and equivalent change measures. I will discuss these in detail 
later in the thesis. The theory is a purely abstract one - Hicks did not provide a 
methodological framework for measuring values using this theory. Indeed, initially 
Hicks did not even provide or stipulate what welfare is and how it should be 
measured. 
 
This all came later in economics through the important theoretical work of Paul 
Samuelson’s utility theory, which set preference satisfaction as the central measure of 
welfare.  This led to the development of valuation methods based on people’s choices 
and preferences such as the stated preference approach and the revealed preference 
approach. A third distinct category of valuation methodology is wellbeing valuation 
which was first introduced in 2002. This method moves away from defining welfare 
in terms of preference satisfaction to defining welfare in terms of people’s self-
reported feelings through subjective wellbeing (SWB) measures. It is a method that is 
still in its infancy and is in development, but it promises many key advantages over 
the traditional preference valuation methods.  
 
This thesis focuses on the wellbeing valuation method as an alternative to preference-
based valuation methods with the ultimate aim of developing and improving the 
wellbeing valuation methodology so that it can be applied robustly in CBA, policy 
evaluation and in social value studies conducted outside of Government in the private 
sector. 
 
1.2.  Purpose and scope of the PhD thesis  
 
The literature on wellbeing valuation (WV) to date has focused almost entirely on the 
application of the method to new areas – in other words using the relatively new and 
novel WV approach to value more and more different types of non-market goods and 
services, such as safety (low crime), health, environment and education. Whilst this 
has thrown up many interesting findings, this research trend has come at the expense 
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of a serious attempt to really understand, develop and improve the theory and 
methodology behind WV.  
 
There are a number of important questions and issues regarding WV which have not 
been discussed let alone solved in the literature; it is still unclear how WV relates to 
the economic theory of valuation, how it should be seen against other (traditional) 
valuation methods such as stated preference and revealed preference methods, what 
the key validity and robustness criteria and conditions are, and what the values 
derived from WV really mean. Add to this the significant problem that has been 
highlighted in the literature that the values from WV seem to be implausibly too high 
and inaccurate.  
 
Given the importance currently placed on valuing non-market outcomes, goods and 
services, this thesis examines the wellbeing valuation approach with the aim of 
developing a comprehensive understanding of the method and a new and improved 
methodology to solve for many of the current technical issues related to the approach 
to increase the rigour and robustness of the method and ultimately its application in 
policy evaluation. The aim is to provide a platform for using wellbeing valuation in 
CBA and policy analysis and in social value assessments undertaken by private sector 
companies, which will ultimately itself have a social impact since it will allow us to 
better understand how our actions and policies benefit society and to make decisions 
according to that evidence.  
 
1.2.1. Original contributions of this thesis 
 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to the literature by building on previous 
research in the following ways:  
 
i. Valuation theory. Hicks’ theory of compensating and equivalent surplus is 
the accepted theory for valuing non-market goods in economics. To set the 
context this thesis takes Hicks’ theory as a given and contributes to the 
literature by providing a clear description of how WV aligns with Hicks’ 
valuation theory and under what conditions. I am not aware of any study to 
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date to have done this. This is a critical first step in developing and improving 
the WV method because it provides a theoretical benchmark that values 
derived from WV need to align with in order to be robust.  
 
From this I will develop a full theoretical exposition of the wellbeing valuation 
approach to valuing non-market goods. This will allow me to create a set of 
theoretical conditions and criteria which the WV method is required to adhere 
to in order to produce robust values in line with Hicks’ valuation theory. This 
is a significant contribution to the literature in WV because there does not 
currently exist a set of technical conditions and criteria against which to assess 
WV studies. It is the crucial first step in improving the WV method so that it 
can be used to produce robust values. 
 
ii. Rationale for wellbeing valuation. I build a rationale for using WV to value 
non-market goods and services. This is partly reliant on some of the problems 
with the more traditional preference-based valuation methods as well as the 
unique advantages of WV itself. The problems associated with preference-
based valuation methods are numerous and have been well documented and 
rehearsed in many previous publications. I will provide a summary of the key 
problems which are relevant to the rationale for WV, but also provide some 
new insights and problems related to preference-based valuation methods 
which have not been discussed before.  
 
In developing the rationale for wellbeing valuation I will also use the new 
estimation criteria developed in this thesis for WV to provide a full critique of 
the current wellbeing valuation methodology and studies to date. Whilst there 
have been a number of papers in the past that have provided some critical 
assessment of the method, the critique in this thesis will be more extensive and 
comprehensive developing new ideas and critiques that have not been 
discussed, recognised or understood before. 
 
iii. Development of a new approach to wellbeing valuation – The Three-Step 
Wellbeing Valuation method. The key and main contribution of this thesis is 
the development of a completely new statistical/technical approach for 
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wellbeing valuation. Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation provides a solution to 
the technical problems associated with the method as described in this thesis 
and ensures that the values derived from WV are robust and in line with 
Hicks’ valuation theory. Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation represents a 
significant modification to the WV methodology and no other study in the 
literature to date has used a similar methodology. It is, therefore, a significant 
original contribution to the literature. I demonstrate the new method with a 
labour market case study where I value the non-pecuniary aspects of 
employment. 
 
iv. Interpretation. I provide a full interpretation of values derived from the 
wellbeing valuation approach. This covers many new areas that have not been 
discussed in the literature to date and is an important contribution as it is 
crucial to understand in order to apply the values in the correct way in policy 
evaluations. 
 
Given that the field of research in monetary valuation is wide and ever-growing, it is 
important to state what this thesis will not cover. The thesis will work within the 
current theoretical framework underlying welfare economics and CBA. That is, I do 
not provide a defence of CBA or of Hicksian valuation theory. Although this is an 
important area of research it is out of the scope of this thesis. Hicksian value theory is 
a welfarist approach to valuation and as a consequence in this thesis I do not attempt 
to defend the welfarist paradigm. I take the current methodology as given and discuss 
the role and relative advantages and disadvantages of the wellbeing valuation 
approach within this context.  Also, at a broader or deeper level I do not discuss the 
merits of valuation per se – i.e. whether it is right or wrong to place monetary values 
on things. There is an extensive literature in this area and many of the arguments have 
been captured well in books by Anderson (1995) and Sandel (2013). I will take as my 
starting point that there are good reasons to value things as I have set out in the first 
part of this Chapter. What this means is that I will also not cover recently developed 
proposals to use wellbeing as the evaluation metric rather than monetary values in a 
form of cost-effectiveness analysis whereby costs are compared against the wellbeing 
impacts of a policy or programme (for example see Wright et al., 2017). This thesis is 
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intended to contribute to methodological issues in valuation rather than first-order 
theoretical issues related to monetary valuation.  
 
1.2.2. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is set out as follows. In Chapter 2 I set out the theory of monetary valuation 
in economics. This will act as the core theoretical framework for the whole thesis. As 
we will see valuation theory in economics is based on wellbeing, but it is agnostic 
about the measure of wellbeing used and thus to this end I will follow the theory with 
a discussion of the key measures of wellbeing. I end this chapter by then discussing 
the traditional valuation methods in economics which specifically use what is known 
as the preference satisfaction account or measure of wellbeing. I will review the 
critical literature relating to these methods. Chapter 2 will therefore set the scene in 
terms of what valuation is and how it is defined and where the methods are currently. 
Discussing the key problems of the traditional valuation methods provides important 
rationale for the wellbeing valuation method as an alternative approach to non-market 
valuation; I will show that there are significant problems with the current methods and 
that the field would benefit from a new approach that could solve for these problems. 
 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the wellbeing valuation method. I first set out the underlying 
theory and methodology of the wellbeing valuation method. I then discuss the main 
advantages and disadvantages of the wellbeing valuation approach in comparison to 
preference-based valuation methods and provide the full rationale for wellbeing 
valuation. The chapter ends with a defence specifically of the life satisfaction measure 
that is most frequently employed in wellbeing valuation. Although as I have stated in 
Chapter 1, I do not aim in this thesis to provide a defence of welfarism per se it seems 
appropriate to spend some time discussing the validity of the SWB measure that has 
formed the basis of wellbeing valuation to date. Chapter 3, therefore, builds logically 
from Chapter 2 to introduce a new method - the wellbeing valuation approach - and to 
provide rationale and support for its use in light of the problems with the current more 
traditional valuation methods.  
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Chapter 4 then assesses the current wellbeing valuation method with the aim of 
improving it. I develop a framework for assessing the validity of wellbeing valuation 
studies based on a set of new criteria that I establish in this thesis. I then develop a full 
theoretical approach to measuring values in wellbeing valuation. I end the chapter by 
assessing the current wellbeing valuation methodology against the validity criteria 
that I have developed and demonstrate that there are a number of problems with the 
current wellbeing valuation methodology. 
 
This sets the background for Chapter 5, where I set out a new approach to wellbeing 
valuation, the Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation approach. I derive the estimation 
framework and procedure for Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation and discuss how it 
provides a solution to the key technical challenges in wellbeing valuation and how it 
adheres to the validity criteria set out earlier in the chapter. A key part of the 
estimation process in all wellbeing valuation studies is the estimation of the impact of 
income on SWB. In this chapter I set out a generic model to estimate the impact of 
income in a robust way. This model sits at the core of the Three-Step Wellbeing 
Valuation approach. I argue that Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation provides a more 
robust method of valuing non-market outcomes using subjective wellbeing data and 
one which aligns with Hicks’ value theory. The chapter also provides a detailed 
discussion of how values from wellbeing valuation should be interpreted and used in 
CBA and what their relation is to preference values.  
 
In Chapter 6 I demonstrate the new Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation methodology 
with a case study of employment-related values. Employment outcomes have been 
systematically undervalued in traditional valuation methods and CBA, which have 
tended to focus only on the income-related benefits of employment at the expense of 
missing the important impacts on health, relationships, self-esteem, social stigma and 
personal identity. Wellbeing valuation provides a highly suitable framework for 
picking up and valuing these non-financial benefits, which as Greenberg and Robins 
(2008) argue should be part and parcel of any CBA on employment. I derive values 
associated with moving from unemployment to employment and I show the 
improvements in estimation gained from using Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation in 
comparison to current wellbeing valuation methods.  
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Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter which focuses on the policy implications of the 
findings in this thesis and concluding remarks. I also provide some recommendations 
for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2. Valuation methods 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the important opening setting for the thesis. It provides a 
description of where the field of valuation currently sits, what is wrong with it and 
why it needs improving. 
 
I start by setting out the theory of valuation in economics. This is an uncontested 
theory and is generally the consensus in economics. It provides a barometer or target 
against which the rigour of valuation methods can be assessed and will be referenced 
and discussed numerous times during the thesis. The chapter then goes on to 
describing the traditional valuation methods in economics that use preference as the 
measure of welfare: stated preference and revealed preference valuation methods. It 
finishes with a critique of these methods, which are well-known in economics. This 
provides some of the rationale and reason for exploring and using a different method 
for valuation, wellbeing valuation. Chapter 3 will then go on to set out a full rationale 
for wellbeing valuation, borrowing heavily from the critiques discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
2.2. The theory of valuation in economics 
 
The theory of monetary valuation developed in economics is fully consistent with the 
underlying welfarist paradigm in economics and CBA and is therefore the underlying 
theory of the Green Book and other related policy manuals.  
 
The value of a good or service relates to the impact that it has on human welfare 
(Champ et al., 2003). The theory is rich and there exist a number of possible ways of 
measuring welfare in monetary terms, which all derive from the same fundamental 
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welfarist premise. A good place to start is the money metric measure of welfare. This 
defines some level of welfare, or utility as it is known in economics, in terms of the 
expenditures needed to attain that level of welfare. The standard assumption in 
economics is that individuals maximise a utility function with respect to market and 
non-market goods subject to a budget constraint: 
 
(1) max 
𝑋
𝑈(𝑍, 𝑄)  s.t.  𝑃 ∙ 𝑍 ≤ 𝑀 
 
where 𝑍 = market goods; 𝑄 = non-market goods; 𝑃 = prices and 𝑀 = income.  
 
The dual problem for the individual is to minimise expenditures subject to obtaining a 
given level of utility (𝑈∗): 
 
(2) min 
𝑋
𝑃 ∙ 𝑋   s.t.  𝑈(𝑍, 𝑄) ≥ 𝑈∗ 
 
This produces the expenditure function: 
 
(3) 𝑒 = 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑈∗) 
 
which shows how expenditure changes as a function of the prices of market goods and 
provision of the non-market good, such that the individual continues to maximise 
utility at the level 𝑈∗.  
 
The expenditure function provides a money metric measure of welfare as it shows the 
minimum expenditure required to obtain the same level of welfare (𝑈∗) as with 𝑍 and 
𝑄. This measure of the monetary equivalent of some level of welfare can be used to 
assess the monetary value of changes in welfare due to non-market goods and 
services, which represents the monetary value of the non-market outcomes 
themselves. 
 
Hicks (Hicks and Allen, 1934) set out two measures of monetary value, known 
broadly as compensating and equivalent welfare measures. These can be derived 
from the expenditure function as in equations (4) and (5). Here I will focus on 
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compensating and equivalent surplus rather than variation measures. Surplus 
measures differ from variations in that the latter are calculated after the individual has 
made adjustments to his consumption set (Randall, 1982) and hence relate to price 
changes. Thus compensating/equivalent variation relates to price changes, whilst 
compensating/equivalent surplus relates to quantity or quality changes, which applies 
to non-market outcomes.  
 
(4) CS = 𝑒(𝑃0, 𝑄0, 𝑈0) - 𝑒(𝑃0, 𝑄1, 𝑈0)   
 
(5)  ES = 𝑒(𝑃0, 𝑄0, 𝑈1) - 𝑒(𝑃0, 𝑄1, 𝑈1)   
 
Where CS = compensating surplus, ES = equivalent surplus and the 0 and 1 
superscripts refer to before and after provision/consumption of the non-market good 
(𝑄).  
 
In words, CS is the amount of money, paid or received, that will leave the agent in his 
initial welfare position following a change from the status quo. And ES is the amount 
of money, to be paid or received, that will leave the agent in his subsequent welfare 
position in the absence of a change from the status quo. Here the change is in the form 
of changes to the quantity or quality of non-market goods represented as 𝑄0 → 𝑄1.  
 
There are two important points to note here. First, this is a theory about value to the 
individual. This is known as the primary benefits of non-market outcomes and relate 
to the value of impacts directly on an individual’s welfare. There are also secondary 
benefits that can be valued separately. Secondary benefits relate to impacts that 
benefit society more widely which at some point may be an indirect benefit to the 
individual as well. This mainly encompasses impacts on the economy and public 
purse. This could be, for example, reductions in medical service usage due to 
improved health or increases in tax receipts due to rises in employment.  
 
The two types of benefit are important for different sectors of society and both are 
included in CBA. As individuals it is highly unlikely that we make any personal 
decisions based on secondary benefits – we go to the doctor to get better and not to 
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reduce medical expenditures to the state later on (in fact we increase medical 
expenditures by going to the doctor in the first place) and we care about safety 
primarily because crime has significant adverse effects on our wellbeing and not 
because crime incurs costs to the state (policing, courts, prisons etc). But as policy 
makers or as (civic) individuals in instances where we are making decisions for the 
good of the community or society we also care about secondary benefits since this 
allows us to provide more or better services to people. 
 
The focus of this thesis and of the valuation theory discussed above is on the primary 
benefits to the individual as this is where wellbeing valuation can be employed. 
 
The second point of note is that the theoretical framework can be derived without 
recourse or reference to any concrete measure of welfare as equations (1) to (5) 
demonstrate. And indeed Hicks, in his pioneering work on the theory of value (1934), 
did not initially propose a specific measure of welfare to be used in calculations of CS 
and ES. And so how these measures of value and welfare change would be assessed in 
reality was not clear until economists started to adopt a standard measure of welfare in 
empirical work. This came to be the preference satisfaction account of welfare, to 
which we now turn in the next section. This is in contrast to other forms or theories of 
wellbeing; broadly speaking there are three accounts of human wellbeing (Parfit, 
1984): 
 
1. Mental states and the self-reported experience of the individual. 
2. Preference satisfaction. 
3. Objective lists encompassing normative ideals. 
 
These are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Briefly, mental state accounts of welfare 
are based on people’s self-reports about how their lives are going, whilst the objective 
list account is based on normative assumptions about basic human needs and rights 
(Dolan et al., 2011). The WV method uses the mental state account of welfare and 
hence the basis of this thesis is a comparison between valuation methods that use the 
preference account and those that use the mental state account of welfare. We start 
with an assessment of the preference-based valuation methods before moving on to 
introducing the WV method in the next chapter. 
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2.3. Traditional methods: Preference-based valuation methods  
 
Although Hicks’ pioneering work on the theory of value did not specify how 
‘welfare’ should be defined and measured, work in the early twentieth century by 
economists such as Paul Samuelson and Roy Allen directed economics to what is 
known as the preference satisfaction account of welfare and consequently the theory 
of value followed suit (Hicks, 1934). This move to a preference account of the world 
is termed the 'Paretian turn' by Bruni and Sugden (2007. p.146) in recognition of 
Vilfredo Pareto who had initiated the transition of economics to a theory of rational 
choice. The preference satisfaction account states that “what would be best for 
someone is what would best fulfil his desires” (Parfitt, 1984. p.4).  
 
In what Wong (2006) terms the ‘Samuelson Programme’ we see various economists 
contributing to the revealed preference approach to the theory of consumer behaviour. 
This is a well-known theory that forms the basis of modern economic theory and 
hence will not be discussed in great detail here, but the fundamental premise is that 
under a small set of rationality assumptions embodied in the Axioms of Revealed 
Preference we are able to map choices over a number of binary options on to a well-
defined utility function. Rationality here implies that preferences are:  
 
i. Complete – individuals are able to express a preference for any good or say 
they are indifferent between any pair of goods;  
ii. Transitive – individuals who prefer (or are indifferent to) good x over good y, 
and who prefer (or are indifferent to) good y over good z, must also prefer (or 
be indifferent to) x over z; and  
iii. Reflexive – individuals are indifferent between x and x.  
 
If these assumptions are met then people will behave as if they are maximising some 
utility function. And it is important to note that these are 'assumptions'. Indeed,  
Pareto's integrability problem was that it was not possible to prove that preferences 
are transitive in some commodity space and so transitivity is only a mere "speculative 
hypothesis" (Bruni and Sugden, 2007. p.160) Economists are generally very reluctant 
to make normative claims about agents but if we add a further substantive assumption 
that people act to maximise their own welfare then preference satisfaction, utility and 
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welfare all become synonymous with each other and preferences can be used as the 
basis of welfare in valuation. For the purposes of valuation we need to add two further 
assumptions (Champ et al., 2003): 
 
iv. Non-satiation – that preferences are never fully satiated such that the 
individual always places a positive value on more consumption; and 
v. Substitutability - if the quantity (or quality) of one good decreases it is 
possible to increase the quantity (or quality) of another good sufficiently to 
make the individual indifferent between the two states of the world. 
 
In CBA preferences are usually taken as they are - as actual non-idealised preferences 
(Adler, 2012; Champ et al., 2003), but in practice policy makers may require that 
preferences be informed to some extent for the purposes of policy analysis. Apart 
from these assumptions economics makes no further normative claim about how 
preferences should be. In contrast to Kahneman's (2000) substantive rationality 
criterion - whether preference and choice maximise wellbeing as experienced by the 
individual (Kahneman states that this measure of wellbeing should be a hedonic 
measure) - the early founders of the current approach to rational choice (through 
preference) in economics were not interested in the basis or reasons for preference 
(Bruni and Sugden, 2007). 
 
As Samuelson states welfare economics rests on "one fundamental ethical postulate", 
that "the preferences of individuals are to count in the allocation of resources" (from 
Sagoff, 2003. p.588). Under the preference satisfaction account of welfare, higher 
levels of utility denote a greater number of preferences satisfied. Utility in this sense 
is not observable, but a number of methods exist for measuring welfare change and 
monetary value using preferences.  
 
Under preference valuation methods CS and ES are often rephrased in terms of 
willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) and Table 1 describes the 
relationship between these concepts of value. 
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Table 1. The relationship between CS, ES, WTP and WTA 
 Compensating Surplus (CS) Equivalent Surplus (ES) 
 
Welfare gain 
 
WTP for the positive change 
 
 
WTA to forego the positive change 
 
 
Welfare loss 
 
WTA the negative change 
 
 
WTP to avoid the negative change 
 
As I discuss in more detail below it is important to recognise that technically speaking 
the concepts of WTP and WTA are only relevant to preference-based valuation 
methods. As I will set out later we should not use these terms in WV. 
 
Conceptually there are two distinct ways of measuring CS and ES using preferences: 
(1) Direct approaches (termed income compensation approaches by Randall (1982)) 
measure value directly in terms of the money required to restore some level of 
welfare, whereas (2) Indirect approaches use data on expenditures on related 
marketed goods to infer values for non-market goods and services (Randall, 1982). 
The latter uses the expenditure function framework to achieve this, whilst direct 
approaches can be derived using the direct utility function as I demonstrate below. 
Revealed preference and stated preference methods make up two of the recommended 
valuation methods in the Green Book (2018) and OECD (2018) guidelines. 
 
2.3.1. Revealed preference valuation methods (indirect approaches) 
 
Generally speaking where proxy markets exist the favoured approach is to estimate 
WTP or WTA from people’s market behaviour using revealed preference valuation 
methods. Revealed preference methods uncover estimates of the value of non-market 
goods by using evidence of how people behave in the face of real choices. The basic 
premise is that non-market goods affect the price of market goods in other well-
functioning markets and price differentials in these markets can provide estimates of 
WTP and WTA. This exploits the expenditure function under the assumption of weak 
complementarity whereby the demand for a market good depends on the level of the 
non-market good. There are a number of methods that can be used here and two of the 
most common revealed preference methods are:  
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(i) Hedonic Pricing Method. This involves examining people‘s purchasing decisions 
in markets related to the non-market good in question. The hedonic pricing method 
has most commonly been applied using data from housing and labour markets. In the 
former, the intuition is that the price differential between otherwise identical houses 
that differ in their exposure levels to non-market goods and bads such as pollution, 
noise, crime or education facilities reveals information regarding individuals’ WTP 
for such goods. Labour market applications follow a similar logic, though the focus is 
typically on the compensating wage differentials that are paid in relation to job 
characteristics such as health and safety risks or job security.  
 
(ii) Travel Cost Method. This involves observing costs incurred in the consumption 
of the non-market good in question. The travel cost method has most predominantly 
been used to estimate the value of recreational sites (e.g. a river, a park, or a beach). It 
has also been used to value changes in the characteristics of sites (e.g. ease of access). 
The number of visits to a site by an individual over a period of time is likely to be 
related to the price they have to pay to visit the site, the travel costs incurred, the price 
of substitute sites available to them, and their income. This information can be used to 
model demand curves and hence WTP for the sites. 
 
Behaviour can also be observed through the actions people take to insulate themselves 
from things that lower their utility and this forms the basis for the defensive 
expenditure method for non-market valuation. For example, in response to traffic 
noise or air pollution, households may purchase double glazed windows or hire 
window cleaners. Therefore, expenditures on market goods can be related to levels of 
non-market bads. 
 
Revealed preference is an indirect method because it utilises the expenditure function 
to circumvent the need to observe or measure utility. Under the assumption that the 
non-market good is an argument in the demand function for market goods, market 
data (prices and quantities consumed) can be used to “reveal the welfare impact of 
changes in Q [the non-market good]” (Randall, 1982. p. 152). 
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2.3.2. Stated preference valuation methods (direct approaches) 
 
Although economists are generally very wary of self-reported or non-behavioural data 
due to incentive compatibility issues very often proxy markets do not exist for the 
non-market good in question and hence we may need to ask people about their WTP 
or WTA instead. This makes up the basis of so-called stated preference valuation 
methods, which use surveys to ask people directly about the value they place on a 
good or some attributes of a good.  
 
Contingent valuation methods construct and present a hypothetical market to 
questionnaire respondents. A detailed description of a good, how it will be provided, 
and the method and frequency of payment are usually highlighted. Following this, 
questions are posed in order to infer a respondent's WTP or WTA. These valuation 
questions can be presented in a number of different ways, including open ended, 
bidding game, payment card, and dichotomous choice elicitation formats.  
 
Contingent valuation questionnaires also normally contain additional questions to 
gain information on a respondent‘s socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, 
their attitudes towards the good, and the reasons behind their stated valuations. The 
responses to these questions are typically used to model the determinants of stated 
valuations so that econometric analysis can be used to filter out the proportion of 
WTP (or WTA) related directly to the good. 
 
Non-market goods can also be described by their attributes. For example, a scheme to 
reduce sewage overflows into the River Thames could be described by the resultant 
reduction in fish deaths, health risks, and visual disamenity (Mourato et al., 2005).  
 
Choice modelling methods focus on a good‘s attributes and their values. To uncover 
valuation estimates, choice modelling questionnaires present respondents with a series 
of alternative descriptions of a good. The alternative descriptions are constructed by 
varying the levels of the good‘s attributes. Depending on the specific choice 
modelling method adopted, respondents are either then asked to rank (contingent 
ranking), chose (choice experiments), rate (contingent rating), or choose then rate 
(paired comparisons) the descriptions presented (Hanley and Shogren, 2005). For 
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these methods, as long as cost or price is included as an attribute, statistical techniques 
can be used to recover WTP estimates for the other attributes of the good. 
 
Stated preference is a direct method in that it seeks to directly estimate the amount of 
money that compensates or equates to the change in welfare due to the non-market 
good. For example, the following functions can be used to estimate CS for a non-
market good: 
 
(6) 𝑈(𝑄0, 𝑀0) = 𝑈(𝑄1, 𝑀0 − 𝐶𝑆) 
(here CS = WTP for the positive change 𝑄0 → 𝑄1) 
 
(7) 𝑈(𝑄1, 𝑀0) = 𝑈(𝑄0, 𝑀0 + 𝐶𝑆)  
(here CS = WTA for the negative change 𝑄1 → 𝑄0) 
 
In stated preference CS (the solutions to equations (6) and (7)) is estimated from 
people’s stated WTP and WTA. Although we cannot directly observe utility (𝑈) in 
equations (6) and (7), stated preference represents a much more direct approach 
targeting estimates of WTP/WTA without recourse to market data. In this set up we 
are reliant on the respondent accurately estimating the welfare change due to the non-
market good and the amount of money required to produce the equivalent impact on 
wellbeing. This is an identifying assumption in stated preference because it is not 
something that can be tested.   
 
2.4. Critiques of preference-based valuation methods 
 
Preference-based valuation methods have been found to suffer from a number of 
problems. The literature in this area is extensive and includes whole special edition 
journal publications devoted to it. Since these problems have been well-documented 
in the literature I will cover the main critiques that are relevant to this thesis and the 
comparison ultimately to wellbeing valuation. These critiques form the first part of 
the rationales for wellbeing valuation that will I develop in subsequent chapters.  
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The problems related to preference-based valuation methods can be categorised in to 
those that (a) critique the validity, rigour and usefulness of preference as a measure of 
welfare per se, which has implications beyond valuation for any application of 
preference such as quality adjusted life year analysis in health economics, and those 
that (b) have found technical problems and issues in the methods themselves. The first 
category of critiques fundamentally questions whether it is right to use preferences in 
valuation and the second category demonstrates that even if we accept preference as a 
measure of welfare for valuation we run into a number of technical problems when 
applying preferences in RP and SP approaches. 
 
2.4.1. Substantive critiques of the preference satisfaction account of welfare 
 
The preference satisfaction account of welfare has come under increasing attack from 
the behavioural economics sub-discipline and the fields of the psychological sciences 
that underpin it. The following critiques focus on the extent to which preference can 
be relied on as a measure of welfare. This is clearly an important issue for valuation 
methods that use preferences, but it also has wider implications in relation to the use 
of preference per se in policy analysis. This thesis does not cover the latter as the 
focus is on valuation methods. 
 
Sagoff (2003) argues that preferences may not fundamentally align with individual 
welfare. An individual's preference may have all sorts of motives. Findings from 
experimental research suggests that people are committed to goals other than their 
own welfare, especially when making choices about policy (Sagoff, 2003).  Similarly, 
Sen (1977) discusses the issue of choice based on 'commitment values', whereby a 
person chooses an act that yields a lower level of welfare in order to fulfil and 
commitment.  
 
RP and SP methods both suffer from the fundamental problem of the context 
sensitivity of preferences. Although traditionally economists have tended to see 
preferences as stable, consistent and uniform, a large and growing literature in the 
decision sciences has shown that preferences can be highly context-dependent (see 
Slovic and Lichtenstein, 2006); they can often be biased by irrelevant factors, which 
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mean that what people want may not always align well with what is best for them. 
Experimental evidence suggests that context sensitivity is equally problematic for RP 
and SP methods (Carlsson, 2010). 
 
There are countless experimental studies in this area and so it is out of the scope of 
this thesis to provide a full dissection of the results here. Instead, I provide a 
discussion of the main findings, which will provide the basis and rationale for the new 
approach proposed in this thesis, which uses measures of people's self-reported 
wellbeing to value non-market goods rather than their preferences. 
 
1. If preferences are to be accurate indicators of our welfare it is obvious that people 
need to accurately predict how much they will like in the future the thing that they 
show a preference for now (Kahneman, 2000). But numerous experiments have 
shown that people are unable to accurately predict the pleasure or benefits they will 
get from different goods and services (Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999; Loewenstein 
and Adler, 1995; Read and van Leeuwen, 1998; Simonson, 1990; Loewenstein et al., 
2003; Wilson and Gilbert, 2003) and this is true even for everyday goods such as 
music and ice cream (Kahneman and Snell, 1992). In Kahneman and Snell's (1992) 
study participants were asked to consume yogurt and their favourite flavour of ice 
cream and to listen to their favourite music each day for a week. They rated their 
liking of the goods after each consumption and also predicted their liking and 
enjoyment of the goods for the following day. Correlations between predicted and 
actual enjoyment were negligible even in relatively large sample sizes. Nisbett and 
Kanouse (1969) and Read and van Leeuwen (1998) find evidence that shoppers who 
have recently eaten cannot forecast their future food consumption and appetites 
accurately.  
 
Prediction errors are exacerbated when the temporal gap is long (ie, when they try to 
predict preferences far into the future) and when the agent’s circumstances vary over 
the period (Kahneman and Thaler, 2006). One of the drivers of this phenomenon is 
that people are unable to predict how much they will adapt to different things and 
circumstances in the future. They therefore tend to over-estimate the utility gain that 
will result from events, circumstances or outcomes (Kahneman and Thaler, 2006; 
Loewenstein and Adler, 1995). Frey and Stutzer (2004), for example, argue that 
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people underestimate how quickly they will adapt to extrinsic goods, such as money. 
They, therefore, end up sacrificing too many intrinsic goods, such as time with family 
and friends, for time spent at work and commuting. Schkade and Kahneman (1998) 
present evidence that people are not able to predict the satisfaction they would derive 
from moving from the Midwest to California. Individuals tended to focus on one or 
two salient aspects associated with California, such as the weather (which in reality 
does not feature so saliently in people‘s actual day-to-day lives), when forecasting 
utility. 
 
Asking people about how something will affect their lives or about their preferences 
between different states of the world often leads to a focussing illusion (Kahneman et 
al., 2006; Schkade and Kahneman, 1998), whereby at the time of preference 
elicitation people are focusing only on the salient aspects of the condition and this 
may not reflect in any way how people would actually experience these conditions or 
states in real life. The fundamental problem is that what we focus on in a preference 
question is often not what we focus our attention on in the actual experiences of our 
lives, where lots of other phenomena vie for our attention and we may adapt to certain 
things. (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). As Kahneman (2012) puts it "nothing is as 
important as you think it is when you are thinking about it." 
 
Gilbert puts these welfare or utility mis-predictions down to a presentism heuristic, 
whereby people generally find it hard to predict how much they will like something 
and use a short cut method of simply projecting current tastes and desires on to their 
predicted future preferences.   
 
Finally, Kahneman (2000) states that retrospective evaluations of previous 
experiences are the main sources of predictions of future outcomes and quality of 
experience. But these memories are fallible because of the peak-end rule, whereby 
people tend to remember the quality of an experience by the most extreme affect and 
the experiences during the final moments of the activity. This can lead to duration 
neglect, whereby the remembered quality of an experience is not dependent on the 
duration of the episode. "Affective peaks and endings are more salient than duration 
in the cognitive representation of events" (Kahneman, 2000. p.769).  
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Whatever the driver behind these mis-predictions may be, it is clear that current 
contextual factors will have big effects on how much we state or reveal we prefer 
something.  
 
2. The fundamental assumption behind the use of preferences as indicators of welfare 
is that they are rational preferences. As discussed, this allows us to map people's 
choices on to well-defined utility functions. Adding a non-satiation assumption then 
allows us to use rational preferences for the purposes of valuing non-market goods. A 
key axiom of the rationality assumptions is that preferences are transitive. This simply 
means that individuals who prefer (or are indifferent to) good x over good y, and who 
prefer (or are indifferent to) good y over good z, must also prefer (or be indifferent to) 
x over z.  
 
The transitivity and rationality axioms are severely challenged by the phenomenon of 
preference reversals.  This is when someone or a group of people initially shows a 
preference for A over B, but then when the same information about A and B is 
presented in slightly different ways they prefer B to A. Preference reversals violate 
the rationality assumptions making it difficult to judge which state of the world 
ultimately makes the individual better off.  
 
One of the first and certainly one of the most famous examples of preference reversals 
was found in Slovic and Lichtenstein’s 1971 (see Slovic and Lichtenstein, 2006) 
experiments on preferences over different gambles. People were offered two different 
bets of the same expected value; a probability bet (high probability of winning a small 
amount – eg, an 80% chance of winning $5) and a dollar bet (low probability of 
winning a large payout - eg, a 10% chance of winning $40). In lab experiments as 
well as field experiments in casinos the overwhelming majority of people chose to 
play probability bets over dollar bets, but when both of the bets were given to them 
and they were asked to sell them back to the House, the majority assigned higher 
prices (higher WTA values) to the dollar bet - ie, they preferred the dollar bet when 
selling back to the house. This was explained by people using different information 
under the two tasks; people put an emphasis on probabilities when making a choice 
and then conversely they put an emphasis on payout when stating a price. 
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Another example is preference reversals under separate versus joint evaluation modes, 
made famous by Hsee's work (e.g. Hsee, 1998; Hsee and Hastie, 2006). Here people 
use different aspects of the same information set when jointly evaluating a good (say 
two different TV sets) rather than evaluating it on its own. Hsee's (2000) music 
dictionary study asked students to state their WTP values for the following two music 
dictionaries. 
 
 
 
Respondents were assigned to three different groups: i) subjects who were shown both 
dictionary descriptions and asked to state their WTP for each (joint evaluation mode); 
ii) subjects who were shown dictionary A only and asked to state their WTP for that 
dictionary (separate evaluation mode); and iii) subjects who were shown dictionary B 
only and asked to state their WTP for that dictionary (separate evaluation mode).The 
mean WTP values for the two dictionaries are shown in the table below. 
 
 
 
Under joint evaluation, people state a higher value for dictionary B. However, under 
separate valuation, dictionary A attracts the highest stated value. These joint 
evaluation– separate evaluation preference reversals can be explained by some simple 
heuristics. In separate evaluation people focus on the categorical attributes of the 
good, in this case 'whether the dictionary has any defects’. In joint evaluation, 
attention is focused on the incremental aspects or differences in the goods, in this case 
'the number of additional entries’. 
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In a well-documented study two economists, Grether and Plott (1979), criticised the 
previous work on preference reversals by psychologists and replicated the 
experiments introducing improved incentive compatibility, a wider and more varied 
range of participants and more information for participants. However, the preference 
reversal phenomenon did not disappear.  
 
Importantly, preference reversals have also been found in contingent valuation 
surveys for environmental goods and amenities (Irwin et al., 1993; Gregory et al., 
1993; Brown, 1984) and safety programmes (Slovic et al., 2002).  
 
Slovic et al. (2002) employed a phenomenon known as proportion dominance. People 
attach greater weight to information formats that use proportions, percentages or 
probabilities, rather than absolute figures because these formats put the outcome 
dimension into perspective. Proportional formats have upper and lower bounds which 
allow people to place where a given value falls (Slovic et al., 2002). In a study on 
airport safety equipment, people in different groups were offered equipment that, in 
the event of a crash landing, would (i) save 150 lives or would (ii) save 98% of 150 
lives (147 lives in total). In general people placed a higher willingness to pay or value 
on the equipment that saved less lives. In fact it was found that saving 98%, 95%, 
90% and 85% of 150 lives were all more valuable options than saving 150 lives. 
 
The manner in which information is presented has a huge impact on people's 
preferences and their willingness to pay for an outcome/good. The presentational 
issues described here should be irrelevant to the choices that people make and the 
value that they place on outcomes because fundamentally people have access to the 
same underlying information. The problems related to preference reversals means that 
it is quite possible for survey developers and enumerators to force or induce the 
results they want in stated preference studies and this is a huge problem for preference 
valuation methods.  
 
Smith and Moore (2010) discuss some evidence (albeit from laboratory experiments 
rather than real-world market settings) to show that the presence of irrational agents 
(those holding inconsistent preferences) can distort market efficiencies and 
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performance. This has implications for using revealed preference methods with 
market data. 
 
It is important to note that even if preferences are rational (coherent), we may still 
want to reject them if they do not align with welfare and this could be due to the 
effects of utility mis-predictions discussed above. Kahneman calls this a new 
substantive rationality challenge for preferences.  
 
3. The environment in which people are placed can also provide some other cues or 
nudges in regards to their preferences. People tend to systematically anchor their 
values for non-market goods on irrelevant numbers or cues that appear in the 
environment at the time. This applies to both real market scenarios and to SP. For 
example, real estate agents are influenced by random house listing price anchors when 
valuing a property (Northcraft and Neale, 1987). 
 
Ariely et al. (2003) found, for example, that people's WTP for a range of everyday 
consumer goods and their WTA values for small annoyances, such as high pitched 
sounds, were heavily anchored around their social security (SS) numbers. People were 
asked to write down the last two digits of their SS number and were then asked 
whether they would be willing to pay or accept a value equal to that number. Values 
were then increased or reduced from the initial SS number anchor until the 
respondents' maximum (minimum) WTP (WTA) values were derived. US SS 
numbers are randomly generated, which means that they could not provide any 
information on the quality of the good. In general, people with higher SS numbers 
were willing to pay significantly more for the goods. An interesting second finding 
was a marked stability of relative preference. For example, although people's absolute 
valuations of a superior and inferior wine were subject to normatively irrelevant 
number anchors, the vast majority of people valued the highly rated product more 
than the inferior product. Therefore, the evidence suggests that people did not know 
how much they were truly WTP for each of the wines, but they did know that they 
were WTP more for the superior wine. This, and other evidence, lead the authors to 
claim that people's preferences and valuations were coherently arbitrary; "consumers’ 
absolute valuation of experienced goods is surprisingly arbitrary, even under "full 
information" conditions. However, consumers’ relative valuations of different 
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amounts of the good appear orderly, as if supported by demand curves derived from 
fundamental preferences" (Ariely et al., 2003. p.74). 
 
In wine tasting experiments, Plassmann et al. (2007) found that actual (neurological) 
experience of the good (wine) measured under functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) was primed by price anchors. Plassmann et al. (2007) gave the same wine to 
different groups, manipulating only the price tag across the groups. They found that 
reported experience/pleasantness and activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex 
(mOFC) (a key area of the brain associated with experienced pleasantness) both 
increased with price (although the wine was identical).  
 
WTP values have also been shown to be affected by the pleasantness of the room, 
smells and moods of the respondent (Poundstone, 2010). Sadness leads to higher 
WTP values because the emotion signifies that things are not great and we need to 
change our circumstances, whereas disgust leads to lower WTA amounts as it tells us 
to get rid of current possessions (Hastie and Dawes, 2010; Bleichrodt, 1997). 
 
The anchoring effect leads to a number of well-documented problems in SP valuation. 
Firstly, estimates derived through the bidding game format have been found to be 
subject to starting point effects: The higher the opening offer is, the larger the 
valuation estimates are. And second, estimates found under the payment card 
elicitation format have been found to be sensitive to range effects: A presented range 
of £0-100, for example, would attract higher valuation estimates than a range of £0-
50.   
 
Duborg et al. (1997), for example, report results from an SP study for the UK 
Department of Transport that looked at the value people attach to reductions in the 
risk of road injuries. In an elicitation format similar to the bidding game, they found 
that a £75 starting point resulted in mean WTP estimates around 1.89 to 2.87 times as 
large as those elicited with a £25 starting point. They also employed a payment card 
elicitation format; using a range from £0 to £500 for one sample and from £0 to 
£1,500 for another. They found that the latter range generated higher WTP estimates. 
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4. Contextual factors can also help to explain the odd findings that have emerged 
under the broad title of embedding effects in the SP literature. There are three types of 
embedding effect:  
 
i) Insensitivity to scope  
This refers to when the estimated WTP for a non-market good is insensitive to the 
size of that good. For instance, Desvousges et al. (1992) found no significant 
difference in the mean levels of WTP to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 migrating 
birds from death. Scope insensitivity has been discovered in a number of other 
applications. Schulze et al. (2018) discover little difference in the estimated WTP for 
a partial or complete clean-up of a contaminated area; McFadden and Leonard (1993) 
find that residents in four western states are willing to pay only 28% more to protect 
57 wilderness areas in those states compared to the protection of a single area;  Jones-
Lee et al. (1995) find that reducing the number of non-fatal road injuries by a factor of 
three only increases the stated WTP for a programme by 29%; and Hutchinson et al. 
(1995) find insensitivity to WTP for increases in life expectancy in normal health for 
the respondent and all members of their immediate household. The mean WTP for an 
extra 6 months was just over 30% higher than an extra 1 month.  
 
Ariely et al. (2003) claim that scope insensitivity is further evidence of coherent 
arbitrariness because insensitivity to scope is most dramatic in studies that use 
between-subject designs. Within-subject design studies produce valuations that are far 
more responsive to scale. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) argue that insensitivity to 
scope is explained by respondents putting forward their WTP for the moral 
satisfaction of contributing to public goods, rather than their true valuation of the 
good. Another explanation (Kahneman et al., 1999) is that insensitivity to scope 
reflects respondents expressing an affective valuation of a prototypical exemplar. 
Here, affective valuation refers to assessments of preference on the basis of "the sign 
and intensity of the emotional response to objects". (Kahneman et al., 1999. p.204). In 
the study by Desvousges et al. (1992) cited above, for example, under this 
psychological hypothesis respondents would have formed a "mental representation of 
a prototypical incident, perhaps an image of an exhausted bird, its feathers soaked in 
black oil, unable to escape" (Kahneman et al., 1999. p.213) and they would have then 
responded on the basis of their affective valuation of this image. 
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ii) Sub-additivity effects  
These effects occur when the estimated WTP for one good plus the estimated WTP 
for another good is greater than the estimated willingness-to-pay when respondents 
are asked to value both goods together (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992).  
 
iii) Sequencing effects  
These effects have been found when more than one good has been valued in a survey 
and the estimated value of a good differs according to where in the sequence it is 
presented to the respondent. The estimated WTP for a good has been found to fall the 
later in the sequence that it is presented (Samples and Hollyer, 1990).  
 
It has been argued that insensitivity to scope findings are idiosyncratic and/or that the 
studies that have obtained such results are flawed in terms of survey design 
(Whittington et al., 1992; Carson et al., 2001). For example, the finding of 
insensitivity to scope should not be surprising if the description presented is not 
adequate to enable the respondent to distinguish between the smaller and larger good 
or if the survey emphasises they symbolic nature of providing the good. Another 
potential explanation is that individuals are running up against a budget constraint, so 
that they value the larger good more but they are unable to pay required multiple. 
However, Loomes (2006) notes that contingent valuation studies formed with WTA 
questions have also found insensitivity to scope.  
 
Sequencing effects and sub-additivity effects have also been argued to be explainable 
with reference to income effects (Hoehn and Randall, 1989; Carson et al., 2001). 
Intuitively, each new good obtained reduces the income available for respondents to 
spend on other goods. Given this, the later in the overall package that a good is 
offered, the less people can spend on it.  
 
This all further supports the notion that context matters for preferences and in 
preference valuation studies like contingent valuation. Context is likely to matter 
because the task of stating a WTP or WTA value in SP is a cognitively demanding 
one. Recall that in SP we are reliant on the survey respondent calculating the point at 
which he is indifferent between the money amount and the good. This will provide us 
the exact amount of money that produces the same effect on his welfare as the good in 
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question. In a seminal piece of work Mosteller & Nogee (1951) offered bets with 
different probabilities of winning. Participants had to accept or reject a simple binary 
gamble with a probability of 2/3 to loose 5 cents and a probability of 1/3 to win a 
particular amount. The winning amount varied between 5 cents and 16 cents. As the 
expected value of the win increased more people opted in to the bet. The study tested 
many different psychological phenomena, but the interesting finding for valuation 
was that where the expected losses and gains were close or nearly equal participants 
took a lot longer to make their minds up as to whether they were going to take the bet 
found. In other words, when we approach a point of indifference people take longer to 
decide implying that the cognitive burden increases. This suggests that if people are 
answering SP survey questions like we want them to (in accordance with economic 
theory), then this is a very cognitively demanding task - it is likely to be even more 
demanding than the experiment in Mosteller and Nogee (1951) because we are often 
dealing with non-market goods that people know very little about in SP. In support of 
this theme, (Whittington et al., 1992) undertook a contingent valuation study in 
Nigeria asking about WTP for communal water supply in rural areas. They found that 
that giving participants time to think in SP studies (a full day instead of a few 
minutes) significantly impacts on WTP figures because it allows people to think over 
the issue in more detail.  
 
A well-known conclusion from the psychological literature is that people tend to use 
heurisitcs or shortcuts to aide the decision-making process when faced with novel and 
complex problems and data. Stating or deriving WTP/WTA figures is complex and 
demanding and it can be argued that people use contextual cues and primes in 
heuristic decision-making processes to respond in SP studies (and to some extent in 
their market decisions).  
 
5. Related to the context-sensitivity critiques, Sagoff (2003) claims something even 
more fundamental - that it is not possible to 'observe’ preference. In welfare 
economics preference does not "cause or pre-exist choice; rather it is derived and 
inferred from it".  The key point is that preference is seen as a "theoretical construct" 
that is inferred from the selections and choices individuals make among a set of 
alternatives (Sagoff, 2003. p.591), but the alternatives or "choice sets" available to the 
individual at the time of choice are unknown to the economist (Sagoff, 2003. p.594). 
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Sagoff (2003) describes a number of examples to put over the point, the most vivid of 
which is his description of his recent purchase of eight boxes of cookies from a girl 
scout for $20. An economics perspective would take this to signify that Sagoff prefers 
(and values) a box of cookies at least as much as $2.50. It turned out, however, that 
Sagoff actually dislikes cookies and gave them all to his office colleagues; the $20 
had nothing to do with his preferences for cookies.  Sagoff claims that the $20 may 
instead have signified the value he holds towards goodwill in the local community or 
towards supporting the scouts. Thus, from this behaviour we cannot decipher whether 
the choice for Sagoff was between (i) the cookies versus $20; (ii) community 
goodwill versus $20; (iii) supporting the girl scouts versus $20; or (iv) a mixture of all 
of the above versus $20. The value is dependent on the alternatives present to the 
individual at the time of the decision and these alternatives are not observable to the 
analyst. A choice, therefore, can reveal the preference and value of anything the 
analyst stipulates it to be and Sagoff concludes that, therefore, preference cannot 
provide the basis for CBA.  
 
This context-sensitivity of preference in relation to the alternatives and choice sets on 
offer leads Koszegi and Rabin (2008) to conclude that welfare analysis requires 
additional data in the form of happiness or subjective wellbeing metrics. 
 
There are also some issues outside of context-sensitivity. For example, although 
preferences are generally left as they are and are not laundered in any way in RP and 
SP studies (i.e. there is no requirement on idealised preferences), we expect people to 
have a sufficient level of information about the good, but this is not always the case 
(Frey and Stutzer, 2005; Stutzer and Frey, 2004a; Stutzer and Frey, 2004b; Robinson 
and Hammitt, 2011). Also, specifically for SP, people may not fully understand the 
details of the payment system (Braga and Starmer, 2005). This all means that 
respondents can be manipulated by the information provided during the SP survey. 
The bias generated by non-neutrality in presentation is termed information bias.  
 
Second, face-to-face or telephone surveys also create the potential for interviewer bias 
if respondents deviate from their true preferences under influence exerted by the 
interviewer. Information problems will lead people's preferences and their welfare 
impacts to misalign.  
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And finally on the issue of preference and welfare misalignment, Sagoff (2000) 
makes the case that preference cannot be used for policy analysis and decisions 
because “if the preference – or the associated WTP – has no clear relation to 
wellbeing…, society has no prima facie reason to seek to satisfy it” (p.1428). He goes 
on to conclude in emphatic terms stating that “that people are willing to pay more for 
one outcome than another… tells us nothing beyond that fact – nothing further and 
therefore nothing whatever about the relative value of that outcome”. “Since WTP 
correlates with no independently defined conception of the good (such as happiness), 
what is that point of measuring it?” (Sagoff, 2000. p.1430). In a similar manner to 
Koszegi and Rabin (2008), Sagoff (2000) calls for welfare analysis in the form of 
WTP to take account of welfare more explicitly but in a novel way; Sagoff 
recommends that instead of asking people their WTP for some non-market good, we 
should ask them to state their WTP for the welfare change associated with the 
provision of the non-market good.  
 
With this recommendation in mind in Dolan and Fujiwara (2012) we surveyed 1,001 
adults who had recently completed an adult learning or training course. In the survey 
we asked how much people would be willing to pay per month (for one year) for a 
course or training that gave them a range of different benefits. In total we asked about 
10 different benefits, such as a course that “Led to a certificate or qualification” or 
that “Enabled you to improve your knowledge or skills” and so on. We also asked 
about the WTP for a course that “Improved your happiness on a day-to-day basis” 
and for one that “Made you more satisfied with your life overall”. In terms of 
outcomes, life satisfaction ranked second out of 10 and happiness was sixth 
(“Progress in work or a career” was first), meaning that using wellbeing explicitly in 
the WTP question had the tendency to reduce WTP values for training courses, which 
is good news in light of the issues of hypothetical bias discussed below. Importantly, 
the number of non-responses (‘don’t knows’) and zero (£0) WTP values – two key 
tests of the validity of a contingent valuation study – were not any higher for the life 
satisfaction and happiness WTP questions than the other 8 outcomes, which suggests 
that Sagoff’s recommendations can be applied in practice. For Sagoff this would 
ensure that preference and WTP have a meaningful connection to wellbeing. This 
early paper acted as a first bridge for me between preference satisfaction and 
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wellbeing valuation and demonstrated that wellbeing data and concepts can be applied 
to valuation. 
 
The findings and recommendations stemming from this literature set out some 
rationale for the greater use of SWB data in policy analysis to solve for some of the 
main substantive problems related to the preference satisfaction account of welfare. 
 
2.4.2. Technical critiques of the preference satisfaction account for valuation 
 
This section focuses on specific problems that have been found in the RP and SP 
valuation literature and therefore focuses on a more narrow set of issues than those 
covered in the previous section which looked at the critiques of the preference 
satisfaction account of welfare per se. 
 
1. Choi et al. (2011) use an experimental setting to test the extent to which individual 
choice behaviour complies with economic preference rationality assumptions. Here 
choice behaviour complies with rationality assumptions if there exists a well-defined 
utility function that choices maximise. Subjects were presented with a binary choice 
under risk with varying levels of financial payouts. The authors found that less than 
half of the sample of people exhibited choices that came close to satisfying rationality 
assumptions. There were some respondents who have “very high error propensities” 
(Choi et al., 2011. p.27). High-income and high-education subjects displayed greater 
levels of consistency and younger subjects were better utility maximisers in their 
choices. They conclude that the heterogeneity in utility-maximising performance 
suggests that “there are circumstances when revealed preferences may not be ‘true’ 
preferences. If so, then positive predictions and welfare conclusions based on revealed 
preferences may be misleading” (p.8). I would also add these problems also apply to 
stated preference methods. 
 
2. RP approaches are limited by the number of proxy markets available that can reveal 
something meaningful about the value of a non-market good and by the fact that the 
proxy market in question needs to be functioning well. For example, the values that 
we place on clean air, improved mental health and protection of endangered species 
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may not show up in any of our market transactions. And even if they may in theory 
show up (e.g. cleaner air could contribute to house prices), they may not in practice if 
we are unaware of the non-market good when making market decisions. CBA tends to 
take actual preferences (rather than some account of idealised preference), and so 
well-informed consumers in related markets is one implicit pre-requisite for RP 
valuation. The market itself also needs to be sensitive to changes or levels in the non-
market good. For example, valuation of environmental amenities like clean air or 
noise is not possible where there are state-related interventions in the market such as 
caps on house rental prices. With rental caps houses in clean and quite areas may be 
restricted from increasing in price. 
 
SP methods get around these problems by creating a hypothetical market, with full 
information about the good. This allows us, in theory, to estimate values for any type 
of non-market good, but with the downside that in SP we are working in hypothetical 
market scenarios with reduced incentive compatibility, which can create problems of 
its own. 
 
3. CS and ES are estimates of Hicksian surplus. Hicksian surplus is derived from the 
substitution effect and is the theoretically appropriate measure because it  
captures the monetary amount required to hold each individual’s utility constant. 
While some applications have made attempts to recover compensated measures, RP 
methods like travel cost and hedonic market methods typically estimate and report 
changes in Marshallian surplus, which differs from Hicksian surplus in that it picks up 
the income effect as well. Although, in practice, income effects are likely to be small 
in non-market valuation settings this is still an important point to bear in mind about 
RP methods. 
 
4. There may be cases when individuals hold lexical preference orderings for non-
market goods, whereby a reduction in the non-market good cannot be compensated 
for by an increase in income and consumption of market goods. This represents a 
violation of the substitutability assumption for valuation and in such cases no finite 
WTA (or WTP) amount exists for the non-market good (Adler, 2012; Adler and 
Posner, 2008). 
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5. Specifically to SP methods, asking survey respondents for a WTP or WTA figure 
can change the subsequent perceptions and values associated with the non-market 
good (Sandel, 2003). This means that if we ask people their WTP (WTA) and 
subsequently undertake the policy intervention, what they actually experience could 
be different to what we would expect based on the contingent valuation survey results 
or we may not be able to value a non-market good with contingent valuation in an 
(economic) theory-consistent way. One interesting example of where this happens is 
in ‘NIMBY’ (Not In My Back Yard) policy interventions, such as nuclear waste 
disposal, power plants, airports, prisons and so on. In the US states that have used 
compensation schemes for NIMBY sitings have not experienced much success 
(Arrow et al., 1993; Frey et al., 1996). Citizens recognise that, although there are 
negative externalities involved for the local community, these projects are socially 
desirable and Frey et al. (1996) find that in the case of a proposed new nuclear waste 
repository in the small village of Wolfenschiessen (Switzerland) a slight majority of 
the villagers (50.8%) voted in favour of the project. However, when a monetary 
compensation package was offered to the villagers support for the project dropped by 
more than a half. The negative effects of the compensation package come about 
because people feel that the compensation acts as a bribe (the bribe effect) and 
because monetary compensation deprives people of satisfying pro-social feelings and 
behaviours (crowding out of public spirit effect) Frey et al. (1996). The compensation 
on offer is essentially a WTA amount and the latter effect is a case of where monetary 
valuation (in the form of WTA) changes the perceptions of the good. In the case of 
NIMBY projects a contingent valuation survey would not be able to find a finite 
WTA figure for such projects, although people may often be willing to accommodate 
them - as Frey et al. (1996) find people show support for these projects in referendum-
type voting and in-kind compensation schemes have been found to be more effective 
in garnering support for NIMBYs than monetary compensation. It is, therefore, the 
monetisation that is problematic and this has implications for stated preference 
methods.  
 
Also, relatedly, economic theory relies heavily on comparative statics in partial 
equilibrium, holding preferences constant (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). This is certainly 
the norm for valuation in CBA (OECD, 2018).  But preferences - and hence value - 
may change as a result of provision or experience of the non-market good, and this 
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would only be acknowledged properly if people were able to forecast this preference-
changing outcome in advance when stating or revealing a preference. This is very 
similar to the concept of adaptation, but there are some differences. For example, 
those who adapt to severe obesity or paraplegia may do so by changing their daily 
activities to adapt whilst their actual preferences have not changed in any significant 
way - eg, they still have a preference for and would like to be able to play tennis and 
basketball etc .   
 
6. People find it difficult to convert a feeling or concept of value on to a monetary 
scale (Loewenstein and Schkade, 2003). In this interpretation people could have 
strong and well-defined references, beliefs and feelings for many of the things that are 
not sold through markets, but these beliefs are not represented monetarily (Gregory et 
al., 1993). Amir et al. (2008) find a disparity between people’s WTP and their 
predicted experience or utility of goods like music concerts. Kahneman et al. (1998) 
found that in a juror award experiment in which people studied a number of corporate 
malpractice cases and were asked to rate the defendant’s (the corporation) actions on 
a scales of ‘outrage’ and ‘degree of punishment justified’, there were strong 
correlations between the level of outrage and punishment across the different jurors, 
but the dollar awards had very little correlation. This is supported by a study by 
Malouff and Schutte (1989) who find that juror awards are highly susceptible to the 
anchoring effect of the plaintiff’s initial level of compensatory demand (presumably 
because the jurors had no concrete idea of what the dollar compensation amount 
should be). 
 
7. There exists a set of survey-related biases inherent to SP methods. The embedding 
effects and interviewer and information bias discussed above are themselves survey-
related biases. In addition, SP surveys may suffer from,  
 
(i) Hypothetical bias 
The hypothetical nature of the good in question and the payment mechanism can lead 
to inflated values in surveys and it is widely believed that individuals overstate their 
valuation of a good by a factor of two to three when comparing hypothetical versus 
actual payments for goods (Murphy et al., 2005). One reason is attributed to non-
commitment bias; respondents may overstate their true WTP because they do not face 
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a budget constraint and do not consider substitute goods within the world of the 
hypothetical scenario.  
 
There is some evidence that the magnitude of hypothetical bias is greater for public 
goods than for private goods (Murphy et al., 2005). 
 
(ii) Strategic bias 
Respondents in stated preference surveys may have an incentive to deliberately 
misrepresent their true preferences in order to achieve a more 
desirable outcome for themselves by influencing policy. Individuals may overstate 
their valuations of the good if they believe their responses influence its provision and 
are un-related to the price they will be charged for it. Conversely, individuals may 
understate if they believe that their response will not influence their desired outcome 
but will influence the price they are charged for it (Carson et al., 2001). Carson argues 
that true preferences are revealed when respondents believe that the non-market 
good's provision is contingent on their stated values and when they believe that they 
will have to pay the amount they state, but this is virtually never achievable in SP 
studies. 
 
(iii) Protest values  
Respondents with a positive true WTP may put forward a zero stated valuation due to, 
for example, ethical objections to the idea of paying for the good under consideration 
or to the idea of government intervening in the issue at hand. If such respondents are 
not identified through follow up questions, and their responses consequently excluded 
from the statistical analysis, then biased estimates of the value of the good will result. 
 
(iv) Non-response bias  
This will occur if individuals who feel strongly for or strongly against a good or issue 
are more likely to respond, which can lead to either an upward or downward bias. 
There is also the potential for fatigue and frustration to set in, especially in iterative 
bidding formats. In this situation respondents make end up making little effort to 
provide accurate replies of their WTP/WTA (Accent, 2010). 
 
(v) The WTP-WTA disparity 
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All stated preference survey choices and questions can be presented in terms of WTP 
(to receive a good or prevent a loss) or in terms of WTA (to lose a good or incur a 
loss). In theory, WTA for most goods evaluated under Stated Preferences should 
exceed WTP by a few percentage points due to the fact that WTP is constrained by an 
individual's income (Sugden, 2005). Numerous papers have found, however, that 
stated WTP is often far below stated WTA for the same good (Hanley and Shogren, 
2005) and the WTP-WTA disparity has become one of the most infamous survey-
related biases examined in stated preference research.  
 
Sugden (2005) argues that the most credible explanations for this relate to the 
psychological arguments concerning loss aversion and its derivative; the endowment 
effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Loewenstein and Adler, 1995). Some authors 
argue that the appropriate formation depends on property rights (Carson et al., 2001), 
others have argued that the WTP formulation should always be used (Arrow et al., 
1993). One reason for this is that CV studies adopting a WTA formulation have often 
been unsuccessful due to an inability to convince respondents that they have the right 
to sell a nonmarket good (Carson et al., 2001).  
 
The WTP-WTA disparity may also be, to some extent, a product of informational 
constraints and inexperience. Bateman et al.'s (2009) virtual reality survey tool (that 
allows survey respondents to experience environmental policy changes in a 3D 
environment) reduced the difference between WTP and WTA for environmental 
goods and List (2003) finds that experienced traders (in a number of different real 
markets) do not exhibit the endowment effect.  
 
8. It is also interesting to assess what conclusions we can draw from the growing 
neuroscientific literature on this topic. A highly-cited example is Berridge (1996) (see 
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2011) who found that wanting and liking or experiencing 
arise in two different neurological areas or systems. Therefore, “wanting things may 
not be an accurate predictor of whether those things will increase subjective 
wellbeing” (Diener and Suh, 1997. p.190). Glimcher’s (2010) seminal book provides 
a comprehensive review of the neuroscientific literature, looking at decision-making 
and valuation, two areas that are central to CBA. Although Glimcher (2010) is 
tentative in that he thinks it is premature to use neural measurements explicitly for 
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welfare analysis, there are a number of important lessons from the fields of 
neuroscience and neuroeconomics.  
 
Glimcher (2010. p.396) states that the choices people make "occur because our brains 
explicitly represent the economic concept of preferences in the form of cardinalised 
expected subjective values". The transitivity axiom requires that these subjective 
values are stored in absolute terms somewhere in the brain (Glimcher, 2010). His 
example discusses training somebody to make utility-maximising choices between 
four options: A = $1,000,000; B = $100,000; C = $1,000; and D = $100. When 
presented with A vs B we would need to train the individual (i.e. programme the 
brain) to choose A over B (A > B). And presented with C vs D we would need to train 
the individual to choose C over D (C > D). Now when faced with B vs C, the 
transitivity axioms requires that B > C, but if the chooser only represents relative 
values in the brain he will choose C over B, because C has "higher learned relative 
subjective value" (p.235). In order for the chooser to form transitive choices and 
choose B over C then he must hold absolute subjective values for these outcomes.  
 
The problem comes in the fact that subjective values seem to actually be stored in 
relative terms in the brain. "Everything we know about the brain tells us that the value 
of options are encoded in a reference-dependent way.... Cortical areas do not represent 
the absolute values of anything". "This constraint on how our brains represent 
subjective values has profound implications for.... welfare economics" (Glimcher, 
2010. p.417). This process has come to be known as Heeger normalisation (Heeger, 
1992), whereby the firing rates of relevant neurotransmitters (mainly dopamine 
neurons) are converted from an absolute to relative magnitude.  
 
Dorris and Glimcher (2004) found that when the values of different choices in a 
choice set all doubled firing rates of dopamine neurons remained roughly constant. 
Neurons have a firing range of about 100 Hz, with a baseline of 10 Hz. This gives us 
only about 90 Hz of range for signalling in decision making tasks. If a candy bar 
represents 11 Hz and a new computer 60 Hz, then there is not a lot of leeway left for 
goods and outcomes preferable to a laptop computer. Thus through the normalisation 
process the brain ensures the same gap in firing rates for any binary decision - around 
a 90 Hz difference for the choice between candy and the laptop and  equally around a 
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90 Hz difference for the choice between a laptop and a five-bedroom Manhatten 
penthouse. This normalisation "maximises the discriminability of the two options in 
the choice set given the existing cortical variance" (Glimcher, 2010. p.244). Without 
this normalisation process under the restricted cortical variance the brain architecture 
would make a huge number of errors in choice tasks. These values are generated in 
the fronto-parietal areas. 
 
Now, of course, there must be some more absolute level of value stored in the brain as 
in reality we are fully capable of choosing properly between different amounts of 
money etc, over which we have not made choices before. Glimcher (2010) states that 
the medial prefrontal cortex and the striatum are central areas that act as the "physical 
seat of valuation" (p.347), funnelling all of the subjective values that guide choice. 
This area "supports comparisons of all of the objects we have ever encountered, and 
so must store the values of all of these objects within a single common framework" 
(p.347). However, “the shifting baselines, or reference points, of all sensory encoding 
systems require that vertebrates produce some degree of irrationality in their choices – 
some violations of axioms such as transitivity are unavoidable…” (Glimcher, 2010. 
p.346). 
 
The upshot of what we currently know about the neural basis of choice implies that 
the axioms that underlie preference for economic analysis are not something that 
aligns with human nature and our biological make-up. We are back to Pareto's 
integrability problem - transitivity to some extent really is mere speculation.    
 
2.5. Summary 
 
Hicks’ theory of valuation is the agreed approach to valuation in economics and 
policy evaluation. Under this theory the value of a non-market good or service relates 
to the impact that it has on the individual’s wellbeing. Monetary value is expressed as 
the amount of money which would have the equivalent impact on wellbeing. 
Valuation theory is agnostic about the measure of wellbeing to be used in the analysis.  
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For the purposes of valuation economics has traditionally used the preference 
satisfaction account of wellbeing. This has led to the development of the revealed 
preference and stated preference methods for valuation. Stated preference methods are 
more direct in their approach in that they more closely replicate the original theory of 
valuation. 
 
There is a longstanding literature that criticises preference-based valuation methods. 
There are critiques of preference as a measure of welfare as well as technical 
problems with the valuation methods themselves, which I have discussed at some 
length. These critiques and problems demonstrate serious flaws in RP and SP 
methods, the dominant methods for valuation in economics and CBA and two key 
approaches in the Green Book. As such these critiques form an important part of the 
rationale and motivation for the wellbeing valuation approach in the next chapter 
because as we shall see since wellbeing valuation does not use preference data it 
provides the potential to avoid many of these issues in valuation.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Wellbeing valuation 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I develop from the arguments discussed in Chapter 2 to set out the 
rationale for wellbeing valuation which provides the background and context for the 
derivation of the new approach in Chapter 4. This chapter covers and summarises a 
substantial amount of literature, but also makes a number of original contributions.  
 
I start by setting out the context and background of the use of wellbeing data in 
research. This will show the growing interest in wellbeing analysis in economics as 
well as in policy analysis. I then provide a short introduction to the wellbeing 
valuation method, which has come out of this increased interest in wellbeing data in 
economics. The discussion of the wellbeing valuation method at this stage is brief 
because I provide a full in-depth discussion and assessment of the methodology in 
Chapter 4. The description of the wellbeing valuation method in this chapter is 
intended to provide sufficient information for the discussion of where the method sits 
alongside the preference methods discussed in the previous chapter and of the main 
rationale and reasons for using wellbeing valuation, the core aim of this chapter.  
 
In terms of original contributions, firstly, I pull together all of the previous discussion 
in this area into a succinct and complete assessment of WV. Previous studies have 
tended to discuss a small handful of disparate issues when making the case for WV. I 
formally categorise and aggregate this literature into a set of key issues and pros and 
cons and add some further thoughts and arguments for WV that have not been 
covered before. Secondly, I merge previous and separate work by Adler and Sugden 
to form a new framework or structure for thinking about WV and its relationship to 
traditional preference-based valuation methods. This is an important issue because it 
will determine the extent to which WV and preference-based methods are 
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complements or alternatives in terms of valuation methods. The literature to date has 
not focussed on this key question in any detail. The joining up and synthesising of 
these various areas of work and theories has, to the best of my knowledge, not been 
done before.  
 
This chapter will provide the most comprehensive rationale and support for the WV 
method to date. 
 
3.2. Subjective wellbeing measures in economics and policy evaluation  
 
The definition and measurement of human welfare has a long academic history going 
back to the ancient Greeks and other thinkers such as Confucius (Bok, 2010). Welfare 
and happiness were the central themes in the writings of Socrates, Aristotle, Epicurus 
and other early Greek philosophers and much of their theories and viewpoints have 
shaped how we think about welfare today and some argue that we have not developed 
or added that much more in addition to what the ancient Greeks had said (Diener et 
al., 1999). 
 
Recognition of the role of welfare surged with the work of the classical utilitarian 
philosophers such as Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick. These early utilitarian thinkers had 
a profound influence on economics. Jeremy Bentham first defined utility in hedonic 
terms, measured as the balance of the amount of pleasure versus pain experienced by 
an individual. Under utilitarianism this concept, which Bentham often called 
happiness, was the ultimate intrinsic good and hence consequently Bentham claims 
that “The greatest happiness for the greatest number is the foundation of morals and 
legislation.” (Bentham, 1983). Similarly, experience and sensation played a 
paramount role in the theories and work of the economists of this generation (e.g., 
Jevons, Edgeworth and Pantaleoni). To them psychological phenomena such as 
sensation, pleasure and pain were "an essential part of economics" (Bruni and Sugden, 
2007. p.154). Classical utilitarianism and early economic theory was thus based on 
hedonic or experienced concepts of wellbeing and utilitarianism (albeit under 
different guises) has become the basic moral or normative tenet in modern economics. 
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Bentham’s moral philosophy rests on two criteria/assumptions: (i) that pleasure and 
pain are quantifiable and (ii) the quantities can be aggregated across individuals 
(Read, 2007). The main stumbling block back then was the degree to which it was 
possible to measure pleasure and pain and it was clear that utilitarian philosophers and 
economists looked forward to the day when hedonic states could be measured directly 
using, for example, a hedonimeter as proposed by Edgeworth (McPherson & 
Hausman, 2006). This type of technology never materialised and so whilst staying 
true to the utilitarian framework, economists abandoned Bentham’s hedonic measure 
of utility in favour of a preference satisfaction account of welfare in the early 
twentieth century (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). No clearer can this been seen than in the 
work of Edgeworth, a devoted Benthamite who became the “pathfinder of ordinalism” 
(Read, 2004. p.5). Under the ordinal utility approach, as Paul Samuelson showed (as 
discussed above), it is possible to map people’s choices over different bundles of 
goods on to a complete map of utility.  
 
This move represents a normative transition in economics between different 
definitions of welfare that themselves have a long tradition in philosophical thinking. 
Although many permutations exist, we can think of three broad accounts of human 
welfare (Parfit, 1984): 
 
4. Mental states and the self-reported experience of the individual. 
5. Preference satisfaction. 
6. Objective lists encompassing normative ideals. 
 
Mental state accounts of welfare are based on people’s self-reports about how their 
lives are going. I shall use the terms subjective wellbeing (SWB) and mental states 
interchangeably here. Broadly speaking, mental states can be, 
 
• Evaluative SWB, which are global assessments of people’s wellbeing such as 
life satisfaction. 
• Experience SWB, which are measures of people’s feelings or affect over a 
period of time. This could be measures of happiness, worry, anxiety, sadness, 
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fatigue, vitality and so on. This account of welfare is what Bentham originally 
held human welfare to consist of.  
• Eudemonic SWB, which relates to people’s psychological needs, such as 
autonomy and the feeling of things being worthwhile, which could contribute 
to welfare independently of any pleasure they bring (Hurka, 1993). 
 
The preference satisfaction account has been described in detail in Chapter 2. It 
equates the degree to which people’s preferences are satisfied with their level of 
welfare and is the measure used traditionally by economists since the early part of the 
twentieth century. As we have seen this account is dependent on a number of 
assumptions regarding the validity of preferences. 
 
Finally, the objective list account is based on normative assumptions about basic 
human needs and rights (Dolan et al., 2011). In objective lists "certain things are good 
or bad for us even if we would not want to have the good things or avoid the bad 
things" (Parfit, 1984. p.499-502). This may be measured, for example, by the literacy 
and morbidity rates in a country and the items on the list often cover the items set out 
in Nussbaum’s Capabilities approach (Bok (2010) and Dolan and White (2006) argue 
that Nussbaum's capabilities are objective lists). 
 
The first two categories are subjective in that they allow the individual in question to 
determine or reveal what is important for his welfare, whereas the objective list 
account represents a list of factors that are determined externally to someone’s self-
reported wellbeing or their preferences and wants although of course many of the 
items on any list are important determinants of subjective measures of welfare. 
(Veenhoven, 2010). 
 
For economists there are a number of big draws associated with subjective accounts 
of welfare. Firstly, subjective measures placate the profession’s general (self-claimed) 
reluctance to make strong normative statements (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). Subjective 
accounts (SWB and preferences) privilege the individual “as the only one qualified to 
assess his or her own wellbeing” (MacKerron, 2011. p.3) which is compatible with 
liberal political views (MacKerron, 2011; Dolan et al., 2011) and helps economists (to 
some extent) stay clear of making normative claims.  
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Secondly, and more importantly, subjective welfare measures provide the facility to 
derive trade-offs between different goods, services and life events to help direct 
policy. Policy evaluation needs to draw conclusions on what actions are right to take 
in society’s interest and in a world with scarce resources this invariably means 
making trade-offs between different objectives. With subjective welfare measures we 
can be led by the individuals/citizens themselves; their preferences or the differential 
impacts on SWB will tell us what is worth doing and what is not. In objective list 
accounts of welfare, it is a hard enough task determining the items to include in the 
list, let alone thinking about how we can weight these items against each other 
(Diener and Suh, 1997). Invariably weighting systems for objective list accounts fall 
back to relying on subjective measures to provide clues as to which goods are more 
important and in doing so raises the question of why not just use subjective measures 
from the outset? For these reasons it is impossible to derive monetary values for 
different goods based on an objective list account of welfare as we lack robust 
objective techniques for weighting the worth of money in relation to other goods in 
order to derive theoretically consistent measures of value (compensating and 
equivalent surplus). We shall, therefore, leave the objective list account of welfare 
here and focus on mental states and preference satisfaction accounts from here on. 
 
The two subjective accounts of welfare have dominated discourse in economics over 
the past two centuries. The transition discussed above was from a reliance on mental 
state accounts of welfare to the application and endorsement of the preference 
account. This move to ordinal measures of utility in the twentieth century was by no 
means at the time a mere stop-gap on the road to eventual cardinality (once - we 
might suppose - that scientific methods of welfare measurement had been developed 
to a sufficient degree) (Read, 2004). 
 
This thesis sits at an interesting time when mental state measures are making a 
comeback in economic theory and applied economics. As Kahneman et al. (1997) 
phrases it the economics discipline is going “back to Bentham”, referring to efforts in 
economics to revert back to mental state measures of welfare as first proposed by the 
early utilitarians.  
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The problems associated with preference satisfaction as a measure of welfare have 
encouraged an increasing number of economists to revert to measures of SWB in 
economic and policy analysis. Figure 1 shows the exponential rise in the number of 
SWB-related publications in economics journals. 
 
Figure 1. The increase in wellbeing research and publications (1960 – 2015) 
 
Source: OECD (2018). 
 
Economists use SWB data mainly in four different ways (Diener et al., 2009; Dolan et 
al., 2011): 
 
• Economic analysis. This research looks at the relationships between 
economic phenomena and SWB. For example, Easterlin (1974) and (1995)  
has looked at the impact of income on life satisfaction. Winkelman and 
Winkelman and (1998) look at unemployment and life satisfaction and 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) look at the impacts of aggregate level 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation and unemployment rates on SWB. 
A large proportion of this work also tests standard economic assumptions with 
SWB data. 
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• Non-economic analysis. These data have also been used to look at 
phenomena that are outside of the traditional economist’s viewpoint. A 
prominent example is Metcalfe et al.’s (2011) study of the impact of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on SWB. Also SWB analysis can inform legal compensation 
decisions (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008). 
 
• Policy evaluation. SWB data can also be used to look at the impact on 
wellbeing of certain policies. For example, the Department for Work and 
Pensions tracked wellbeing measures (life satisfaction) as one of the outcomes 
of the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) scheme, which added 
a new unique combination of services to help unemployed individuals who 
have entered work as well as low-paid workers remain and progress in work. 
The impact of the ERA was assessed using a large-scale randomised trial and 
wellbeing outcomes were taken along with traditional labour market metrics 
such as wages and employment rates. Governments and other organisations 
may use SWB data to identify the main determinants of quality of life, such as 
the best places to live and work for SWB, or they may use SWB data to 
identify those groups who are worst-off and most disadvantaged (in terms of 
wellbeing) in order to determine where resources should be directed. 
 
• Valuation of non-market goods. As I will discuss in the rest of this thesis 
SWB data can be used to derive estimates of compensating and equivalent 
surplus for non-market goods using the wellbeing valuation approach. These 
values can feed into CBA. Also, governments may use this type of analysis to 
determine levels of compensation to pay citizens who are adversely affected 
by a policy intervention.  
 
Generally speaking, these analyses work off the large amount of data on SWB and life 
events that are collected by universities and national statistical offices. They are 
arguably all very fruitful and important areas of research and can unlock analytical 
mysteries that cannot be tackled with standard preference-based economic welfare 
analysis. The focus of this thesis is on techniques for the valuation of non-market 
goods using SWB data.  
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The development of these research areas has come hand-in-hand with an interest from 
policy-making institutions. The United Nations guidelines on national accounts now 
state that GDP should not be used to stand for wellbeing (Duncan, 2010) and both the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK and the OECD have prominent 
wellbeing programmes in place covering both data collection and analysis. 
 
3.3. The Wellbeing Valuation Approach  
 
3.3.1. Background 
 
A new method for valuing non-market goods and services, the wellbeing valuation 
method, has arisen out of the growth in interest in wellbeing data and analysis in 
economics and policy analysis. WV has been one of the main uses of SWB data in the 
economics literature and out of the four uses of SWB data described above it has 
arguably been the focus of the most amount of debate and research.  
 
The first paper on WV was published in 2002 in Health Economics by Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Van Praag (2002) who looked at the valuation of various illnesses. The 
WV method has since then been used to value a range of non-market goods, ‘bads’ 
and outcomes, including, 
 
• Sports participation and the Olympics (Fujiwara et al., 2014; Dolan et al., 
2019);  
• Environment and environmental amenities, including air quality (Welsch, 
2002; Welsch, 2006; Welsch, 2007; Welsch and Kuhling, 2009; Rehdanz and 
Maddison, 2005; Carroll et al., 2009; Ferreira and Moro, 2009; Ambrey and 
Fleming, 2011; Tsurumi and Managi, 2015; Mendoza et al., 2019; Barrington-
Leigh and Behzadnejad, 2017; Giovanis and Ozdamar, 2016; Krekel and 
Zerrahn, 2017); 
• Weather (Fedderson et al., 2012); 
• Nuclear disasters and natural disasters (Sarrias and Jara, 2019; Danzer and 
Danzer, 2011; Fernandez et al., 2019) 
 62 
 
• Health (Groot and van den Brink, 2006; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag, 
2002; Howley, 2016; Huang et al., 2018);  
• Crime (Manning et al., 2016; Cohen, 2008; Brenig and Proeger, 2016; Moore, 
2006); 
• Public sector corruption (Welsch, 2008b);  
• Civil conflicts (Welsch, 2008a);  
• Care-giving (McDonald and Powdthavee, 2018; Schneider and Kleindienst, 
2016; van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007);  
• Access to water (Mahasuweerachai and Pangjai, 2019); 
• Terrorist attacks (Frey et al., 2007);  
• Social relationships (Powdthavee, 2008; Chandoevwit and Thampanishvong, 
2015);  
• Employment and job characteristics (Murtin et al., 2017; Clark and Oswald, 
2002; Helliwell and Huang, 2005); 
• Macroeconomic events (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004);  
• Value of life (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008);  
• Commuting (Stutzer and Frey, 2004);  
• Green space (Aoshima et al., 2018; Tsurumi and Managi, 2015); 
• Daylight savings time transitions (Kuehnle and Wunder, 2015); 
• Volunteering (Becchetti et al., 2018); 
• Adult learning courses and qualifications (Dolan and Fujiwara, 2012);  
• Income inequality (Beja, 2011);  
• Cultural activities and events (del Saz-Salazar et al., 2019; Fujiwara et al., 
2014; Marsh and Bertranou, 2012). 
 
In this section I set out a non-technical introduction to WV to provide the foundation 
for a discussion on interpretation of the method and the pros and cons of the approach. 
I then provide a full technical exposition of the WV approach in Chapter 4 when 
discussing the main technical issues of the method. 
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3.3.2. Introduction to the wellbeing valuation methodology 
 
The premise of the wellbeing valuation (WV) approach is to estimate measures of 
welfare change (CS and ES) as set out in section 2.2. from data on people’s SWB. 
This is depicted in Figure 2. We are interested in measuring two effects: first, the 
impact of the non-market good on SWB (𝛽𝑄) and second the impact of income or 
money on SWB (𝛽𝑀). 
 
Figure 2. The wellbeing valuation approach 
 
 
Once these effects have been estimated it is possible to derive measures of welfare 
change by looking at the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between the non-
market good and money. This essentially measures moves around an indifference 
curve at a given level of SWB, where I am using the term 'indifference curve' more 
broadly here to mean a set of points at which an individual's level of welfare remains 
constant (however we may measure that level of welfare). In other words, with 
‘observable’ welfare data – in the form of SWB data – we can measure a welfare 
function and the level sets of this function (provided that there are two or more 
arguments in the function) - which equate to the indifference curves - to see how two 
different goods can be traded off against each other at the margin. 
 
A key point to note is that the WV approach, therefore, represents what Randall 
(1982) would call a direct income compensation approach. Since we can work with 
Money 
Non-market 
good 
SWB 
𝛽𝑀 𝛽𝑄 
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an ‘observable’ measure of welfare, the WV approach actually provides a solution to 
McKenzie’s (1957) and Hurwicz and Uzawa’s (1971) original income compensation 
method, whereby one estimates the amount of the numeraire (here, money) the 
individual would require to have with 𝑄0 to achieve the same level of welfare as with 
𝑄1 and her original level of income 𝑀0 (McKenzie (1957) and Hurwicz and Uzawa 
(1971) originally worked with price changes, but following Randall (1982) I have 
substituted changes in a non-market good (𝑄) for prices here).  
 
The solution to the original income compensation method requires observing the 
relevant points on indifference curves (Randall, 1982), which we can now in theory 
do with WV, rather than relying on market behaviour or eliciting values directly from 
people in stated preference. Therefore, it can be said that the WV approach represents 
the most direct approach to non-market valuation, which most faithfully translates the 
economic theory of welfare change measures into practice, with the caveat that this 
measure of welfare is SWB rather than preference as usually assumed in economics. 
One thing to note here is that WV is effectively more closely related in concept and 
theoretical underpinnings to stated preference than to revealed preference in terms of 
the directness of approach to non-market valuation, although WV is more direct than 
stated preference because it works with ‘observable’ measures of welfare. 
 
In practice the elements of Figure 2 and the MRS between 𝑄 and 𝑀 are estimated 
empirically through statistical analysis based on a model of SWB such as: 
 
(8) 𝑆𝑊𝐵 = 𝑓(𝑀, 𝑄, 𝑋)  
 
where 𝑆𝑊𝐵 is some measure of wellbeing, such as life satisfaction, 𝑀 = income, 𝑄 = 
the non-market good being valued and 𝑋 = other determinants of SWB. 
 
The vast majority of WV studies to date have defined SWB as life satisfaction and 
employed single-equation multivariate regression models to estimate (8) - examples 
include, (Kountouris and Remoundou, 2011; Ambrey and Fleming, 2011; Moore, 
2006; Menz and Welsch, 2012; Beja, 2011; Cohen, 2008; van den Berg and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2007; Clark and Oswald, 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Frey et 
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al., 2004; Stutzer and Frey, 2004b; Barrington-Leigh and Behzadnejad, 2017; Sarrias 
and Jara, 2019; Murtin et al., 2017; Schneider and Kleindienst, 2016; Becchetti et al., 
2018). Equation (9) sets out an example of the regression models used. 
 
(9) 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
where 𝜀 is the error term and the subscript 𝑖 denotes individual 𝑖. Other statistical 
methods used to date include use of panel data, which adds a time subscript to 
equation (9) and a time-invariant term can be added in 𝜀𝑖 so that model (9) is 
estimated using fixed effects (e.g. Manning et al., 2016; Giovanis and Ozdamar, 2016; 
McDonald and Powdthavee, 2018).  
 
The results from a model like equation (9) are used to estimate values as per Figure 2, 
where 𝛽2 = 𝛽𝑄 and 𝛽1 = 𝛽𝑀. The value of 𝑄 is estimated from the MRS between 𝑄 
and 𝑀. Equation (10) provides the basic format of the calculation. In practice this 
becomes more complex and involved as the impacts of 𝑄 and 𝑀 may be estimated in 
a non-linear format. 
 
(10) Value of 𝑄 = 
− (𝛽𝑄 ∙ ∆𝑄)
𝛽𝑀
൘  
 
Where in many cases ∆𝑄 = 1 as it’s the provision of a good or service. When it is a 
non-market ‘bad’, 𝛽𝑄 will be negative and the result of equation (10) will be positive 
signifying that the individual needs to be compensated a positive financial amount.  
 
In the WV method the value of the non-market good (𝑄) is therefore derived without 
recourse to market transaction data (as in revealed preferences) or to eliciting WTP or 
WTA values from survey respondents (as in stated preferences).  
 
3.3.3. Where does wellbeing valuation sit alongside preference methods? 
 
A key question to ask is how and where the new wellbeing valuation method fits in 
the current landscape of valuation methodologies made up of preference-based 
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methods. This question has received very little attention in the WV literature to date 
and the conclusions drawn tend to be fairly rudimentary. 
 
A strong theme that runs through the current literature on SWB is the assumption that 
SWB data are direct measures of the economist’s concept of utility (Adler, 2012) (e.g. 
Diener et al., 2009; Frey and Stutzer, 2009; Levinson, 2012; van den Berg and Ferrer-
i-Carbonell, 2007). For example, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2012. p.2) states that self-
reported wellbeing measures serve the "purpose of better understanding individual's 
preferences".  Diener et al., (2009. ch.2, p.4) go further to claim that “[subjective] 
wellbeing is essentially identical to economists’ concept of utility”. However, none of 
these types of statements have been backed up with any evidence or principled moral 
reasoning. 
 
In this thesis I take a different approach that is more consistent with the thinking in 
philosophy and ethics, that SWB (mental state accounts) are qualitatively distinct to 
the preference account of welfare. This has implications for how we use and interpret 
values from WV. Drawing on a number of theories and propositions we can formulate 
a better and more comprehensive framework for thinking about WV and other 
valuation methods. 
 
3.3.3.1. SWB and preferences 
 
A useful framework for organising the different views on the relationship between 
SWB and preference is Adler’s two defences of SWB data in policy analysis (2012) 4: 
 
 
4 I note that there exists one further approach to interpreting SWB data in economics, which sits 
outside of Adler’s two defences. Kimball and Willis (2006) use SWB as an argument in the 
standard utility function, alongside other goods and outcomes. This is what Adler (2012) calls the 
'hybrid model'. This is probably the least common use of SWB data among economists and also 
philosophers and is problematic for valuation which requires either the PR or EQ defence. This is 
because in order to estimate trade-offs SWB needs to be the intrinsic outcome against which 
trade-offs can be made between goods and money (i.e. it needs to be the objective of the welfare 
function rather than an argument in it as per Kimball’s approach). Under the hybrid model utility 
remains the intrinsic outcome and SWB only has instrumental value. Therefore, I will not explore 
the hybrid model any further here. 
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i. The Preference-Realisation (PR) defence of SWB adopts the view that SWB 
data measure the extent to which a person's preferences are being satisfied. In 
other words, SWB data are evidence of an individual's level of preference-
realisation. As discussed above, this is the common line of thought amongst 
many economists.   
 
ii. The Experience-Quality (EQ) defence of SWB takes the view that SWB data 
are evidence of an individual's mental states. This is more in line with the 
thinking in philosophy and amongst psychologists such as Kahneman. 
 
Those who use SWB and preference satisfaction synonymously such as Diener (see 
for example Diener et al., 2009; Diener and Suh, 1997; Diener et al., 1999) are 
adopting the PR defence of SWB. A good example of this school of thought is 
Benjamin et al., (2012) where preference is 'privileged' in the assessment in that the 
usefulness and reliability of SWB data is questioned on the extent to which they can 
replicate preference data. Under the PR defence, SWB data can be used in wellbeing 
valuation to measure the preference-specific forms of willingness to pay (WTP) and 
willingness to accept (WTA). In other words, wellbeing values will represent WTP 
and WTA as in preference methods under this approach. For this defence to be true, it 
requires that SWB data evidence individuals' ordinal preference utility (Adler, 2012).  
 
Many non-economists (and some economists such as Layard), however, take a 
broader view, which I believe better accounts for the nuanced differences between 
SWB and preference. For example, Adler and Posner (2008) acknowledge that 
wellbeing values only equate to WTP and WTA if people satisfy preferences in order 
to maximise SWB. Unfortunately, there is little work outside of economics on the 
interpretation of wellbeing values and so the direct equivalisation with WTP and 
WTA has seemed to stick and has become the perceived wisdom. Outside of the 
wellbeing valuation literature, in the broad field of normative ethics, I believe it 
would be impossible to find a philosopher that would take such a stance of directly 
equating SWB with preference and those that may would stipulate a list of important 
assumptions and caveats for making such a claim.  
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I think that Layard’s (2006. p.31) conclusions, which align with the EQ defence, 
provide the correct way to think about this. He states that “economics uses exactly the 
right framework for thinking about public policy. Policy instruments are set so as to 
maximise the sum of utilities,… What is wrong is the account of what makes people 
happy.” 
 
I, therefore, follow Adler’s (Adler, 2012; Adler and Posner, 2008) claim here that 
preference should not be equated to SWB because preferences contain more than just 
a reflection of SWB or mental states. Although, SWB (especially evaluative SWB 
measures) can predict choice and preference to some degree (e.g. see Benjamin et al., 
2012), there are times when they can diverge. For example, in health where adaptation 
plays a significant role in SWB ratings we find that people can assign high quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) values (based on preferences) to health states to which they 
adapt in terms of experience SWB (Adler, 2012). Likewise, Smith et al. (2006) find 
that current colostomy patients report reasonably high levels of life satisfaction and 
mood, such that adaptation is nearly complete, but at the same time they express a 
willingness to reduce their life-span by a substantial 15 per cent in exchange for a 
return to perfect health. Adler (2012. p.19) states that a utility function is simply a 
"mathematical device" for representing an individual's preference rankings. Since the 
utility function can contain non-mental state entries, then the individual can have 
higher utility even though her subjective experiences may not have changed.  
 
Therefore, I am proposing that the WV approach take/align itself with the EQ 
defence. This is supported by Parfitt’s distinction between the three different 
measures of welfare and by Kahneman’s categorisation of wellbeing measures. 
Kahneman (2012) terms the preference-based welfare measures used by economists 
as 'Decision utility' and separates this from other accounts of wellbeing that he labels 
'Experienced utility', which refers to experience SWB or affect and 'Remembered 
utility', which refers to evaluative measures of wellbeing (objective list measures of 
wellbeing are not included in Kahneman’s categorisations). It is fair to say that these 
definitions and distinctions are recognised by a number of economists working in this 
area too (for example Dolan, 1998; Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). 
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A further reason for taking the EQ defence is that if preferences can in some cases be 
context-dependent, irrational and mis-informed, as some of the major criticisms of 
preference-based valuation methods have suggested, then strategically we do not want 
SWB to simply reflect preference rankings. Indeed, many of the advantages 
associated with wellbeing valuation would be annulled if we adopted the PR defence 
and claim that SWB equals or evidences preference satisfaction. 
 
3.3.3.2. The PR and EQ defence and Sugden 
 
Interestingly Adler’s PR and EQ defence categorisation overlaps to some degree with 
Sugden’s (2015) and (2018) discussions of issues with preferences in economics. 
Here we can interpret Sugden’s arguments in to a set of two separate solutions for 
preference anomalies and problems:   
 
Solution 1: Assume that within each agent there exists a ‘rational self’ that is 
frustrated by a ‘behaviourally-susceptible’ outer ‘shell’ and help the agent to elicit 
their preferences more accurately (Sugden, 2018).  
 
In other words, inside each of us there is a calculating sophisticated individual who, 
given sufficient information, will consistently make choices according to the 
rationality assumptions in economic theory, but in reality this rational self has a hard 
time being heard because our environment can lead us astray. Here the environment 
could be something like a price prime or anchor that people end up relying on due to 
time and resource constraints. Sugden’s theory has clear parallels with Kahneman’s 
(2012) System 1 and System 2 framework. Within this setting Sugden is essentially 
saying that our System 2 brain is ok in that it works how economic theory suggests it 
does, but that we are often misled by System 1. The solution is, therefore, to design 
surveys and studies in such a way that it makes it easier for people to provide us with 
their real preferences and values. There is precedent for this school of thought in the 
valuation literature – it is essentially what Gregory et al. (1993) meant when they said 
that,  
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“designers of a CV [contingent valuation] study should function not as 
archaeologists, carefully uncovering what is there, but as architects, working to build 
a defensible expression of value” (1993. p.179). 
 
Most of the options under this solution are preventative pre-survey methods which 
generally try to provide assistance before or during the survey to help participants 
elicit values from the ‘rational self’.  
 
Two editions of the Journal of Environmental and Resources Economics (in 2005 and 
2010) were dedicated to methods that have been developed to deal with preference 
anomalies in contingent valuation studies and many of these solutions make up part of 
best-practice methodology in CV today. A key mechanism that sits at the heart of 
anomaly reduction techniques in these papers is through learning by repetition and 
experience. The work is based on Plott‘s (1996) Discovered Preference Hypothesis 
(DPH). The DPH argues that stable and consistent preferences are the product of 
experience gained through repetition. There are a number of studies that report 
reductions in the effects of arbitrary anchors and in the number of preference reversals 
as people become familiar with the good and the institutional payment arrangements 
in a contingent valuation context (Bateman et al., 2006; Braga and Starmer, 2005).  
 
Contrary to the recommendations set out by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) in 1993 (Arrow et al., 1993), which recommended a single-
bound dichotomous choice format in order to mimic a market setting, Bateman et al. 
(2006) propose a double-bound dichotomous choice payment format for eliciting 
values. This, they say, is to allow for learning and experience as it gives participants 
the opportunity to “discover” their preferences during the survey. Alternatively, 
Gregory et al. (1993), propose a deliberative CV mechanism (multi-attribute utility 
analysis) in which a group of stakeholders, that includes the affected citizenry and 
technical experts, assesses the merits of the good under consideration and determines 
which attributes have the greatest impact on utility. Consequently, some contingent 
valuation surveys now employ a workshop format whereby people discuss the 
valuation issues with others and they can seek further information from moderators 
and experts again in an attempt to help them discover their true preferences (Hanley 
and Shogren, 2005). 
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Possibly the most novel approach in this area has been taken by Bateman et al. (2009) 
who have used virtual reality simulators to communicate environmental changes to 
survey respondents so that they can gain direct experience of the non-market goods 
and outcomes at hand. This had the effect of reducing the difference between WTP 
and WTA for environmental goods. 
 
Other frequently observed problems in CV that fall under the category of embedding 
effects discussed in Chapter 2 have been argued to be a consequence of the survey 
instrument. It has been argued that insensitivity to scope findings are idiosyncratic 
and/or that the studies that have obtained such results are flawed in terms of survey 
design (Smith, 1993; Carson et al., 2001). For example, the finding of insensitivity to 
scope should not be surprising if the description presented is not adequate to enable 
the respondent to distinguish between the smaller and larger good or if the survey 
emphasises the symbolic nature of providing the good. Sequencing effects and sub-
additivity effects have also been argued to be explainable with reference to income 
and substitution effects (Hoehn and Randall, 1989; Carson et al., 2001). Intuitively, 
each new good obtained reduces the income available for respondents to spend on 
other goods. Given this, the later in the overall package that a good is offered, the less 
desirable it will look. There may also be a similar effect if the goods are substitutes 
for each other.  
 
It is fair to say that it is not fully clear how applicable these results are for preference-
based valuation methods because opportunities for learning are often minimal. It is 
hard to provide repetitive experience for many of the public goods assessed in stated 
preference (Braga and Starmer, 2005) and there are likely to be constraints on the 
types of non-market goods and outcomes that can be simulated effectively in virtual 
simulators. These methods probably make good sense for environmental issues, but 
they are harder to employ effectively in, for example, health and education-related 
interventions. Where we use revealed preferences in proxy markets such as housing 
and labour markets, transactions are often infrequent (i.e. we don’t move house, 
change job or negotiate wages frequently) so that few chances for learning exist at the 
individual level (Genesove and Mayer, 2001). 
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Another popular preventative method for reducing biases in CV has been the use of 
entreaties, which are text boxes that remind respondents of their budget constraints 
and to ask them to provide a truthful and accurate response. They can go as far as 
asking people to take an oath before answering the questions. Entreaty scripts have 
been shown to be effective in reducing hypothetical bias in WTP values in CV studies 
(Cummings and Taylor, 1999). 
 
It is possible to align Sugden’s theory of a behavioural shell with the PR defence of 
SWB. If SWB provided accurate information on preferences, then presumably they 
could be used to garner preference data without being affected by the behavioural 
biases and issues inherent to preference elicitation methods – in other words, they 
could be used to get to the individual’s ‘rational’ preferences. Thus, in this solution 
preference is still king and we could measure it by either modifying and improving 
how we elicit preference data or by using SWB data instead because under the PR 
defence SWB equates to preference. Therefore, we can conclude that the general 
consensus to equate SWB with preference in the WV literature to date aligns those 
proponents with the solution set out here and with Adler’s PR defence. 
 
A different solution that is recommended by Sugden (2018) is to move away from 
preference in economics and to think instead about opportunity sets. We could apply a 
similar argument in favour of SWB and would come to the following solution. 
 
Solution 2: Discard the preference satisfaction account of welfare in favour of self-
reported measures of wellbeing (subjective wellbeing) and estimate the value of 
non-market goods using the Wellbeing Valuation approach. 
 
This approach is far more drastic than Solution 1. Approaches under Solution 1 are 
positive (methodological/technical) in nature, whereas Solution 2 requires discussion 
of and reference to both more fundamental normative and positive aspects of 
economics. Economists have always been in the business of developing piece-wise 
non-substantive (in the normative sense) adjustments to their theories and methods so 
they can better model the way that agents and economies behave, all usually still 
within the standard preference view of the world and Solution 1 is typical of this 
tradition.  
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Solution 2, on the other hand, offers a more radical approach, but one that is not new 
to the economics profession (Kahneman et al., 1997). The fundamental premise of 
Solution 2 is a move (back) to self-reported measures of welfare, whereby the impact 
(and value) of non-market goods is measured in terms of the effect they have on 
people’s self-reported wellbeing rather than in terms of people’s preferences (or 
opportunities if we were to take Sugden’s recommendations).  
 
Solution 2 is consistent with the EQ defence and the approach I have taken here 
because it does not attempt or assume to equate SWB with utility and preference.  
 
Through the development and merging of Adler’s EQ defence and Sugden’s solutions 
(or a version of it) we have developed, for the first time, a comprehensive framework 
for conceptualising where WV sits in the valuation landscape. As argued here, WV is 
not a complement to preference-based methods. WV is entirely separate from 
preference methods and should be seen as its own unique methodology for estimating 
ES and CS values. This has two major implications that I discuss in more detail later. 
Firstly, it means that WV values cannot be used with preference values and secondly 
it means that WV values should not be compared to preference values and certainly 
their accuracy should not depend on their ability to align to or mimic preference 
values (i.e. WTP and WTA) because SWB and utility are two entirely different 
concepts with no real reason for there to be a convergence in values when using the 
two different approaches. This is a substantial, but I would argue, correct divergence 
from the main thinking in the WV literature which has generally tended to assume 
that values derived from WV are the same in nature to (and can be compared with) 
preference-based values. This tendency to equate the two methods has been either 
explicit (for example Diener et al., 2009) or implicit in the literature, in the sense that 
studies have looked to assess the validity of WV against preference-based methods 
such as the results from SP studies. 
 
In the final section of this chapter I will build a defence and rationale for WV, before 
then discussing methodological issues in later chapters. 
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3.3.4. The rationale for wellbeing valuation 
 
In this section I set out the key advantages and pros of WV which provide the 
rationale for using the method. A contribution to the literature is that I categorise 
these pros into normative based issues and methodological issues, whilst adding some 
new insights. A key part of building the rationale for WV is also to consider and 
address any problems or cons that the method may have. I cover this in the latter part 
of this section and also in the next chapter. The key problems with WV relate to the 
validity of the measure of SWB used in the analysis and to the statistical method 
employed. In this chapter I provide a defence of life satisfaction, the key measure of 
SWB used in WV to date and in the following chapter I provide solutions to the 
methodological problems through a new approach to WV. 
 
3.3.4.1. Advantages of the wellbeing valuation approach 
 
3.3.4.1.1. Normative advantages 
Probably the key advantage of WV is that it gets around the issue of 
incommensurability (Anderson, 1995). Many philosophers would argue that many 
non-market goods, services and outcomes are not commensurable or comparable with 
money and hence cannot be valued according to economic theory. This type of 
criticism is especially prevalent in the valuation of the environment, health and human 
life. An outcome of this is the type of lexical preference orderings discussed in section 
2.4.2., in which no amount of money would equate to the non-market good. Here in 
stated preference no finite WTP or WTA amount would exist for the non-market good 
making it impossible to place a monetary value on it. The end result in CV studies is 
often a protest value, where despite valuing or appreciating the good in question 
people state a zero WTP amount.   
 
Other forms of incommensurability can also present itself in other guises related to 
substitutability. Substitutability requires that a gain in one good can offset the loss in 
another and vice versa. Here two objects may be commensurable in the eyes of the 
individual but the individual has no sound internal basis or method to make the 
comparison between the two objects. In this context we may find that the monetary 
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values that are revealed in proxy markets or that are stated in surveys will be quite 
arbitrary and may not be uncovering what the economist really seeks to discover. As a 
result, this may lead to some of the anomalous preference behaviour that I have 
discussed in section 2.4.2. such as the anchoring effects found by Ariely et al. (2003) 
and difficulties in converting feelings on to monetary scales (e.g. Lowenstein and 
Schkade, 2003; Kahneman et al., 1998).  
 
In the WV approach the issues of incommensurability and non-substitutability do not 
surface because we do not need to ask people to translate a sentiment or feeling 
towards a non-market good on to a monetary scale. Instead we are simply measuring 
the welfare impact of the good or outcome in monetary equivalent terms without ever 
asking the individual to make a comparison for us. A key point at the extreme is that 
even if individuals believe that certain goods are incommensurable with money it is 
possible to estimate values in WV that are precise and non-arbitrary reflections of 
welfare change and which align with economic theory. WV is the only valuation 
method that can solve for the problem of strong incommensurability and non-
substitutability. Clearly this is a major advantage of the WV method, since valuation 
theory is highly dependent on these two assumptions. This advantage is especially 
relevant in policy areas that have traditionally been very problematic for valuation, 
such as health valuation and the environment.  
 
A second and related advantage is there may be times when people (and markets) do 
not feel it morally justifiable or acceptable to trade or place a value on certain types of 
goods (like wildlife, health and education) in actual or in the case of SP, hypothetical 
markets. This is different to the issues of incommensurability and non-substitutability 
as it may be that we can think of a monetary amount that would equate in value to the 
issue at hand, but we would rather not have to think in this way for moral or ethical 
reasons. Preference-based valuation approaches rely on what can be called the 
‘commodification’ of goods – that is, to value a non-market good we need to have 
people think and act as if the good was actually traded in markets. This may be 
inherently difficult at best, and morally unacceptable at worst and is likely to result in 
issues such as protest values and anchoring effects which were discussed in section 
2.4.2. For the same reasons just discussed above, WV can get around this issue and 
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still provide values in these situations without having to force people to make difficult 
ethical choices. 
 
And thirdly, as raised in this thesis, WV is the only direct approach to valuation. For 
the purest it is the method that most closely replicates Hicks’ theory of valuation. It 
can be argued that WV is, therefore, conceptually cleaner and easier to trace and 
defend in terms of its normative rationale. 
 
3.3.4.1.2. Methodological advantages 
There are a number of methodological advantages associated with WV and so I shall 
list them here. Stutzer and Frey (2010. p.23-24) claim that the WV approach “avoids 
some major difficulties inherent in both stated and revealed preference methods”. 
  
1. In WV there are no rationality assumptions, like those needed if we are to use 
preferences in valuation. The method “does not rely on respondents’ ability to 
consider all relevant consequences of a change in the provision of a public good. It 
suffices if respondents state their own life satisfaction with some degree of precision” 
(Stutzer and Frey, 2010. p.23; van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007) and this is 
probably a cognitively less burdensome task than thinking about a WTP value (Frey 
et al., 2009). In the critique of preference-based methods we saw how violations of 
the rationality assumptions lead to preference reversals which pose a major challenge 
for SP methods. We also saw how in studies a large number of subjects exhibit choice 
behaviour that is inconsistent with the rationality assumptions (Choi et al., 2011). A 
major draw of the WV method is that it does not suffer from this issue because it does 
not use preference data. 
 
2. WV does not rely on market efficiency assumptions that are critical to revealed 
preference methods (Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005; Frey et al., 2004). If markets are 
imperfect, large transaction costs exist or people suffer from lack of information then 
market behaviour will reveal very little about people’s WTP and WTA. In fact, WV 
can add further important information when market assumptions may not be met; the 
WV approach is able to pick up any residual effect of the non-market good after 
allowing for market compensation. If a non-market ‘bad’ like crime is not fully 
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reflected in lower house prices then we would expect crime to impact on SWB after 
accounting for house price differentials and hence in the WV approach we can value 
this residual impact (Stutzer and Frey, 2004a; Ferreira and Moro, 2009; Luechinger, 
2009; Levinson, 2012; Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005; Cohen, 2008). 
 
3. WV does not rely on any forecasting or prediction of preference on behalf of the 
individual. Market transactions and stated preferences require people to accurately 
predict future welfare impacts of the good, but as discussed in section 2.4.1. there is a 
lot of evidence that people find it difficult to predict future utility impacts even for 
simple everyday products. Furthermore, the value of something will depend on the 
likely fruition of some factors – for example the value of an umbrella depends on the 
likelihood of rain - and people’s perceptions of future risks may not align with actual 
events (Luechinger and Raschky, 2009). WV relies only on people’s actual 
experiences: we can see how the good impacts on people’s welfare under the actual 
conditions that come to fruition.  
 
Decisions in markets (real or hypothetical) may not accurately reflect people’s 
experiences (Luechinger and Raschky, 2009) and in hypothetical settings this may get 
exacerbated by the focussing illusion, whereby people focus their attention on the 
salient aspects of the non-market good at the time of preference elicitation, whereas in 
reality these aspects have little or no consequence for how they actually experience 
their lives. Outside of the survey or lab, in day to day life the non-market good will 
have to vie for attention amongst all of the other things that are going. As Kahneman 
(2012) puts it nothing is as important as you think it is when you are thinking about it 
and hence stated preference methods are likely to overstate values all else constant. 
This leads to the issue of hypothetical bias in stated preference as discussed in section 
2.4.2. A major advantage of WV is that we can find out the importance and values of 
non-market goods alongside all of the other things that affect people's lives hence 
eliminating hypothetical bias. 
 
4. WV does not suffer from the broad range of survey-related biases inherent to stated 
preference methods because respondents are not asked directly to state a value or pay 
a certain price (van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007). For example, it is not 
possible for respondents to use strategic answers (van Praag and Baarsma, 2005; Frey 
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et al., 2004) or protest values. Also, information bias and interviewer bias do not exist 
in WV and there will not be the issues around comprehending the payment 
mechanism that we see in SP methods. Furthermore, there is no possibility of 
embedding effects or priming effects, such as anchors.  
 
5. Related to this, since we do not elicit values from individuals in WV we do not 
change subsequent perceptions of the non-market good and hence can assume that the 
values will be accurate and stable even with provision of the good (see arguments on 
NIMBY policies in section 2.4.2.). 
  
6. SWB or life satisfaction questions are relatively easier (than WTP questions) to 
answer for respondents (van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007). Typically the 
percentage of people who do not respond to SWB questions in surveys is low (van 
Praag et al., 2003) . This helps reduce biases due to sample selection, which will 
improve the valuation results from WV making them more generalizable (van den 
Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007). 
 
7. There are two issues regarding the estimation of the indifference point. In WV we 
eliminate the cognitively demanding task of estimating the indifference point (as was 
demonstrated in the Mosteller and Nogee (1951) paper), because the analyst now does 
this on behalf of the respondent using statistical methods. Under wellbeing valuation 
it suffices that we measure the impacts of money and the non-market good on SWB 
and the indifference point can be measured simply from the ratio of the impacts of 
these two goods as per equation (10). As we will discuss there are issues related to 
measuring the impacts of income and the non-market good on SWB, but the actual 
task of estimating the indifference point is simple in WV. 
 
In regards to the indifference point, there is an issue that has not been picked up to 
date in the literature and that I contribute in this thesis and that is whether people in 
stated preference surveys act in the way that is assumed by economic theory. That is 
does a willingness to pay value really represent the tipping point at which the 
individual is indifferent between the good in question and the money value? This is a 
separate issue to the one described by Mosteller and Nogee (1951). Mosteller and 
Nogee were interested in the cognitive burden associated with estimating the 
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indifference point. Let's here assume that people can actually make that calculation. 
The question I am asking here is then whether the figure that they state is the true 
point of indifference. Even if people can calculate the point of indifference (in a 
cognitive sense) do they estimate the real or right one? Economics assumes (as does 
many branches of psychology and philosophy) that human beings fundamentally act 
in order to maximise their own welfare. Accordingly, every purchasing decision is 
only made when the perceived welfare benefits of the good exceed the welfare costs 
associated with foregoing the money to pay for it. Taking this line of thought, we 
might conclude that humans are likely to be conditioned in to making some surplus in 
every purchasing decision based on the information at hand. In reality they may be 
misinformed and hence do not derive any surplus or even a dis-surplus out of the 
good, but this does not affect facts about their intended behaviour.  
 
Let us assume that a given population on average seeks to derive 10% surplus on any 
purchase/transaction - this could be seen as a spending heuristic. That is they derive 
surplus to the value of 10% of the price they pay, which means that for say someone 
that buys a new computer for £1,000, he values the computer at £1,100 and if the 
computer were worth less than £1,100 to him he would not buy it (we can of course 
allow for different surplus requirements across different types of goods – e.g., very 
expensive goods may require only 3% surplus since this can be a large sum in 
absolute terms – but I will stick to a simple average here). Now assume that the 
computer is some non-market good like a nice view or lower crime rates. In theory for 
CBA we would want to measure the value of the non-market good as £1,100, but it 
would seem to be highly unlikely that this is the value that people would give us in a 
stated preference survey. If people are programmed to maximise welfare and hence 
seek surplus in any transaction then it becomes difficult to argue that they would be 
able to easily state a maximum (surplus exhausting) value of £1,100 in a one-off 
survey. Even where stated preference surveys use multiple bounded shots - whereby 
the survey enumerator increases values until the individual states he would not be 
willing to pay any higher - there is no guarantee that the WTP value at which people 
stop includes the surplus that they would traditionally extract in a purchasing 
decision.    
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There are very few occasions in life when people are required to state a maximum 
WTP or WTA amount truthfully. One occasion may be in auctions, although one 
could argue that supposed maximum WTP values stated in auctions still contain a 
purchase surplus (i.e. the maximum WTP is reduced somewhat to incorporate the 
surplus requirement). Plenty of evidence shows that people use a number of heuristics 
in stated preference surveys and a surplus seeking heuristic could be an important 
additional one and one that we have not tested before. Note that a surplus seeking 
heuristic would also have implications for revealed preference methods because it 
would mean that we would not be able to estimate correct demand curves from market 
data. If the heuristic legitimately exists we should conclude that WTP values in stated 
preference surveys and from market data are likely to be understated all else constant. 
WV is the only method that would allow us to estimate unbiased estimates of CS, ES 
and monetary value under the presence of a surplus seeking heuristic. This is because 
we can assess the full impact of the non-market good on welfare and derive the 
equivalent amount of money that exactly exhausts all surplus, such that the individual 
does remain at his/her original welfare position and no surplus is extracted. 
 
8. The WV method has a broad application; indeed it could be used for any non-
market good we have data on and where this may not exist we can collect primary 
data. Consequently, WV is far broader and of wider application than revealed 
preference methods and are on a par with stated preference methods in this respect. 
The key difference is that stated preference methods can be widely applied (you can 
ask a WTP or WTA question about any good you like) by virtue of the hypothetical 
nature of the survey instrument and scenario, where any question can be posed to 
respondents. An important advantage of the WV approach is its ability to be similarly 
wide in its application, but – and this is key - without the need to use hypothetical 
settings and questions: WV is based entirely on people’s actual experiences (Stutzer 
and Frey, 2010; Luechinger, 2009; Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). This should sit as an 
important advantage of WV in relation to stated preference from the perspective of 
economists who tend to prefer revealed preference over stated preference valuation 
methods because the former are based on actual behaviour. Like with revealed 
preference, WV has some trace that can be picked up in people’s behaviour and 
experiences, which may make it more justifiable than decisions based on hypothetical 
scenarios and states of the world. Certainly, an economist may tend to think this way. 
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3.3.4.2. Problems associated with the wellbeing valuation approach  
 
3.3.4.2.1. Statistical methodology/technical problems 
As described above, WV is a statistical approach and there are a number of technical 
challenges associated with the methodology. These issues mainly relate to the 
challenge of estimating the impacts of the non-market good and income on SWB – in 
other words whether we can derive robust estimates of 𝛽𝑄 and 𝛽𝑀 in Figure 2. 
Discussion of these technical issues requires a full exposition of the statistical 
methodology that underlies the WV approach and cannot be understood in the context 
of the introduction to WV provided to date. In this thesis I develop a new framework 
for assessing the validity of the WV method and so I will, therefore, cover the 
technical problems related to WV in Chapter 4 in the process of developing the new 
WV approach. In Chapter 4 I will present these technical problems and provide a set 
of statistical solutions to address them.  
 
In this section, therefore, I focus on the issues related to using SWB in valuation. In 
this regard, there are two issues: (i) general criticisms of the use of SWB measures in 
economics; and (ii) problems regarding the measurement of SWB. I provide a defence 
against these problems at the end of this chapter. 
 
3.3.4.2.2. General criticisms of SWB in economics 
One of the strongest attacks on SWB in economics has come from Gul and 
Pesendorfer (2008). The general gist of their argument is that economics as a 
discipline has no substantive element or desires. They say that economics simply 
“provides a benchmark for the performance of economic institutions at aggregating 
individual preferences” (p.4) What is relevant here are the agents’ preferences as 
perceived by themselves and discussions of experiences “play no role in standard 
economic analysis because economics makes no predictions about them and has no 
data to test such prediction” (p.2). In sum, agents’ preferences are “given” and 
economics merely “evaluates the performance of economic institutions” (p.33). This 
kind of distinction between preference in economics and measures of SWB is also 
made frequently elsewhere, for example by Kimball and Willis (2006). 
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Other criticisms come from Sen (1999) and Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) who are 
sceptical of SWB measures because of the possibility of adaptation to circumstances. 
This can be summarised by the ‘happy slave’ phenomenon, whereby over time a slave 
could adapt to his dire circumstances to the extent that he does not report a low level 
of SWB anymore, despite fairing badly on nearly every kind of measure we would 
usually associate with human welfare such as good health, freedom and dignity. Near-
complete adaptation to significant life events such as paraplegia, lottery wins and end-
stage kidney disease has been well-documented in the literature (Loewenstein and 
Ubel, 2008).  
 
Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) also raise the problem that SWB (especially experience 
utility) may fail to capture the wide range of things that people deeply care about in 
life and hence may not be inclusive enough of a measure for policy analysis. This 
echoes long-standing concerns voiced in other disciplines, mainly from philosophers. 
Veenhoven (2004) organises the critiques on two grounds: First it does not make 
sense to prioritise one particular value only and second, that there are other values that 
rank higher than SWB and on the latter experience machine type arguments often 
come to the fore (Nozick, 1974).   
 
There is also the question of the sensitivity of SWB scores. Johns and Ormerod 
(2007) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) are concerned with the bounded nature of 
SWB measures. Since measures like happiness and life satisfaction are measured on 
scales like 1-7 or 0-10 this may make it insensitive to small impacts and after some 
point an effect, no matter how large or important may not be able to show up on 
people’s self-reports as people cannot state any higher (lower) than the upper (lower) 
bound on the scale. Relatedly, a number of studies have found that life satisfaction is 
highly stable over time due to personality traits (Costa and McCrae, 1980; 
Chamberlain and Zika, 1992; Eid and Diener, 2004; Lykken and Tellegen, 1996). 
Both Eid and Diener, (2004) and Lykken and Tellegen, (1996) find that only about 
15%-20% of the variation in evaluative wellbeing measures like life satisfaction is 
due to external factors and life circumstances. According to Lykken and Tellegen, 
(1996. p.188, 189) wellbeing is “largely determined genetically” and so trying to 
increase it is “futile”. Sunstein (2015) states that SWB metrics have limited reliability 
for policy analysis since it is difficult to map policy and regulatory changes onto 
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SWB. He claims that SWB measures are too ‘crude’ and ‘coarse’ and may not pick up 
things outside of significant life events. In terms of the latter Sunstein does concede 
that SWB measures do provide useful welfare information on employment and labour 
market interventions where the evidence is consistent and compelling. It should be 
noted that his claims are mainly made on intuitive grounds, rather than being based on 
empirical studies. 
 
3.3.4.2.3. SWB measurement issues 
In addition to the broad challenges set out above, there are issues regarding the extent 
to which SWB can be measured accurately in surveys. As discussed, the main SWB 
measure used in WV has been life satisfaction, which is usually elicited from the 
following type of question (taken from the British Household Panel Survey): “How 
disatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?” and responses are made on a 
scale of 1-7 or 0-10 and so on. I will focus on the measurement problems related to 
life satisfaction here. This section is mainly to recognise these problems and for 
completeness. And it should be noted that the adverse implications that they may have 
for the WV approach more generally is limited for two reasons. The first is that as I 
shall discuss in the next section many of these problems may not be as bad as once 
thought and that in fact there are strong arguments for using life satisfaction in WV. 
The second is that the WV approach is a general approach to valuation that can be 
applied with any measure of SWB and the solutions and new framework that I 
develop in Chapter 4 can be employed with any SWB measure. Therefore, any failure 
related to life satisfaction as a measure of SWB does not in any way imply that the 
WV approach is condemned or doomed. However, if we continue to use life 
satisfaction in WV (as I do in the new approach set out in Chapter 4) we need to be 
aware of these problems and issues. 
 
Life satisfaction is an evaluative measure of SWB, which it has been proposed, can be 
seen as being made up of a balance of affect (positive and negative emotions and 
feelings) together with a cognitive assessment of how well one’s life measures up to 
aspirations, goals and the achievements of others (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; 
Diener, 1984). A life satisfaction response is also said to incorporate to some extent a 
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retrospective judgement of one’s life together with how one feels now (Kahneman 
and Krueger, 2006).  
 
This retrospective element of the life satisfaction measure is what distinguishes it 
from experience SWB and is one source of the problems associated with evaluative 
measures because people do not always correctly remember past experiences. 
Furthermore, people’s present feelings can be influenced by contextual factors present 
at the time of the interview and biases can also arise in the stage of verbally reporting 
life satisfaction scores and due to adaptation (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; 
Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz and Strack, 1999).  
 
i. Remembering past experiences  
Experiments have shown that people’s remembered experiences can be biased due to 
their tendency to adopt a peak-end rule; in retrospective evaluations people place 
greatest weight on the peak (more intense part) and on the end of an experience. They 
attach less weight to the duration of an experience. There is therefore often a mis-
match between people‘s actual experiences at the time and their retrospective 
evaluations of these experiences (Kahneman et al., 1993; Schwarz, 2012). Wirtz et al. 
(2003) for example, compare people’s evaluations (satisfaction) of their holidays 
against their experiences during the holiday and find that people cannot accurately 
remember the wellbeing actually associated with holiday trips. 
 
ii. Within-person comparisons: which information is used?  
Bodenhausen and Wyer (1987) find that when responding to questions on satisfaction, 
“people truncate the search process as soon as enough information has come to mind 
to form a judgment with sufficient subjective certainty”. The judgment, therefore, 
tends to rely on the information that is most accessible in the moment and that 
accessibility depends on: a) the recency of the information and b) the frequency of its 
use. Self-reported satisfaction scores may thus only reflect a part of the experience of 
the individual tainted by most recent events and experiences. For example, analysis of 
longitudinal data on job satisfaction from the UK and Germany finds that peak and 
end job satisfaction are better predictors of quitting than overall job satisfaction 
ratings (Webb and Sheeran 2006). 
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In terms of accessibility, Strack et al. (1988) famously find that question ordering can 
influence this. By asking students how frequently they go on dates and their life 
satisfaction, they find no relationship if the life satisfaction question precedes the 
dating frequency question (correlation = -0.12) and a strong relationship if the 
ordering is reversed (correlation = 0.66). This was replicated by (Schwarz et al., 1991) 
with questions on marriage satisfaction and life satisfaction. The authors suggest that 
the effect of question-order effects increase when this draws attention to information 
that is not chronically accessible (eg: dating frequency rather than chronic pain). 
Question order effects, thus, may not affect all respondents (Schwarz and Strack, 
1999) – eg, respondents currently undergoing a divorce are unlikely to be affected by 
whether they are asked to consider their marriage before or after the general question 
because this information is frequently used by them (e.g. it relates to their current 
concerns). In other more recent studies a survey of fans of two English football clubs 
in the 2008 Champions League final found that fans of the losing team were less 
happy after the event when they had been asked about their happiness before the event 
(compared to those only asked after the event) (Dolan and Metcalfe, 2010). In this 
case, there was a contamination effect, where being reminded of one’s happiness in 
association with the defeat produced lower levels of happiness. This is in line with 
other studies (for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)). 
 
Further, conversational norms may amplify question order problems. For example, 
topics of conversation typically follow a logical pattern. So the respondent may 
assume that if they were just asked about their marriage satisfaction and then their life 
satisfaction, the question on life satisfaction should exclude how they feel about their 
marital life as they were just asked about that topic separately (Schwarz and Strack, 
1999). In sum, the information made salient by previous questions can impact heavily 
on SWB and satisfaction scores.  
 
iii. Between-person comparisons: Comparing self to others 
How satisfied we feel about our lives can be impacted on by whom we compare 
ourselves against. Strack et al. (1988) find that when interviewed by individuals with 
a disability, respondents have been found to subdue their life satisfaction responses. In 
contrast, when a disabled person was present in the same room as a respondent 
completing their own survey, their condition was used as a standard of comparison 
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with the result that life satisfaction scores were inflated. Recent studies using large 
national datasets corroborate that life satisfaction responses depend significantly on 
whom we compare ourselves with (Becchetti and Pelloni 2013; Frey et al. 2014).  
 
iv. How an assessment of one’s life is constructed 
Satisfaction scores also depend on what prior life events come to mind when making 
an assessment. Because of the accessibility effect, a positive or negative life event that 
comes to mind may impact on life satisfaction. Or prior life events may result in a 
positive (or negative) effect on life satisfaction scores because they create a 
benchmark (known as a contrast effect).  
 
Strack et al. (1985) asked respondents to report either three positive or negative recent 
events that are temporarily accessible. Respondents reported higher life satisfaction 
when they thought of positive recent events. The authors suggest that people include 
accessible recent events when assessing their current lives but use distant events to 
form a standard of comparison (Tversky and Griffin, 1991). The problems are that (i) 
the memory of these events may not be a fair assessment of how good or bad 
comparators they provide, and (ii) that trivial recent events and circumstances may 
taint the overall life satisfaction scores of respondents, leading to a mis-alignment 
between life satisfaction reports and actual experiences.  
 
v. Context effects 
The research instrument itself and other contextual factors can have a large influence 
on responses to life satisfaction questions. Current mood can impact on responses to 
life satisfaction questions in two ways. Thinking about one’s life whilst in a good 
mood may lead to the selective retrieval of positive information that leads to an 
affirmation of their life and a more positive evaluation. Or people may also take their 
current mood as a good indicator of their wellbeing in life in general (Schwarz and 
Strack, 1999). Some evidence suggests that the latter explanation may be more 
accurate and that people use a ‘current-mood-heuristic’ to judge overall life 
satisfaction (Schwarz and Clore, 2003). There are a number of factors that can impact 
on people’s moods. In a set of famous studies Schwarz et al. (1987) (see Schwarz and 
Strack, 1999) show that finding money before the survey, spending time in a pleasant 
versus unpleasant room or seeing your football team win the night before increases 
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life satisfaction responses. Schwarz and Clore (1983) telephoned people on sunny and 
rainy days to ask life satisfaction. The results showed that on sunny days, people 
reported being in a better mood, being happier and having higher life satisfaction. 
Whilst such trivial factors are likely to influence current mood, they should not have 
notable effects on overall life satisfaction and it is telling that in the Schwarz and 
Clore (1983) study when the weather was drawn to the respondent’s attention, this 
mood effect disappeared, meaning that it isn’t salient information in the construction 
of one’s overall life satisfaction.  Relatedly, Kavetsos et al. (2014) explore the 
influence of calendar effects on reports of life satisfaction. They use Eurobarometer 
data from 31 countries over a 20 year period. They find that day and month of the 
interview are statistically significant, but not time of day. Their results show that, 
compared to June, life satisfaction increases in December, January and February and 
decreases in October. And that life satisfaction responses are lower on Sundays, which 
they suggest reflects pre-work anxiety.  
 
vi. Reporting life satisfaction  
Individuals may adjust their life satisfaction scores when reporting them in order to 
give more socially desirable responses. For example, reported wellbeing is higher in 
face-to-face surveys than in postal surveys (Smith, 1979). When interviewed by 
individuals with a disability, respondents have been found to subdue their life 
satisfaction responses. In contrast, when a disabled person was present in the same 
room as a respondent completing their own survey, their condition was used as 
standard of comparison with the result that life satisfaction scores were inflated 
(Strack et al., 1990). Indeed, more generally, life satisfaction ratings are likely to be 
determined to some extent by the comparisons people make with their own life at 
different times and with other people at one point in time (Diener and Suh, 1997; 
Dolan and White, 2006). Furthermore, Haybron (2010) notes that we probably do not 
generally live our lives thinking about how satisfied we are at every moment, which 
may make life satisfaction a difficult concept to grasp, measure and report. As a result 
life satisfaction scores may be 'inert' to life circumstances and events. The general 
problem with these effects is that respondents may provide assessments of their 
wellbeing that do not reflect the true experiences of their lives (Dolan and Kahneman, 
2008). 
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vii. The impact of counterfactuals  
When constructing an assessment of one’s life satisfaction one’s life’s circumstances 
may be compared relative to a counterfactual state of the world. For instance, getting 
a place on the podium is an aim that most athletes will hold going into major 
competitions, but there is evidence to show that winners of bronze medals have been 
found to be more satisfied than silver medallists (Medvec et al., 1995).  
One explanation is that missing out on the gold medal (counterfactual for silver 
medallists) hurts more than missing out on a silver medal (counterfactual for bronze 
medallists). Or it could be that the counterfactual for bronze medalists was actually no 
medal (fourth place). This effect depends how respondents explain current life events 
and circumstances to themselves, which may differ or change depending on the 
context they find themselves in during the survey (Boninger et al., 1994). If the 
counterfactual event was inferior then present satisfaction may increase and vice 
versa.  
 
viii. Adaptation 
It is often cited that evaluative measures are problematic due to adaptation effects. 
People in dire conditions may report reasonably high levels of evaluative wellbeing 
because they have adapted to their conditions, whereas on closer inspection their lives 
are terrible when measured on any objective outcome. This is Sen’s ‘happy slave’ 
problem and is especially pertinent to health conditions. For example, Brickman et 
al.’s (1978) famous study showed that after some time paraplegics were no less 
satisfied with life than able-bodied people. These problems were a major driver of 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s approaches to endowments and capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000).  
 
ix. Measuring experiences  
Many of the criticisms above relate to the fact that evaluative measures of wellbeing, 
such as life satisfaction, may not be accurate reflections of the quality of our 
experiences at the time. Kahneman has been a proponent of using experienced utility, 
defined as the quality and intensity of an hedonic experience as the basis for 
policymaking (for example see Dolan and Kahneman, 2008; Kahneman and Krueger, 
2006; Kahneman and Sugden, 2005; Kahneman et al., 1997). Experienced utility is a 
sum of the moment-to-moment ‘utils’ of an experience and it can be traced back to 
the work of the Classical Utilitarians, such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill 
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(Backhouse, 2002; Hausman and McPherson, 2006). Experienced utility can be 
measured using the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) or 
the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) (Kahneman et al., 2004). The ESM collects 
information on people’s reported feelings in real-time during selected moments of the 
day using a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA). Respondents report their activity at the 
time and their subjective experiences, such as anger, happiness and fatigue.  
 
This does not involve a cognitive assessment of well-being on behalf of the 
participant and is therefore a measure of peoples’ positive and negative affect 
(Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). One criticism of the ESM has been that it is intrusive 
and can interrupt the flow of people‘s experiences. As an alternative, the DRM was 
developed. This method asks people to fill out diaries of their day reporting what they 
were doing and how they felt during those episodes in terms of positive and negative 
affect. The DRM is less intrusive than ESM, but does rely, to some extent on 
remembered utility, but the evidence suggests that over the span of one day DRM 
responses align neatly with ESM responses – in other words retrospective assessments 
covering one day or less are able to measure experiences well.  
 
Experienced utility methods reduce reliance on remembered utility and are less 
susceptible to irrelevant contextual factors. ESM, in some circles, is now taken to be 
the gold standard in wellbeing evaluation and reporting (Kahneman and Krueger, 
2006; Schwarz, 2012; Gilbert, 2007). An assessment of how life is going for someone 
can be gauged from the summation of ESM or DRM reports over a long period of 
time.  
 
3.3.4.3. Arguments in favour of life satisfaction 
So which measure of welfare should we use in policy analysis and non-market 
valuation? Although Haybron (2010) suggests that there is no consensus way of 
determining a good theory of welfare from a bad one, I will use a mix of empirical 
evidence and philosophical argument to put a case forward for evaluative measures 
like life satisfaction. However, as discussed it should be kept in mind that any 
measure of SWB can actually be used in the WV framework. 
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1. We should note that the correlation between life satisfaction and the supposed gold 
standard experienced utility (affect) measures is likely to be strong (Diener, 1993). 
 
2. There is also a variety of evidence to suggest that overall life satisfaction is a good 
measure of well-being. Many studies have been unable to replicate the results from 
Schwarz and Strack's seminal work on the contextual biases in life satisfaction, 
hinting that these issues may not be such as concern as first thought (Haybron, 2010; 
Diener and Suh, 1997). Pavot and Diener (1993), Eid and Diener (2004), Fujita and 
Diener (2005) and Schimmack et al. (2002b) find mood, question order and 
contextual effects to be limited and problems are not so serious as to invalidate life 
satisfaction measures (Pavot and Diener, 1993). Eid and Diener (2004) find mood 
effects to be much more problematic for domain satisfaction measures than for global 
life satisfaction measures and that part of the mood effects may be driven by the use 
of a timeframe such as “these days” or “nowadays” in the evaluative wellbeing survey 
question wording (which helps to explain the differences between their study findings 
and those of Schwarz and Strack (1999). Diener et al. (1999) find social desirability 
influences to be minimal and in fact they claim that there is reason to believe that 
social desirability is a valid component of wellbeing as it taps in to important aspects 
of personality that are consequential for an individual’s wellbeing. Diener et al. (1999. 
p.53) conclude that response artifacts “do not represent any prohibitive barrier to the 
accurate assessment of SWB by direct self-report”. There is also some evidence that 
data collected from aggregated moment-to-moment experiences through ESM 
converge well with global or retrospective reports although this depends greatly on 
how ‘convergence’ is defined by the study (Scollon et al., 2003). Schimmack and 
Oishi (2005), Schimmack et al. (2002a) and Heller et al. (2004) find that most of the 
variance in life satisfaction is due to changes and impacts happening at domain level 
wellbeing.  
 
Sandvik et al. (1993) and Shizgal (1999) demonstrate that there is a strong positive 
correlation between well-being ratings and emotions such as smiling and frowning. 
Research shows that Duchenne smiles (i.e. a type of smiling that involves a muscle 
near the eye called orbicularis oculi, pars laterali, which can distinguish between true 
and feigned enjoyment) are correlated with subjective well-being (Ekman et al., 
1990). Urry et al. (2004) show that reports of life satisfaction are correlated with 
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activity in the left pre-frontal cortex of the brain, which is the area associated with 
sensations of positive emotions and pleasure.  
 
3. Furthermore, many studies have found that wellbeing and life satisfaction are good 
predictors of future behaviour (Frijters, 2000; Clark et al., 2008; Scollon et al., 2003; 
Haybron, 2010) and health (Kimball and Willis, 2006), such as heart disease (Sales 
and House, 1971) and strokes (Huppert, 2006). Frijters (2000) finds evidence from 
large national German and Russian datasets that people try to maximise life 
satisfaction in their choices to some extent - people are more likely to try to change 
areas of their lives with which they are less satisfied. A number of studies have found 
that life satisfaction predicts suicide (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Benjamin et al 
(2012) compare people's choices and their predicted SWB under a variety of 
hypothetical decision scenarios, such as labour market choices. They find that SWB is 
systematically the best predictor of choice (compared to other life circumstances) and 
that among different SWB measures, such as happiness and sense of purpose, life 
satisfaction was the best determinant. Cohen et al. (2003) find that people who report 
higher life satisfaction were less likely to catch a cold and would recover quicker if 
they did. Kiecolt-Glaser et al. (2002) find that people with higher life satisfaction heal 
more quickly from wounds.  
 
4. Life satisfaction also seems to be “observable to others” and there is strong 
convergence between self and third party (family members and friends) reports of 
one’s wellbeing (Pavot et al., 1991) suggesting that in so far as we can take third party 
reports to be of genuine value - Lucas et al. (1996) discuss some reasons for caution - 
“life satisfaction is a consistent and stable phenomenon; it is not simply constructed at 
the moment by the subject based on short term factors” (Pavot et al., 1991. p.158). 
 
5. Krueger and Schkade (2008) assess the test-retest reliability of life satisfaction 
responses. They question the same sample of women two weeks apart and find that 
correlation in life satisfaction responses was about r = 0.59, which relates closely to 
results from studies by Kammann and Flett (1983). Schimmack et al. (2002a) find 
higher retest correlations for life satisfaction over a three month period (r = 0.73). 
Krueger and Schkade (2008) conclude that these levels of test-retest reliability “are 
probably sufficiently high to yield informative estimates for……research”. Other 
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related work of interest by Ehrhardt et al. (2000) finds that the within-subject 
variation in life satisfaction scores falls over time signifying that people ‘learn’ how 
to respond accurately to life satisfaction questions over time – with practice they are 
better able to assess their life satisfaction, which suggests that panel studies like the 
BHPS are able to increase the validity of their data over time.   
 
In sum, Diener et al. (1999. p.278) claim that global self-report measures like life 
satisfaction “possess adequate psychometric properties” and “show moderate 
convergence with daily moods” and third party reports and “recall for positive versus 
negative life events”. The evidence overall suggests that life satisfaction has 
reasonably high construct and convergent validity properties. Veenhoven (2004. p.7) 
states that although there is always potential to find some deficiencies he has 
reviewed the literature on the critiques of life satisfaction and has “concluded that 
there is no evidence that responses to these questions measure something other than 
what they are meant to measure”.  
 
6. The issue of adaptation seems somewhat overstated. I would agree with Layard 
(2006. p.29) who argues that “we should seek to work with human nature as it is”.  
Hence if there are some experiences to which people do not adapt and others to which 
they do or partially do then this “information is relevant to policy”. Hence, adaptation 
is something we should seek to understand and measure for policy rather than using 
the issue as an argument against some measures of SWB (Menzel et al., 2003). 
 
7. I would also echo Loewenstein and Ubel’s (2008) argument that experienced utility 
measures may not pick up everything that is of importance to people. This argument 
is also strongly made by some philosophers (e.g., Haybron, 2007; Haybron, 2000).  
Measures like life satisfaction will, in addition to mood, capture an evaluation of 
people’s lives – how their life compares to their aspirations and to others (Diener, 
1984; Diener, 1994; Diener et al., 2009). Although we have discussed how this may 
serve to bias life satisfaction responses when our judgements are strongly tainted by 
how well our peers are doing, the evaluative element allows us to pick up broad 
aspects of wellbeing such as goal attainment and the attitude towards a particular 
experience that on reflection may also be an important part of our wellbeing (Kelman, 
2005) and many experiences may be more (or less) valuable at the point of reflection 
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than in the moment (Bok, 2010). Arguably life is not just about having a plurality of 
good moments it can be more or less than the sum of the parts and global evaluative 
measures are able to provide a more holistic perspective (Haybron 2007; Bok, 2010). 
Haybron (2007. p.120) asks the valid question “how important to me is something I 
care about, considered in isolation?” There will clearly be higher fidelity of ESM and 
DRM methods in reference to moment-to-moment experiences but the methods are 
unlikely to capture what Diener (1993) terms ‘meta-moods’, which concerns the 
conceptualisation of one’s emotions.  
 
The following thought experiment is interesting. Assume there is some organization 
or person(s) that have been tasked with the very difficult job of choosing what you 
should do at every stage of your life. The objective for them is to maximize your 
wellbeing. This could be for example the government, a dictator or your parents. In 
this scenario - which is not so far-fetched as it seems, because in effect this type of 
role is assumed by all parents at the early stages of a child’s life – would you be 
happy with the decision-making organisation or person to base their decisions for you 
entirely on your hedonic state? I would posit that most people would want their 
evaluations of the events in their lives to count before the decision-making entity 
decides to prohibit marathon running (even if such evaluations are based to some 
extent on comparisons we make against others, on our current moods and so on). 
Indeed, if confronted by a choice between having the decision makers base their 
judgments for us on our hedonic states or on our evaluative measures of SWB, such as 
life satisfaction, then I would guess that most people would opt for the latter. I am not 
aware of any experiment that tests this hypothesis, but the fact that probably very few 
of us hold a grudge against our parents now (as adults) for constantly not letting us eat 
that extra chocolate bar or for not letting us play that extra hour on the Nintendo when 
we were kids is some supporting (if anecdotal) evidence - for if we had been fully 
informed as children, constantly eating that extra chocolate bar and getting to play one 
more hour on the Nintendo would have shown up negatively for evaluative wellbeing 
but positively for hedonic measures. Similar conclusions could be made for drug and 
alcohol abuse. 
 
8. To this line of argument I would like to add examples of cases where an evaluative 
measure seems to be much more adept at picking up the wellbeing of an experience 
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than experienced utility measures. The first case is sleep. Take John, whose life is 
going well for him in all aspects except for his sleeping patterns and quality. John has 
experienced different variants of the same nightmare for 3 months on a fairly 
consistent basis. In the dream, John experiences everything as if it were real, but on 
waking quickly realises that it was all a bad dream and gets on with the rest of the 
day. For obvious reasons ESM methods cannot survey John during his sleep. In 
John’s case he does not fear the nightmares before going to bed as he knows they are 
not real and are only ‘mild’ and on waking he can rationalise the experience and 
forget about them. Thus, ESM readings just before and after sleep would not pick up 
anything untoward. But given a choice John would surely prefer to be rid of the 
nightmares and the experience itself during sleep is unpleasant and on reflection John 
is bothered by them to some extent and does feel that overall his quality of life is 
reduced by the continuing nightmares. If this were a policy-related issue, then as 
policy makers we would surely want to help John overcome these problems and hence 
in this sense an evaluative measure (and indeed preferences) would provide a better 
gauge of John’s welfare. There are experiences, therefore, that ESM and experienced 
utility measures cannot capture. This is quite a specific case, but as we shall see next 
there are others. 
 
The second case concerns activities where the final episodes of the event have 
extreme contrasts. Two examples would be marathon running and childbirth. Take a 
professional athlete who has trained hard for years and is now in the final stages of an 
Olympics marathon competition, which he is to win and receive the gold medal. The 
marathon is of course a paramount part of the athlete’s life and goals. But measuring 
the athlete’s quality of life in relation to the marathon using ESM say by asking for 
hedonic wellbeing responses during the marathon would probably show the event to 
be neutral for wellbeing.  
 
The starting couple of hours may be pleasant to some extent although increasingly 
hard-going. If ESM measures experienced utility as the hedonic states we would like 
it to, then we would expect the final few miles of the marathon to be devastatingly 
negative for the athlete’s wellbeing. The win and realisation of the attainment of the 
gold medal would then bring euphoria, which would help to offset the negative affect. 
But because there are question marks about the extent to which hedonic states capture 
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an evaluative component it may not be possible for the athlete to rationalise his 
experiences over the last few miles and overall the whole experience of the marathon 
could converge on being neutral for the athlete’s wellbeing. Now, of course if we 
were to take ESM data for a long enough period after the end of the race and receipt 
of the gold medal, then the whole event may show up as a very positive experience 
overall, but what if we want to survey the athlete soon after having finished the 
marathon or if we cannot take ESM data for an extended period of time, then we 
would be left with an overall neutral effect of the marathon win. This seems deeply 
worrying because intuitively we would expect such accomplishments to have huge 
positive impacts on wellbeing instantly and it could be argued that the greatest 
positive impacts would be right at the point of accomplishment, when euphoria and a 
realisation of what you have achieved set in. Also, some may argue that the final 
episodes of the marathon should not show up as negative for wellbeing, since 
although the athlete is in great pain and discomfort, it is a ‘good’ or ‘purposeful’ pain 
because it represents the culmination of the athlete’s devoted work and training. 
 
If, on the other hand, we were to survey the athlete using an evaluative measure like 
life satisfaction straight after the marathon win, then it is fair to say that we would 
expect a big positive effect on wellbeing. This would also be the case if we surveyed 
him a period of time after the event. And indeed if we were able to take a life 
satisfaction reading during the final stages of the run, we would expect it to show up 
as positive as the measure allows for the athlete to provide a more general evaluation 
of his life which means he can rationalise the pain and discomfort in the response. 
 
A very similar story could be made for people giving natural birth, where the process 
is devastatingly (and increasingly) painful, but it is dominated by the positive 
euphoric outcome of bringing a new life into the world.  Again, intuitively I think we 
would like the positive effect of childbirth to show up instantly and for the pain to be 
represented as ‘good’ or ‘purposeful’ pain and it could be argued that evaluative 
measures best capture this. 
 
If experienced hedonic wellbeing measures were to produce wellbeing responses in 
line with our intuitions for these extreme contrast events, then it would suggest that 
they have somehow incorporated an evaluative component and hence by definition 
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would not be experienced utility measures any more. The three scenarios (sleep, 
marathon running and childbirth) set out above are of course quite specific, but they 
show circumstances when ESM and experienced utility measures are likely to do a 
poor job. There are likely to be other occasions and circumstances that we observe or 
can think of that are equally problematic for experienced utility measures. An 
interesting response to the problem is Dolan’s (2014) suggestion to measure purpose 
in the moment as a hedonic measure. This would provide a potential solution to the 
types of issues discussed above, but I am not aware of any studies that have looked at 
the convergence between Dolan’s hedonic purpose measure and evaluative SWB 
measures such as life satisfaction. 
 
The upshot is that experienced utility should not always be seen as the ‘gold standard’ 
approach to measuring wellbeing. It is interesting to compare the situation with 
another important area of policy analysis, namely causal inference, to crystallise this 
conclusion. In causal inference randomised trials are taken to be the gold standard 
approach. There are of course many occasions when a trial cannot be undertaken due 
to practical, resource or ethical constraints and concerns. But still for any kind of 
intervention if a robust trial can be undertaken then it represents the best possible 
method for understanding causal effect. The same cannot be said of ESM and 
experienced utility measures, because as I have shown even if there were no 
constraints to the use of an ESM survey, the survey would not provide the best 
measures of human wellbeing in certain circumstances and for certain events and 
episodes. Thus, ESM does not attain the gold standard standing associated with 
randomised trials. The relative advantages of ESM and experienced utility compared 
to evaluative wellbeing measures are context-dependent rather than ubiquitous. 
 
9. Although Kahneman and Sugden (2005) disagree from a theoretical standpoint in 
actuality when looking empirically at the large amount of academic work in this field 
it is extraordinary that a response to a simple life satisfaction question, which takes on 
average a few seconds to muster, is highly sensitive to nearly everything that we 
would expect and in the right direction – it varies with short, medium and long term 
factors and life events (Pavot and Diener, 1993; Schimmack and Oishi, 2005) – 
including anything from marriage to playing football or from employment to going to 
a library (Fujiwara et al., 2014; Fujiwara and Campbell, 2011). This suggests that 
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Haybron’s (2010) concerns that life satisfaction may be inert to life circumstances are 
not supported by the available evidence. In some ways an argument for life 
satisfaction can be made in a manner akin to Milton Friedman’s famous statement that 
a theory does not have to be realistic, it just needs to work/be predictive. For some, 
life satisfaction might not be a ‘realistic’ measure of wellbeing as it is a short single-
item measure that may miss a lot, but despite this it certainly has shown that it has 
high predictive power as it aligns with everything we would assume to be of 
importance to wellbeing.  
 
10. Life satisfaction permits the case where we feel life is going well although we 
may not feel happy at every minute and hence has an advantage over hedonic 
wellbeing measures in this respect. For example, in the case of training for a marathon 
in the rain where our watch broke which means we got home late and missed our 
favourite show on TV, we would probably have a low level of hedonic wellbeing 
throughout the gruelling training and when we got home to find that the TV 
programme had finished. However, some of us may not care about this at all in the 
grand scheme of things and may on reflection be happy with ourselves about having 
got in another training session under such testing circumstances. 
Building on this argument an important advantage of evaluative wellbeing measures 
like life satisfaction is that it gives the individual the power to determine just how 
important their feelings are to their sense of wellbeing. Hedonic measures provide a 
real-time assessment of someone’s feelings, but for some people those types of 
feelings may be irrelevant in some cases or may be more important in some situations 
(e.g. happiness is not an important factor for me when I am in the act of training hard 
in the gym or for a marathon, or when I am helping my children with their 
homework). People might have complex systems, processes and ideas about the 
importance of different feelings when thinking about how good their lives are which 
would be tracked and borne out in life satisfaction responses and scores, but which 
would not be accurately represented in hedonic measures. In sum, life satisfaction 
offers a meta-analysis over moods and feelings, as rated and judged by the individual, 
which hedonic measures cannot do at the risk of not providing accurate measures of 
wellbeing. 
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11. There are also issues related to cost and practicality that are conceded even by the 
strongest proponents of experience measures such as Kahneman and Schwarz (e.g. 
see Kahneman et al., 2004). DRM and even more so ESM methods are very costly to 
run as they require repetitive sampling over periods of time in order to build a picture 
of SWB. A typical ESM study lasts one to two weeks (Scollon et al., 2003) and so for 
policies that have impacts that last for only days or weeks ESM and DRM methods 
may be viable, but this becomes increasingly difficult if we want to know the impacts 
of policy outcomes like health, crime and employment over long periods of time such 
as a year. Evaluative measures are able to cover a much longer time frame (Scollon et 
al., 2003) and life satisfaction questions have a long history in large surveys – these 
types of questions have been asked since 1965 to more than one million people all 
over the world (van Pragg et al., 2003).  
 
There is also the problem of attrition or selection bias in experience wellbeing surveys 
(Kahneman et al., 2004). Motivation plays an important role in whether people 
continue to complete experience surveys properly; Scollon et al. (2003) find that 
people in good health and those with more spare time (the unemployed and students) 
were more likely to complete ESM surveys. And more recent work such as 
Mackerron’s Mappiness application for iPhone (http://www.mappiness.org.uk) clearly 
uses a highly self-selecting sample of the UK population (MacKerron and Mourato, 
2009). Scollon at et al. (2003. p.16) conclude that “the most compliant participants for 
experience sampling studies will be conscientious, agreeable, non-depressed, young 
people who are not too busy – essentially college students”. This in itself is an 
interesting population to study, but may not be whom policy makers are primarily 
concerned with. Thus, due to measurement issues, by no means is there a consensus 
among wellbeing scholars that experience measures are the ‘gold standard’ (Scollon 
et al., 2003) and there is uncertainty regarding whether the additional costs associated 
with collecting ESM or DRM data is outweighed by the benefits of experienced utility 
measures. 
 
In terms of practicality and costs, then, the most viable measure of overall wellbeing 
for use in non-market goods valuation is likely to be the type of global life satisfaction 
question that is included in large national datasets like the BHPS.  
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12. Finally there is evidence that the general public also favours evaluative measures 
of wellbeing, like life satisfaction, for policy making. In a study by Dolan and 
Metcalfe (2011) 1,082 members of the UK public were asked a series of questions 
related to the importance to them of different measures of welfare.  In terms of 
importance to people’s own lives and to government resource allocation decisions 
SWB was clearly far more important than preference satisfaction or objective 
wellbeing measures. People were then asked to choose between evaluative, 
experienced and eudemoinic measures of SWB and in terms of government-level 
resource decisions evaluative wellbeing or life satisfaction came out on top. Although 
the sample was self-selected it was broadly representative of the UK population and 
hence provides support for using life satisfaction in policy evaluation and decisions. 
And as we work more with such measures we will surely start to see the Heisenberg 
principle at work – what we as society measure will influence what we seek and value 
(Diener and Seligman, 2004; Dolan and White, 2007). 
 
This type of evidence is supported by Ng (2003) who claims that welfare economics 
is too narrow in its focus on preference since what we care about ultimately is welfare 
and happiness. He states that "happiness is more ultimate than preference" (2003. 
p.309) and that the most important question for public policies is whether they 
increase happiness. Similarly, Diener et al (1999) argue that social (or objective) 
indicators are not sufficient on their own and that policy should be based on people’s 
subjective experiences. And similar claims have some history in economics (for a full 
discussion see Ng, 2003). 
 
There are a number of high-profile proponents of evaluative measures of wellbeing 
such as life satisfaction. Sumner (1996) places evaluative measures at the centre of his 
account of wellbeing; for Sumner life goes well for someone if they have a positive 
attitude towards their life, encompassing both a cognitive and an affective component. 
Hedonic measures are problematic because they are too narrow with their focus on 
mental states. Sumner sets out a list of criteria for a valid measure of welfare, 
evidence of which I have covered above. Diener et al. (2009. ch.7. p.11) claim that if 
we want the broadest level of assessment of welfare, then evaluative measures “may 
provide the best conclusions”. 
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In this section I have set out arguments and a strong case for the use of subjective 
wellbeing measures and more specifically life satisfaction in public policy and non-
market valuation. These arguments would garner the support of many wellbeing 
scholars as I have shown above, but there will undoubtedly be those who voice 
significant concerns about the approach that I am taking here: Daniel Kahneman and 
Paul Dolan come to mind. But the important thing to note, as shall be highlighted in 
the next sections is that actually the wellbeing valuation approach does not rely on the 
robustness or validity of life satisfaction as a measure of human welfare. Indeed, 
policy analysis and valuation can be undertaken with any SWB metric; the wellbeing 
valuation methodology I set out in the next sections could use evaluative, experienced 
or eudemonic measures of SWB. The main issue, therefore, is more the acceptance of 
SWB as a general measure for public policy and there is plenty of support for this in 
the UK and in many other countries.  
 
The thesis from here on focuses on the methodology behind wellbeing valuation and 
the interpretation of wellbeing values. The focus is on developing a new methodology 
that allows us to use wellbeing valuation to derive value estimates that are in line with 
the economic theory of CS and ES set out in Chapter 2. This general methodology can 
be used with any measure of SWB, but in what follows I shall use life satisfaction as 
the base SWB measure without any further caveats or defence. 
 
3.4. Summary 
 
SWB data is being increasingly used in economics and in policy analysis and 
evaluation. I set out a brief introduction to the WV method and argue that the WV 
method should be seen as distinct to preference-based methods and as such we should 
not compare values derived using WV against those from preference-based methods 
such as stated preference and revealed preference valuation methods.  
 
I provide a number of reasons and arguments for using WV to value non-market 
goods and services and also provide a defence of life satisfaction, the key SWB 
measure used in the WV approach. The next chapter builds a new approach to WV 
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that seeks to address and solve for the key technical problems associated with the 
current WV methodology. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4. A new approach to wellbeing valuation 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis set out the rationale for wellbeing valuation, provided a brief 
introduction to the methodology and discussed the main pros and cons of the method. 
Chapters 4 and 5 represent the main contributions of this thesis to the literature on 
wellbeing valuation. The five main contributions I make in the following two chapters 
are as follows: 
 
i. A new framework for assessing the validity of wellbeing valuation 
(Chapter 4).  
 
ii. A full theoretical exposition of the wellbeing valuation approach. The 
literature to date has not adequately shown the conditions under which 
wellbeing valuation can provide theoretically-consistent measures of welfare 
change. I provide the first full theoretical exposition of the wellbeing valuation 
approach (Chapter 4).  
 
iii. A detailed critical assessment of the current wellbeing valuation 
methodology. Since the literature has not provided a complete theoretical 
exposition of wellbeing valuation it has not been possible to critique the 
current methods in full. I will discuss the main technical problems associated 
with the current methods and what this may mean in terms of biases in the 
current results (Chapter 4).   
 
iv. A new methodology for wellbeing valuation. The new method provides a 
framework for estimating theoretically-consistent measures of welfare change 
using wellbeing valuation (Chapter 5).  
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v. A full interpretation of the values estimated using the wellbeing valuation 
approach.  The literature to date has been pretty silent on this issue and where 
it has been discussed there have been a number of inaccuracies (Chapter 5). 
 
In Chapter 5 I will showcase the new wellbeing valuation methodology with a case 
study applied to valuing non-pecuniary employment outcomes. The discussion from 
here will take life satisfaction as the given measure, but as discussed any other 
measure of SWB can be substituted in place of life satisfaction. 
 
4.2. Assessing the validity of wellbeing valuation 
 
The key question with regards to the validity and robustness of the wellbeing 
valuation approach relates to the extent with which wellbeing valuation derives robust 
measures of welfare change as set out in economic theory. This is the task of all 
valuation methods in economics. In this respect, Luechinger and Raschky (2009) and 
Frey et al. (2009) set out a list of criteria for robust wellbeing valuation. I have put 
these criteria into broader categories and further developed them as I felt they were 
not comprehensive enough.  
 
4.2.1. Validity criteria for wellbeing valuation 
 
Criterion A: Construct validity 
The measure of SWB used in wellbeing valuation must be a valid measure of welfare - 
both in terms of the normative foundations as well as technical issues related to 
measurement error, such that it is a true reflection of how our lives are going 
(Luechinger and Raschky, 2009;  Frey et al., 2009). 
 
Criterion B: Scaling of wellbeing scores 
SWB scores must be interpersonally comparable and for the purpose of statistical 
methodology we need to determine whether life satisfaction is ordinal or cardinal in 
nature (Luechinger and Raschky, 2009; Frey et al., 2009).  
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In addition to these two criteria the following stipulations that I have developed in this 
thesis are required and they are areas I will cover in some detail: 
 
Criterion C: Technical validity 
The statistical methodology employed in wellbeing valuation must be capable of 
estimating compensating and equivalent measures of welfare change in line with 
economic theory (as set out in section 2.2.). A key requirement here is to estimate 
causal effects of the non-market good and income on wellbeing. 
 
Criterion D: Interpretation 
The values derived from wellbeing valuation must be interpreted correctly in terms of 
their normative meaning as well as any technical caveats. This will allow for 
meaningful comparisons of the values against values from preference-based methods 
and for a meaningful interpretation of the results from evaluation frameworks that 
use the values, such as CBA. 
 
With these two additional criteria we can agree with Luechinger and Raschky, (2009. 
p.622) that if these requirements are met life satisfaction measures and the general 
wellbeing valuation methodology can be used to value non-market goods. We will be 
able to derive theoretically-consistent measures of welfare change with a robust 
interpretation for use in policy evaluation. Criteria (A), (B) and (C) ensure that the 
values derived from wellbeing valuation are robust and theoretically-consistent, and 
criterion (D) ensures that the right interpretation is made. 
 
This thesis assesses each of these criteria, but the main focus and contribution is 
towards criteria (C) and (D). The discussions related to criteria (A) and (B) are based 
on a review and assessment of the previous literature in this field. I have dealt with 
issues related to construct validity (A) in depth in Chapter 3. The summary from that 
discussion is that there are arguments and evidence both in favour and against the 
construct validity of life satisfaction, the primary measure of SWB used in wellbeing 
valuation. I have provided a strong defence for life satisfaction and would argue that 
the counter evidence is certainly not strong enough to dismiss the role of life 
satisfaction and other evaluative measures of SWB in wellbeing valuation. And 
indeed, as discussed, if there were a preference for a different measure of SWB, the 
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new theoretical approach set out in this thesis could equally be applied to that 
measure. I will, therefore, set aside issues related to construct validity for the rest of 
this thesis and use life satisfaction measures in my exposition of the wellbeing 
valuation approach. The next sections address criteria (B), (C) and (D). 
 
4.3. Scaling of wellbeing scores (Criterion (B)) 
 
4.3.1. Ordinality versus cardinality 
 
There is some discussion in the wellbeing literature on the cardinality of SWB scores, 
which is to say whether a given change in SWB scores, say a one index point 
increase, represents the same psychological impact along the whole length of the 
scale. In other words, is the change in life satisfaction from 2 to 3 equivalent in 
psychological or emotional terms as a change from 6 to 7?  
 
Psychologists and sociologists have tended to be happy to assume cardinality and use 
methods like ordinary least squares (OLS) regression when analysing SWB data. 
Economists, on the other hand, have been more tentative and many papers have used 
ordinal models such as ordered probits (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 2000; Clark 
and Oswald, 1994; van Praag et al., 2000; Mcbride, 2001; Tsurumi and Managi, 2016; 
Aoshima et al., 2018; Mendoza et al., 2019). This issue is not so important for 
wellbeing valuation for two reasons. First, marginal rates of substitution can be 
measured from ordered response models (Luechinger and Raschky, 2009). Second, 
anyway running life satisfaction models with ordinal and cardinal models produces 
near identical results both in terms of the ranking of life satisfaction determinants in 
order of effect size and in terms of the actual magnitude of the coefficients 
(Luechinger and Raschky, 2009). For these reasons most wellbeing valuation studies 
have used OLS models under the assumption of cardinality and I shall follow this 
trend here. 
 
4.3.2. Interpersonal comparability 
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Here we are interested in whether similar SWB scores across individuals reflect 
similar life circumstances and levels of welfare. More formally, interpersonal 
comparability allows us to determine relationships such as 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖 >  𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑗 for two or 
more different individuals. Following Robbins, it became the norm or fashion in 
economics to eschew the notion of interpersonal comparability of utility or welfare 
(Hammond, 1991; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2002), which left economists limited to 
identifying Pareto efficient outcomes or improvements for the purpose of policy 
analysis. 
 
The issue of interpersonal comparability of utility in terms of the preference 
satisfaction account of welfare has been discussed at length by Hammond (1991) and 
Harsanyi (1955). In terms of wellbeing valuation (and wellbeing analysis more 
generally) the issue of interpersonal comparability is nicely described by Gilbert 
(2007). Gilbert (2007. p.47, 50, 52) states that SWB may become interpersonally 
incomparable due to the uniqueness of our previous experiences, which leads to what 
he calls the 'language-squishing hypothesis' or the 'experience-stretching hypothesis'.  
 
Language-squishing is where impoverished experiences or histories force people to 
rate very highly experiences that to other (more fortunate) people would only 
represent very mediocre experiences. In this case i's 9 out of 10 only represents a 4 
out of 10 for j. An impoverished experiential background may also lead to experience-
stretching, whereby i's 9 out of 10 has the same psychological magnitude as j's 9 out 
of 10, but i reports a 9 for the event of merely eating a piece of cake, whereas j reports 
a 9 for having won a nobel prize. It is a case of i being happy because he does not 
know what he is missing out on. 
 
Which of these hypotheses is correct? Gilbert does not go on to say, and instead he 
makes the important conclusion that "all claims of happiness are claims from 
someone's point of view ...... whose unique collection of past experiences serves as a 
context, a lens, a background for her evaluation of her current experience" (2007. 
p.52, 53). 
 
 107 
 
Gilbert (2007) suggests that we will probably never really know whether SWB and 
happiness ratings are comparable across two different people, but actually when we 
use large datasets, as we do in wellbeing valuation and in wellbeing analysis more 
generally, the issue of interpersonal comparability becomes less problematic anyway 
(Frey et al., 2009; Luechinger and Raschky, 2009; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006; 
Gilbert, 2007) and as we discuss below, there is growing evidence that life 
satisfaction and SWB ratings are comparable across people. There are also those who 
take a more theoretical or normative approach. An early example is Edgeworth who 
claimed that wellbeing in the form of (hedonic) pleasures is commensurable across 
different types of pleasure and across people (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). Ng (1997) is 
a more recent example of this type of argument. 
 
In terms of empirical arguments, following Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), if we 
frame the issue of interpersonal comparability in terms of differences in conversion 
factors/rates from psychological or emotional (wellbeing) states to numeric values 
across individuals (which is consistent with Gilbert's (2007) hypotheses), then we can 
see that because wellbeing valuation and wellbeing analysis more generally use 
group-level data - comparing the SWB of groups of individuals under different 
conditions – individual differences and personal peculiarities will tend to 
“counterbalance one another” (Frey et al., 2009. p.12; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 
2006). Hence “the underlying assumption of a large part of happiness research in 
economics is that when people are measured in groups, the combination of their 
happiness scores does reveal useful information with which to make comparisons 
about social welfare” (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006. p.31-32). In other words, "we 
can be confident that if we ask enough people the same question, the average answer 
will be a roughly accurate index of the average experience" (Gilbert, 2007. p.70). 
 
We note also that there is plenty of evidence in favour of interpersonal comparisons in 
self-reported wellbeing measures. Kahneman (2000) finds considerable convergence 
in affect ratings, especially pain scores across individuals in medical procedures. As 
discussed already, there is substantial agreement in wellbeing scores between self and 
third party reports – people are able to recognise the satisfaction levels of others 
(Diener et al., 1999; van Praag et al., 2003). There are correlations between self-
reported satisfaction responses and (i) physiological measures (Davidson, 2004; 
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Kahneman, 2000) and (ii) objective circumstances (Easterlin, 2004). People from 
same language communities “have a common understanding of how to translate 
internal feelings into a number scale” (van Praag, 2003. p.34) and Van Praag (1991) 
finds that people translate verbal labels such as ‘very good’ or ‘bad’ on to roughly the 
same numerical scales. As van Praag et al. (2003. p.5) state “although it is very 
probable that what makes individuals happy or sad differs greatly amongst different 
cultures, it does seem as if there is a common human ‘language’ of satisfaction…” 
Generally, happiness researchers might see the growing data on SWB “filling the 
gap” for interpersonally comparable welfare data that economists longed for (Duncan, 
2010. p.170). 
 
The above discussion suggests that issues concerning the scaling of wellbeing scores 
are not grave enough to force us to dispose of the wellbeing valuation approach. An 
indeed in a comparative sense, it could be argued there is more evidence to suggest 
that SWB measures are more interpersonally comparable than are preference 
measures of welfare. The literature on the latter has traditionally been couched in 
theoretical terms such as Harsanyi’s theory of extended preference (Hausman and 
McPherson, 2006), whereas there is a growing literature testing interpersonal 
comparability in empirical terms in the wellbeing literature. At best SWB measures 
such as life satisfaction are fully interpersonally comparable, and at worst they are at 
least as interpersonally comparable as are preferences. As far as the issue of 
interpersonal comparability goes, therefore, wellbeing valuation performs just as well, 
and if not better, than preference-based valuation methods. And since preference 
valuation approaches have been used extensively in policy analysis this would mean 
that wellbeing valuation as a practical approach for policy evaluation cannot be 
dismissed purely on the account of interpersonal comparability issues as it is a 
problem inherent to both approaches to valuation.  
 
4.4. Technical validity (Criterion (C))  
 
There are two aims in this section. I will first derive a theoretical approach to 
wellbeing valuation that is consistent with economic theory. And second, I will then 
assess how the current wellbeing valuation methods fare in respect to this (ideal) 
 109 
 
theoretical approach. The contribution to the wellbeing valuation literature of this 
section is that this is the first time that a thorough and precise theoretical approach for 
wellbeing valuation is developed. And because of this I can also provide the first 
comprehensive critique of the current methodologies used in the wellbeing valuation 
literature. This will provide a full explanation of the main biases in the current studies. 
All of this has generally been missing from the wellbeing valuation literature to date. 
 
This foundational work on the theory of wellbeing valuation will then provide the 
basis for a new methodology – The Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation Approach - for 
estimating welfare change using the wellbeing valuation method, the focus of Chapter 
5 of this thesis.   
 
4.4.1. Theory of measuring welfare change through subjective wellbeing data 
  
As discussed in Chapter 3 in the wellbeing valuation approach the aim is to directly 
estimate the MRS between the non-market good (𝑄) and money (𝑀) with an 
“observable” measure of welfare. We do this by estimating the utility function using 
SWB data. Let us start, using compensating surplus as an example, and define CS for 
𝑄 using equation (6) (note that to account for the fact that there may be an indirect 
effect of 𝑄 on welfare through 𝑀 the term in the right hand side of equation (6) has 
been slightly modified by adding a superscript 1 to the income variable (𝑀)): 
 
(6.1) 𝑈(𝑄0, 𝑀0) = 𝑈(𝑄1, 𝑀1 − 𝐶𝑆) 
 
I will look at a positive welfare impact of 𝑄0 → 𝑄1, which could be due to a positive 
change in the quantity or quality of 𝑄. What is crucial to state here is that the welfare 
impact of the change in the non-market good (𝑄0 → 𝑄1) should clearly account for all 
of the possible impacts on welfare (Champ et al., 2003). Many non-market goods will 
foster both direct and indirect welfare impacts. For example, an environmental 
programme that protects a large forest area would create direct enjoyment for people 
using the area as well as impacts on other aspects of life that are instrumentally 
important for welfare, such as any health benefits that people may derive due to, say, 
improved air quality in the local area. Economic theory captures both the direct and 
 110 
 
indirect effects in valuation (Champ et al., 2003) and generally speaking so do stated 
and revealed preference methods in practice (although stated preference can be used 
to ascertain the value associated with a single indirect benefit, such as health).  
 
Equation (6.1) can be estimated empirically by substituting SWB equation (8) into 
(6.1):  
 
(11) 𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑄0, 𝑋0, 𝑀0) = 𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑄1, 𝑋1, 𝑀1 − 𝐶𝑆)   
 
Equation (11) acknowledges that there may be indirect welfare impacts of the change 
in 𝑄 through 𝑀 and 𝑋 (eg, the policy may affect income and the vector 𝑋 may contain 
factors like health), demonstrated by the respective changes 𝑀0 → 𝑀1 and 𝑋0 → 𝑋1. 
 
Solving for CS by using first derivatives we get: 
 
(12)      𝐶𝑆 = (𝑀1 − 𝑀0) +
𝑆𝑊𝐵′𝑋∙𝑋
′
𝑄(𝑄
1−𝑄0)
𝑆𝑊𝐵′𝑀
 +
𝑆𝑊𝐵′𝑄(𝑄
1−𝑄0)
𝑆𝑊𝐵′𝑀
   
 
In words this states that:  
 
CS = (impact of 𝑄 on 𝑀) + (the MRS between income and the indirect effect of 𝑄 on 
SWB via 𝑋) + (the MRS between income and the direct effect of 𝑄 on SWB). 
 
Naturally we must also acknowledge that 𝑀 may also impact on SWB indirectly in 
(12) and so 𝑆𝑊𝐵′𝑀 should represent the total derivative for income. In fact, the CS 
for a change in the non-market good (∆𝑄) in equation (12) can be reformulated in 
terms of total derivatives for 𝑄 and 𝑀: 
 
(13)    𝐶𝑆 =  
− 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
∙ ∆𝑄
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑀
൙    
 
This simply represents the MRS between 𝑄 and 𝑀 accounting for all of the impacts 
that 𝑄 and 𝑀 have on SWB. In equation (13) the MRS represents the amount of 
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money taken away or received that will leave the agent in his initial welfare position 
following a change in 𝑄 from the status quo. It is an exact measure of compensating 
welfare change accounting (as it should – see Champ et al., 2003) for all of the 
impacts on welfare. 
 
Equations (11) through to (13) set out the theoretically correct approach to measuring 
welfare change with SWB data. I demonstrated this using a compensating measure of 
welfare change, but equally it is possible to set out the approach under the format of 
equivalent welfare change measures as well.  
 
It would be beneficial to derive some new terminology for the welfare change 
measures derived using WV in order to distinguish them from welfare change 
measures estimated in preference valuation methods. A number of different terms 
have been used in the WV literature. Many papers just tend to revert to WTP and 
WTA definitions for the values derived in WV (e.g., Luechinger, 2009; Kountiuris 
and Remoundou, 2011; Ambrey and Fleming, 2011; Menz and Welsch, 2012; 
Levinson, 2009; Frey et al, 2004; Ferreira and Moro, 2009; Ambrey and Fleming, 
2014), which is not helpful for WV since these terms should only be employed with 
preference valuation methods (I discuss this in more detail below). Other terminology 
that has been used includes income compensation values (e.g. work by Frijters), 
which is problematic as WV is not restricted to estimating compensation values, and 
income equivalence values Carroll et al. (2009). A more accurate definition, which I 
will use in this thesis, I believe is as follows:  
  
Compensating wellbeing value (CWV). This is the amount of money, to be 
hypothetically deducted or provided, that will leave the agent in his/her initial SWB 
position following a change in the good. 
 
Equivalent wellbeing value (EWV). This is the amount of money, to be hypothetically 
deducted or provided, that will leave the agent in his/her subsequent SWB position in 
absence of a change in the good. 
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4.4.1.1. Measuring Compensating wellbeing value and Equivalent wellbeing value 
Let us define an improvement as a non-market good and a deterioration as a non-
market bad.  A ‘good’ is something which leads to a welfare gain and a ‘bad’ is 
something that leads to a welfare loss. For ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ we can estimate both 
the CWV and the EWV, but here we shall just focus on CWV. This is because we can 
make any ‘good’ a ‘bad’ by restricting provision or making people forego it and so 
the discussion on CWV is generalisable to the case of EWV.  
 
Non-market ‘goods’ 
Panel (i) of Figure 3 shows the CWV of the ‘good’ Q using indifference curves that 
track SWB rather than utility. In other words the indifference curves (U) represent the 
level sets of an SWB function. Ceteris paribus the provision of (or improvement in) 
the ‘good’ from 𝑄0 to 𝑄1 moves the individual from a starting point of a to b. The 
CWV is (𝑀0 − 𝑀1), the amount of money that returns him back to the initial level of 
SWB (𝑈0) at point c (where 𝑈 = SWB). 
 
Figure 3. Graphical representation of the wellbeing valuation approach (for non-
market goods).  
 
Panel (i): Indifference curves    Panel (ii): Level sets of the SWB function 
 
This is replicated in panel (ii), using life satisfaction (LS) as the SWB measure and 
setting it as a function of income, where there is a diminishing marginal utility of 
income as is standardly assumed in the WV literature and models.   
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In order to estimate the CWV for a ‘good’ we must move down the LS function; the 
individual starts at a and with the ‘good’ would move to point b but to measure this in 
terms of CWV we have to move the individual in the opposite direction from 𝑎 →
𝑏′ → 𝑏′′ → 𝑐 and by doing so (𝑀0 − 𝑀1) in panels (i) and (ii) are equal. At point c the 
individual has the ‘good’ but (𝑀0 − 𝑀1) less money and is on his same original level 
of life satisfaction at 𝑈0.  
 
Non-market ‘bads’ 
Figure 4 shows the same process for a ‘bad’ – a ceteris paribus negative change in 𝑄, 
which is shown by the change from 𝑄1 to 𝑄0. Here (𝑀0 − 𝑀2) shows the CWV for a 
non-market ‘bad’. 
 
Figure 4. Graphical representation of the wellbeing valuation approach (for non-
market bads). 
 
Panel (i): Indifference curves       Panel (ii): Level sets of the SWB function 
 
In order to estimate the CWV for a ‘bad’ we must move up the LS function; the 
individual starts at a and with the negative welfare impact from the change from 𝑄1 to 
𝑄0 (representing the non-market ‘bad’) would move to point b but to measure this in 
terms of CWV we have to move the individual in the opposite direction in panel (ii) 
from 𝑎 → 𝑏′ → 𝑏′′ → 𝑐 and by doing so (𝑀0 − 𝑀2) in panels (i) and (ii) are equal. At 
point c the individual has suffered from the ‘bad’ but has more money (𝑀0 − 𝑀2) to 
compensate and is therefore on his same original level of life satisfaction at 𝑈0.  
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It seems counterintuitive in panel (ii) of Figures 3 and 4 that we move in the 
counterintuitive direction along the LS function when estimating welfare change 
measures in WV. This is the case in order to account for the shape of the life 
satisfaction function with respect to income. If the relationship between SWB and 
income were linear then the CWV values would be the same regardless of which 
direction we were to move along the life satisfaction function, but because of the 
diminishing marginal utility of income (where the partial derivative of life satisfaction 
with respect to income is higher (steeper) at lower levels of income), the direction of 
travel along the non-linear life satisfaction curve does make a significant difference to 
the value estimates. This will especially be the case for large changes in SWB and 
there may be very little difference at smaller or marginal changes in SWB due to the 
non-market good/’bad’. 
 
Setting out the processes of estimating welfare change measures in WV like this is 
important because it allows us to make a precise definition of the measure of welfare 
change and to measure it accurately. In the current WV literature it is usually not clear 
which exact measure of welfare change has been estimated (papers like Ferreira and 
Moro (2009) and Welsch and Kuhling (2009) are, however, exceptions to this general 
trend).  
 
Looking at the mechanics behind valuation in WV we can see that there are three 
effects going on when we value non-market goods (𝑄) in the WV approach. First, the 
value depends on the magnitude of the impact of 𝑄 on SWB or life satisfaction 
(shown as 𝑎 → 𝑏 in panel (i)), second the value also depends on the strength of the 
relationship between life satisfaction and income (assumed constant in the Figures 
above), and third the value depends on the direction we move around the LS function 
in panel (ii).  
 
A disparity in CWV values for a good versus a bad (which is famously demonstrated 
in the WTA-WTP disparity) can show up in one of two ways. First, the 
psychologically larger effect of a loss compared to an equivalent gain in 𝑄 would 
show up in a larger absolute impact of 𝑄 on SWB for losses, in other words, |𝑏 − 𝑎| 
would be larger for the ‘bad’ which would render |𝑀0 − 𝑀2| > |𝑀0 − 𝑀1|.  
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The second way (which further magnifies this effect) is due to the diminishing 
marginal utility of income. We can see in Figures 3 and 4 that even for something that 
did not have a larger psychological effect when comparing losses to equivalent gains, 
we would still see a higher valuation for WTA related measures. The distance |𝑎 − 𝑏| 
is drawn at about the same magnitude in both Figures, but |𝑀0 − 𝑀2| is clearly 
visually larger than |𝑀0 − 𝑀1| because from a given SWB starting point, giving 
money to individual is less impactful on LS than taking it away when the impact of 
income is estimated in logarithmic format in the SWB model. In sum, for a given 𝑄, 
differences between EWV and CWV will emerge in this framework due to the 
curvature of the income function. For welfare gains, EWV > CWV and for welfare 
losses, CWV > EWV.  
 
Table 2 provides the framework for estimating CWV and EWV in wellbeing 
valuation, where log of income is used in the income model, as in equation (10). The 
equations are set out for binary 𝑄 variables, but for continuous 𝑄 variables it would 
also be possible to use formats to reflect non-linear impacts on SWB.  
 
Table 2. CWV and EWV in wellbeing valuation 
 Compensating measure (CWV) Equivalent measure (EWV) 
 
Welfare 
gain 
 
𝐶𝑊𝑉 = 𝑀0 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝
[ln(𝑀0) − 
𝑔′𝑄
𝑓′𝑀
]
 
 
𝐸𝑊𝑉 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝
[
𝑔′𝑄
𝑓′𝑀
 + ln (𝑀0)]
− 𝑀0 
 
 
Welfare 
loss 
 
𝐶𝑊𝑉 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝
[
−𝑔′𝑄
𝑓′𝑀
 + ln (𝑀0)]
− 𝑀0 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑊𝑉 = 𝑀0 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝
[ln(𝑀0) + 
𝑔′𝑄
𝑓′𝑀
]
 
Notes: 𝑀0 is initial income; 𝑓′𝑀 is the effect of income on SWB; and 𝑔′𝑄 is the effect of the 
non-market good on SWB. 
 
It is important to note that under this framework CWV for welfare gains and EWV for 
welfare losses are constrained at the level of an individual's income, whereas EWV 
for welfare gains and CWV for welfare losses have their limits at infinity as we would 
expect and as would be the case with WTP and WTA values respectively. To see this, 
for example, take the EWV for a welfare loss. Here 𝑔′𝑄 is negative and for 𝑄 with 
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very large negative impacts, such that 𝑔′𝑄 → −∞ it can be shown that EWV is 
constrained at the original level of income (𝑀0):  
  
(21) 𝐸𝑊𝑉 = 𝑀0 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝
[ln(𝑀0) + 
𝑔′𝑄
𝑓′𝑀
]
= 𝑀0 − 𝑒−∞ = 𝑀0    
 
4.4.2. Technical conditions of the wellbeing valuation approach 
 
There are four key technical conditions that I develop here and which must be 
satisfied in order to estimate equation (13) correctly and to ensure technical validity 
(Criterion C).  
 
 
CONDITION 1: FULL IMPACT 
The full (direct + indirect) effects of the non-market good and of income 
on SWB must be accounted for and measured 
 
 If this condition is not satisfied we cannot derive the full welfare change 
attributable to the non-market good (Champ et al., 2003). 
 
CONDITION 2: CAUSAL ESTIMATORS 
The estimated effects of the non-market good and of income on SWB must 
be unbiased 
 
This is a clearly imperative condition for wellbeing valuation. It means that 
the total derivatives in equation (13) must have a full causal interpretation. 
This is an implicit assumption underlying the definition of a total derivative 
and of course it is not possible to derive welfare change measures without 
knowing how the non-market good and money impact causally on welfare.  
 
Note that this condition is separate and independent to Condition 1. 
Condition 2 states that the statistical estimates must be unbiased. In 
regression analyses this could be an unbiased partial impact. In addition to 
this, Condition 1 requires that the estimate be a full rather than partial effect. 
Together, Conditions 1 and 2 therefore stipulate that the estimates represent 
full and unbiased causal effects. 
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The rationale and details behind these four conditions will be discussed at length 
below. 
 
4.4.3. Assessing the current wellbeing valuation methodology  
 
4.4.3.1. Current wellbeing valuation methodology 
 
CONDITION 3: SAMPLE MATCHING 
 The total causal derivatives in equation (13) must come from the same 
population group so that they are comparable 
 
The theory of valuation in economics is an individual-level theory, which 
defines welfare change in terms of impacts on the individual – that is, how the 
non-market good and income impact the individual’s level of utility. The 
implication for wellbeing valuation, where statistical analysis is run using 
group level data (because it is not possible to estimate SWB functions for a 
single individual), is that the total derivatives for 𝑄 and 𝑀 clearly have to 
come from the same group or be representative estimates for the same group.  
 
This is to avoid the problem of estimating the impact of a non-market good 
for one group and estimating the amount of money required to have the same 
effect for a different group. Clearly if the second group values income in a 
different way to the first group we will have incorrect estimates of value in 
wellbeing valuation. 
 
CONDITION 4: CLEAR INTERPRETATION 
The total causal derivative for the non-market good (𝐝 𝑺𝑾𝑩 𝐝 𝑸ൗ ) should 
have a clear interpretation where there are heterogeneous treatment 
effects of 𝑸, so that results are useful for policy 
 
If there are differential effects of 𝑄 on SWB across the population it is critical 
to understand to whom the total derivative and welfare change estimates are 
applicable. To understand this we need to know whether there are 
heterogeneous treatment effects of 𝑄 on SWB due to selection on gains 
factors. This is where certain individuals select into ‘using’ the non-market 
good because they disproportionately benefit from it. 
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The wellbeing valuation approach is an emerging method with approximately 100 
publications since its inception in 2002. The literature has tended to grow by looking 
at the value of different outcomes and services using the method rather than focus on 
technical developments. By and large the WV literature to date has predominantly 
used fairly simple multivariate regression analysis following the approach as 
discussed in section 3.3. Equation (8) is estimated empirically using the following 
type of single-equation model: 
 
(9) 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽2ln (𝑀𝑖) + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     
 
where income is in logarithmic format to account for the diminishing marginal utility 
of income and where SWB is usually life satisfaction. As discussed above these 
models have usually been run assuming cardinality using OLS regression. The 
technical critiques of the current wellbeing valuation methodologies provided here are 
applicable for any measure of SWB that may be used in equation (9). 
  
Partial derivatives from the single equation model in (9) are used to estimate the value 
(here CS) of 𝑄 as follows by solving for CS (eg, Frey et al., 2009) (I have dropped the 
constant term and error terms that feature in both sides of the equality): 
 
(14)     𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖(𝛽1𝑄𝑖
0 + 𝛽2ln (𝑀𝑖
0) + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖
0) = 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖(𝛽1𝑄𝑖
1 + 𝛽2ln (𝑀𝑖
1 − 𝐶𝑆) +
𝛽3𝑋𝑖
1) 
 
(15) 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑀0 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝
[ln(𝑀0)− 
𝛽1(𝑄
1−𝑄0)
𝛽2
]
     
 
The problem is that generally speaking the approaches used to date do not adhere to 
the four technical criteria/conditions set out above and hence lead to biased estimates 
of the value of 𝑄. I will focus on each of these issues in turn next.  
 
4.4.3.2. The current wellbeing valuation methodology vis-à-vis the technical criteria 
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4.4.3.2.1. Full impact (Condition 1) 
If we adjust equation (12) to account for a logarithmic format for income, we see that 
equation (14) does not estimate the correct measure of welfare change (here CS): 
 
(16) 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑀0 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝
[ln(𝑀0)− 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
∙(𝑄1−𝑄0)
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑀
]
≠  𝑀0 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝
[ln(𝑀0)− 
𝛽1(𝑄
1−𝑄0)
𝛽2
]
   
 
This is because generally d 𝑆𝑊𝐵 d 𝑄ൗ ≠ 𝛽1, and 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑀ൗ ≠ 𝛽2 as single-equation 
models with a number of control variables cannot simultaneously estimate two total 
derivatives. In order to derive total derivatives for 𝑀 and 𝑄 in a single-equation 
structure all other covariates must be measured pre-treatment (ie, before changes in 𝑀 
and 𝑄) and this will be near-impossible to guarantee especially when using 
observational data sets such as those used in WV. Also, of course, we can only 
estimate one total derivative in a single-equation model because 𝑀 and 𝑄 cannot both 
precede each other simultaneously. The upshot is that these parametric restrictions in 
single-equation models mean that some important mediators of the effects of 𝑀 and 𝑄 
on SWB are likely to be controlled for in 𝑋, and hence we cannot account for some of 
the indirect effects. One key mediator variable will be health, for which data is often 
collected at the time of the survey meaning that the health response will be capturing 
effects of 𝑀 and 𝑄 on health.  
 
One possible solution is to move away from the single-equation framework and 
estimate structural equation models, where relationships between 𝑀 and 𝑄 and other 
covariates are modelled explicitly in auxiliary models and this has been an approach 
taken by a few papers. Indeed the indirect effects issue has been well-documented in 
the WV literature (Stutzer and Frey, 2004b; Adler and Posner, 2008) and there have 
been a number of attempts to include some of the indirect effects of the non-market 
good in the valuation (for example Welsch and Kühling, 2009; Carroll et al., 2009; 
Groot and van den Brink, 2006; Welsch, 2002; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag, 
2002; Rehdanz and Maddison, 2005; Welsch, 2008a; Welsch, 2008b). Predominantly 
these studies have been concerned with the indirect impact of the non-market good on 
SWB via income only. Broadly the two types of methodology employed have been 
either to drop the income variable from the regression model entirely (eg, Carroll et 
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al., 2009; Welsch, 2002; Groot and van den Brink, 2006; Welsch, 2008a), or to run an 
auxilary model whereby the relationship between income and the non-market good is 
estimated explicitly (eg, Welsch, 2008b; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag, 2002; 
Groot et al., 2004). For example, this entails running the following models: 
 
(8) 𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑄, 𝑀, 𝑋) 
 
and  
 
(17) 𝑀(𝑄, 𝑇) 
 
where 𝑇 is a vector of other determinants of income. The value of 𝑄 is then based on 
the product of partial derivatives from (8) and (17): [𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑄
′ + (𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑀
′ ∙ 𝑀𝑄
′ )], which 
respectively pick up the direct impact of 𝑄 on 𝑆𝑊𝐵 and the indirect impact on SWB 
through 𝑀.  
 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag (2002) develop on this auxilary model approach to 
assess the indirect impacts of different health conditions on SWB via six domain 
satisfactions, such as job satisfaction, health satisfaction and leisure satisfaction. In 
other words, health is deemed to impact on these domains which in turn impact on 
overall life satisfaction and a value is attached to the sum of the direct effects of 
health and these indirect impacts of health.  
 
These are clearly steps in the right direction because they recognise the issue of 
indirect effects, but they are problematic for a number of reasons. First, dropping an 
important variable like income from an SWB regression will further exacerbate any 
bias that exists in the coefficient on 𝑄. Second, as Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag 
(2002) state the non-market good could impact on 𝑆𝑊𝐵 through more than one 
channel. Third, structural equation model approaches like the one set out in equations 
(8) and (17) will be using and mixing two (or more) biased estimates of the impacts of 
𝑄 unless 𝑄 is exogenous in both models, which is highly unlikely. And finally, these 
methods focus on the non-market good and do not attempt to derive the total 
derivative for income, which is also essential to WV. 
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4.4.3.2.2. Causal estimators (Condition 2) 
It is rare that we can estimate unbiased causal effects with observational data and in 
the WV literature (and also the wider SWB literature more generally) it is well-
documented that bias can arise from endogeneity, simultaneity and measurement error 
(Pischke, 2010; Frijters et al., 2011; Ferreira and Moro, 2009; Frey et al. 2004; Saris, 
2000; Ambrey and Fleming, 2011; Luechinger, 2009). OLS is the predominant 
estimator used in WV, but it is likely to produce biased causal estimates for 𝑄 and 𝑀 
because it relies on a selection on observables assumption which for the most part will 
not hold. There have been three general types of approaches used in the WV and 
general SWB literature to address this. 
 
1. Fixed effects models with panel data. This method uses within-person variation to 
control for time-invariant unobservable variables, which in the context of an SWB 
model could be something like the individual’s underlying preferences or personality 
traits. The problem with fixed effects models are threefold: (i) the approach cannot 
control for time-varying unobservable factors; (ii) factors that have little variation 
over time within individuals, which may causally impact on wellbeing, such as 
employment and marital status may wrongly be found to have no statistically 
significant effect. This means that some important non-market outcomes may be 
assumed to have a zero value although they do impact on SWB; (iii) fixed effects 
models do not eradicate the problem of measurement error and in fact, fixed effects 
can exacerbate problems here by increasing the ratio of measurement error to actual 
variation in variables that are measured with error (Deaton, 1993). Thus, it is unlikely 
that fixed effects methods will provide unbiased causal estimates for 𝑄 and 𝑀. 
 
2. Exogenous variables models. A number of papers have used theoretically 
exogenous or seemingly exogenous variables for income and the non-market good. 
For example, in their valuation of climate variability Alem and Colmer (2013) use 
exogenous shocks in weather conditions. Kuehnle and Wunder (2014) claim that the 
variable they use for the impacts of daylight time saving transitions is exogenous, or 
at least conditionally so. Ambrey and Fleming (2014) use income windfalls as 
exogenous shocks for the income variable - this is similar to Lachowska’s (2017) 
study of the impact of tax rebates on life satisfaction (although Lachowska did not use 
these results to value any non-market goods). These exogenous variables are inputted 
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directly into the (single-equation) SWB function rather than being employed as 
instrumental variables.   
 
There are a number of problems with these papers and methods. First in actuality 
exogeneity tests in these studies tended to show that the variables were not truly 
exogenous as they were correlated with some other factors. Second, exogenous 
changes in income due to windfalls is on the face of it a seemingly plausible method. 
In wellbeing valuation Ambrey and Fleming (2014) use windfalls in income and in 
more general wellbeing analysis Gardner and Oswald (2007) use lottery wins. In both 
papers the income variable concerned is inputted directly into the wellbeing function 
(a mental health function in Gardner and Oswald (2007)). There is a risk here that the 
income variable is still in a sense ‘biased’ because although it could be argued that the 
variable is exogenous, windfalls such as lottery wins and inheritance capture not just a 
change in income for the individual but also an impact on their emotions (euphoria at 
winning the lottery or sadness at having a relative pass by) and so the coefficient on 
income in such models will not necessarily represent the causal effect of income 
alone. Gardner and Oswald’s (2007) solution to this is to compare lottery winners of 
different win sizes (where the full win size was small to medium), rather than 
comparing lottery winners to non-winners. This method is one that I replicate below 
in my own analysis. Third, for this type of method to provide a solution to the 
causality problems, the study would need to employ exogenous variables for both 
income and the non-market good, which none of these studies have done. Fourth, as I 
will discuss in more detail below (in reference to instrumental variable methods), 
even if exogenous variables were used for both income and the non-market good 
unbiased estimates of welfare change could not be estimated from single-equation 
models like the ones used in these studies if income and the non-market good are 
correlated. If the two variables are correlated then including both of them in a single 
model is likely to run into the indirect effects problem for one of the variables. 
 
3. Instrumental variable (IV) models. A number of papers instrument for income 
(e.g. Helliwell and Huang, 2005; Ferreira and Moro, 2009; Marsh and Bertranou, 
2012; Chandoevwit and Thampanishvong, 2016; Howley, 2016; Huang et al., 2018; 
Mendoza et al., 2019; Mahasuweerachai and Pangjai, 2018),  or for the non-market 
good (Danzer and Danzer, 2011; Aoshima et al., 2018) and some for both income and 
 123 
 
the non-market good in 2SLS (e.g. Luechinger, 2009; Tsurumi and Managi, 2015). 
But this does not provide a full solution for a number of reasons and before discussing 
these it is important to set out the main assumptions that underpin IV methods.  
 
IV uses exogenous or conditionally exogenous variation in one or more variables to 
‘force’ exogenous variation in the main variable of interest (ie, 𝑄 or 𝑀). A common 
way of using IVs is in two stage least squares (2SLS) as follows: 
 
(17) 𝐷 = 𝜏 + 𝜌𝑍 + 𝜇 (First stage) 
(18) 𝑆𝑊𝐵 = 𝛾 + 𝛼?̂? + 𝜀  (Second stage) 
 
Where 𝐷 is the variable of interest (ie, the treatment), which could be 𝑄 in this 
example; 𝑍 is the IV (assumed to be a binary variable here); and 𝛼 is the causal effect 
of 𝐷 on SWB. The key assumptions are, 
 
(i) Independence of the instrument and exclusion restriction: (𝑆𝑊𝐵0, 𝑆𝑊𝐵1, 𝐷0, 𝐷1) ⊥
𝑍  
(ii) Monotinicity (no defiers): 𝐷1 ≥ 𝐷0 
(iii) First stage variation: 𝜌 > 0 
(iv) Homogenous effects of 𝐷: 𝛼 is constant for all units 𝑖 
 
Item (ii) is an identifying assumption that needs to be made as we cannot observe 
complier type in the data, so I will assume that this is appropriate as is customarily 
done in the econometrics literature. Item (iii) can be tested in the first stage 
regression. Therefore, the main assumptions of interest are (i) and (iv). Assumption (i) 
states that the instrument is exogenous and that it only impacts on the outcome (SWB) 
through 𝐷. These are untestable assumptions, but I note that the exogeneity element 
can be satisfied through use of other covariates in the models, which then makes the 
assumption one of conditional independence and exogeneity. Assumption (iv) claims 
that the impact of 𝐷 on SWB is the same throughout the sample.  
 
I note first that the theoretical arguments behind income instruments tend not to be 
fully validated in the WV literature. Commonly used instruments for income in WV 
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include spouse’s income, spouse’s employment status, house ownership, predicted 
industry wage levels, local area wage levels, date of survey interview, age of the 
respondent, and social class (Luttmer, 2005; Ferreira and Moro, 2009; Luechinger, 
2009; Pischke, 2010; Chandoevwit and Thampanishvong, 2016; Howley, 2016; 
Mendoza et al., 2019). These instruments are unlikely to be truly independent of the 
potential treatment (here income) and wellbeing – respectively 𝐷 and 𝑆𝑊𝐵 from 
equations (17) and (18) - because none are true exogenous shocks in 𝑍.  
 
Other studies in the wider wellbeing literature have used as instruments sight of 
payslips (Powdthavee, 2010) and father’s years of education (Knight et al., 2009). The 
problem with payslips as an IV is that it is unlikely to adhere to assumption (iii) and it 
is hard to defend parents’ education as an independent instrument that adheres to the 
exclusion restriction, because parents’ education is likely to impact on the child’s 
wellbeing through more than just the income of the child in adulthood.  
 
Generally, the literature has found that compared to estimates from OLS, using 
instruments for income significantly increases the size of the coefficient on the 
income variable in wellbeing regressions by a scale of up to around 10-12 times the 
OLS estimates (Levinson, 2012; Luttmer, 2005; Powdthavee, 2010; Mahasuweerachai 
and Pangjai, 2018). 
 
A promising instrument that has been used for income is lottery wins. After 
controlling for number of times one plays the lottery the instrument should be 
independent of 𝐷 and 𝑆𝑊𝐵. Lottery wins will also clearly have an effect on income 
(assumption (iii)) and if the sample of lottery players is used we can assume that the 
exclusion restriction also holds. The potential issue around exclusion with the lottery 
wins IV is that in addition to increasing income, it is fair to argue that the lottery win 
itself would impact directly on the happiness and wellbeing of the individual. But here 
we can compare big prize lottery winners to smaller prize winners, rather than lottery 
winners to non-winners, such that both groups (ie, 𝑍=1 and 𝑍=0) experience euphoria 
at winning the lottery such that within the sample of lottery players there is no 
separate effect (separate to the income effect) of the lottery win on SWB. 
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However, lottery wins have not been employed in the WV literature to estimate 
monetary values and as I shall argue below the independence assumption may not 
have been fully met in the lottery wins literature because lottery playing frequency 
has not been controlled for in the first stage.  
 
There are also further issues with 2SLS frameworks such as the one set out in (17) 
and (18) for the specific task of WV. First, even with perfect instruments for income 
and the non-market good 2SLS is problematic because the single-equation framework 
in the second stage does not allow us to derive total derivatives for the non-market 
good and income. Instrumenting for income, for the non-market good, or for both 
income and the non-market good gets us a better handle on causality but we cannot 
estimate total derivatives unless all of the other controls in the second stage of 2SLS 
are measured pre-treatment and income and the non-market good are orthogonal, 
which is probably unlikely; if 𝑀 and 𝑄 are correlated, then one of them has to be 
measured before the other in order to avoid the problem of indirect effects, which 
means that it is impossible to estimate both total derivatives (for income and the non-
market good) in the same model (equation (18)). A case in point that exemplifies this 
problem is Brown’s (2015) analysis of health values. Both health and income are 
instrumented but they are heavily correlated with each other – better health leads to 
higher income and vice-versa and so in the second stage of 2SLS we are unable to 
derive the total derivatives of SWB with respect to income and health. 
 
The second issue relates to the fact that assumption (iv) is problematic in 2SLS. I will 
discuss this issue in detail in the next section when I address the topic of sample 
matching. 
 
Before closing this section we can make some hypotheses about the direction of bias 
introduced by the problems related to indirect effects and causality of the income and 
the non-market good variables. A-priori statements about the direction or magnitude 
of bias related to the non-market good (𝑄) are hard to make, but we can argue that the 
income variable is likely to be biased downwards in OLS regressions of the type in 
equation (9) for a number of reasons. First, it is well known that income is measured 
with error which creates a downwards bias in OLS. Second, the indirect effects of 
income are likely to be positive (eg, through positive effects on health) and hence 
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standard OLS SWB models will not produce estimates of the full effect of income on 
SWB. Third, since earning more money comes with additional stresses, work 
commitments and time lost for other meaningful pursuits such as spending time with 
the family, simply looking at salary related income or wealth increases (which nearly 
all SWB papers do) will dilute the effect of income on wellbeing in comparison to 
studies that use exogenous changes in income. For example, putting to one side the 
issue of the euphoria of winning a lottery, a medium-sized lottery win that effectively 
translates into a 50% increase in income for the year will have a much different 
qualitative effect on SWB in comparison to the same salary rise that is due to a 
promotion which entails more responsibility and harder work.  
 
A downward biased income coefficient in OLS (𝛽2) will ceteris paribus lead to an 
upward bias in values estimated using WV because 𝛽2 is the denominator in the value 
calculations in WV (see equations (14) or (15)). And this is supported by the evidence 
as discussed above. (Clark and Oswald, 2002; Powdthavee, 2008; Frey et al., 2009; 
Ferreira and Moro, 2009; Levinson, 2012). Although there are a couple of exceptions 
to the rule, (e.g. van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007) find that results from 
WV and values from contingent valuation were very similar for informal care-giving 
and Cohen (2008) finds similar results for valuations of reductions in crime rates 
using the two approaches (however, it should be noted that Cohen made a number of 
significant simplifying assumptions about how results from CV crime studies can be 
aggregated)), WV values have generally been found to be magnitudes higher than 
values derived from RP and SP methods (Levinson, 2012; Luechinger, 2009). Frey et 
al. (2004) set out the robust estimation of the causal effect of income on SWB as a 
priority area of research for WV.  
 
4.4.3.2.3. Sample matching and clear interpretation (Conditions 3 and 4) 
I will address these issues together as they can surface from a common problem: 
sample matching and treatment effects interpretation become problematic issues when 
we acknowledge heterogenous treatment effects. The majority of WV papers focus on 
a binary 𝑄, for example, being employed, being healthy, living in a safe or polluted 
area etc, and I shall focus the discussion here on binary variables for 𝑄. If the impacts 
of 𝑄  on SWB differ across different population groups then it is essential that (i) our 
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estimates of the impacts of 𝑀 and 𝑄 are representative of the same sub-population 
and that (ii) the estimated effect of the non-market good has a meaningful 
interpretation for policy - in other words, we would like to know whether our 
estimated value of 𝑄 is based on the average effect of 𝑄 on SWB across the 
population or on the average effect for the treated, the non-treated and so on. 
 
In addition to the problems already discussed, this creates further issues for the use of 
both OLS and 2SLS estimators in WV. OLS provides poorly-defined treatment 
estimators for 𝑄, that lie somewhere between the average treatment effect for the 
treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect for the non-treated (ATNT), and how 
close the estimator lies to the ATT or the ATNT will depend on the proportion of 
treated and non-treated groups in the sample (Humphreys, 2009). This means that (in 
addition to being biased) values based on OLS estimates also have no concrete 
implications for policy because we cannot know whether they signify the value 
generated by those who were treated, or the value that would be associated with an 
intervention that impacts on people who otherwise would not participate. If d 𝑆𝑊𝐵 d 𝑄ൗ  
were estimated as the ATT, the monetary value would represent the retrospective 
value of 𝑄 for those that were treated. The ATNT would tell us something about how 
valuable it would be if a policy (concerning some non-market good) were rolled out to 
those who were not initially treated. This would represent the prospective value of the 
policy or non-market good. And the ATE would give us a broad estimate of value for 
anyone picked from the general population. 
 
It is, therefore, vital that in addition to issues related to causality, or internal validity, 
estimates used in WV have a clear treatment effect interpretation for the purposes of 
inputting into policy. This is the separate issue of external validity. An important 
outcome for the discussion here relates to the interpretation of WV values. I discuss 
interpretation issues in detail in Chapter 5, but will add some further commentary here 
in light of the treatment effects discussion. The ability to derive values based on 
different treatment effects for the non-market good in WV puts it in a unique position 
in respect to values associated with non-users. The valuation literature highlights two 
types of value:  
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i. Use value relates to actual use, planned use or possible use of the good. 
 
ii. Non-use value relates to the attachment of value to a good although there is 
no actual, planned or possible use. There are three types of non-use value: (i) 
existence value, (ii) altruistic value, and (iii) bequest value. 
 
It is possible for users to hold both use and non-use values, whereas non-users will by 
definition only hold a non-use value for the non-market good. Revealed preference 
measures are only able to derive use values. Stated preference methods can be used to 
derive both use and non-use values. In WV if the value is estimated from the ATT for 
𝑄 it will represent the users of 𝑄. The ATNT is a special case unique to WV. The 
ATNT for 𝑄 will represent the impact of 𝑄 on SWB for people who do not use 𝑄, ie, 
the non-users. A value derived from the ATNT for 𝑄, therefore, represents the use 
value of 𝑄 for non-users, if they were to use 𝑄. This is a value estimator that is unique 
to WV and which has some important implications for policy. It is unique because it 
cannot be elicited in preference methods. It may seem similar to the case of when a 
stated preference survey asks respondents for the value regarding some future non-
market good (eg, the value of proposed improved public amenities at a national park). 
In this case all respondents are non-users because the amenities have not been 
developed/improved yet, but it is not possible to elicit use values from non-users even 
in this case because in such surveys non-users will state a value based on their 
expected non-use of the services, hence non-users will simply state their predicted 
non-use values. This is different to the use value for non-users should they come to 
use the non-market services, which is what the WV method can derive.  
 
Use values for non-users is not a trivial oxymoron – it is relevant where governments 
and other organisations may seek to change the behaviour of individuals such that 
they are encouraged to consume the non-market good (eg, an environmental 
awareness programme that encourages non-users to use the national park and its 
amenities to develop a better understanding and connection with nature and the 
environment). A standard use value would not suffice to estimate the value of this 
programme here since users are different to initial non-users who are encouraged to 
go. Reverting back to the treatment effects literature we can assume users to ‘select’ 
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into using the national park based on some level of expected gains to their welfare. 
This means that in all likelihood they will more strongly prefer the national park than 
the initial non-users do even if the latter are encouraged to go to the park. The ATT 
for the park will be higher than the ATNT for the park, which is another way of 
saying that use values for the park will be higher for users than for non-users who 
subsequently make use of the park. Only WV can estimate potential use values for 
initial non-users.  
 
In terms of sample matching heterogenous effects have major implications for 2SLS 
estimates. Generally speaking assumption (iv) (𝛼 is constant for all units 𝑖) is not true 
in 2SLS. 2SLS derives estimates for a localised sub-sample of the population known 
as compliers to the instrument. This has been termed the local average treatment 
effect (LATE) by Angrist and colleagues (e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The LATE 
is the effect of some variable (e.g. the non-market good, 𝑄) for people whose 
behaviour complies to the instrument.  
 
The LATE creates problems in WV because it is not generally possible to determine 
who the compliers are because simply observing cases where 𝑍 = 1 and 𝐷 = 1 
simultaneously cannot rule out non-compliers, because some individuals that we 
observe in this group may still get treatment (𝐷 = 1) even if 𝑍 = 0. This means that 
we cannot be sure about to whom the impact estimates apply from 2SLS. Neither 
OLS nor 2SLS, therefore, provides impact estimates that can be clearly attributed to 
some section of the population, or the population as a whole, which makes it 
impossible to sample match groups in the value calculation. In the case of 2SLS 
where both 𝑄 and 𝑀 are instrumented (with the aim of deriving causal estimates) 
impacts of 𝑄 and 𝑀 will pertain to two unobservable groups that are likely to be 
different and this may be very misleading in WV. It results in biased estimates of the 
value of 𝑄 because, for example, the impact of 𝑄 on SWB for the group that complies 
to the income instrument may actually be very different to the effect estimated by the 
𝑄 instrument for a different complier group and there is no way to test this in 2SLS. 
 
In the next chapter I develop a new methodology for wellbeing valuation that 
addresses the problems inherent to the current methods in relation to technical 
 130 
 
conditions (1) to (4). After I have developed this new methodology I will discuss how 
results from wellbeing valuation should be interpreted (Criterion (D)). Then in 
Chapter 6 I use the new wellbeing valuation approach to value employment-related 
outcomes as a case study. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation 
 
5.1. Background 
 
Above I have set out the four key validity criteria for wellbeing valuation. I have 
already dealt with Criteria (A) and (B). This chapter sets out a new approach to 
wellbeing valuation that is capable of deriving total causal derivatives in a way that 
allows for sample matching and value interpretation for policy purposes. Therefore, 
the new approach addresses all four conditions that are required for technical validity 
(Criterion (C)). The fourth validity criterion (D) - related to overall interpretation of 
the results - will be dealt with towards the end of this chapter after I have set out the 
framework of the new approach.  
 
The new approach to wellbeing valuation reverts back to the conceptual model set out 
in Figure 2. There I showed that the value of a non-market good (𝑄) can be estimated 
from the MRS between 𝑄 and money (𝑀) using equation (10), 
 
(10) Value (𝑄) = 
− (𝛽𝑄 ∙ 𝑄)
𝛽𝑀
൘  
 
As discussed above the problems associated with the current wellbeing valuation 
approach are generally all due to the current approach of using a single equation 
outcome model with OLS or two staged least squares. In light of these issues, when 
empirically estimating wellbeing models of the type in equation (8), they are clearly 
better explained and understood as a set of simultaneous equations in which SWB and 
the explanatory variables may be jointly determined and may interact with each other. 
The general approach to estimating simultaneous equation models (SEM) is full-
model maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (Kline, 2005). Estimation through 
MLE requires a-priori knowledge of the relationships between all variables in the 
system and the nature of the error terms. However, SEM modelling through MLE 
does not provide a solution to the technical problems that affect WV. This is because 
without exogenous variation in the explanatory variables we are unable to attribute 
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causality in SEM – we still rely on a selection on observables story for identification. 
Contrary to popular belief SEM does not provide a solution to the causal question in 
statistics (Kline, 2005). Therefore, moving away from single-equation models and 
SEM, I develop a new approach here for wellbeing valuation.  
 
The starting point and the key to addressing these problems and to ensuring that 
wellbeing valuation has technical validity is to separate the estimation process such 
that the full wellbeing model is estimated in two separate steps. The first step models 
the relationship between income and SWB and the second step models the 
relationship between the non-market good and SWB. 
 
The main intuition behind this is that we can deal with the issue of indirect effects and 
estimate total derivatives for each variable, which is not possible under a single-
equation set-up.  Separating the estimation procedure will also provide a better 
mechanism for estimating and interpreting heterogeneous effects of 𝑄 and it provides 
greater flexibility to hone each model to derive unbiased estimators. The method will 
have to be cautious to the issue of sample matching, but a multi-model approach does 
not in theory make sample matching any more difficult than it is in a single-equation 
approach.   
 
From the results of these two models the MRS between 𝑄 and 𝑀 can be derived in the 
final stage of the process. I will show that this three step process can deliver estimates 
of monetary value that are consistent with economic theory and that are more robust 
and superior to values derived from the traditional wellbeing valuation methods. I call 
this method the Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation (3S-WV) approach.  
 
5.2. Theoretical framework of the Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation approach 
 
The 3S-WV approach is comprised of the following three stages: 
STEP 1: INCOME MODEL  
 
(19) 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖 = 𝑓(ln (𝑀𝑖)) 
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We can re-interpret the four technical criteria for the specifics of the 3S-WV model.  
Conditions 1 and 2 require that the SWB impacts of Q (g′Q) and 𝑀 (f′M) are causal 
total derivatives such that g′Q = d SWB d Qൗ ; and f′M =
d SWB
d Mൗ  . An implication of 
this is that clearly only non-market goods/services that have a statistically significant 
impact on SWB can be valued in wellbeing valuation, as an insignificant impact 
would signify that Q does not have a causal effect on SWB.  
 
Condition 3 requires that individuals (𝑖) from equations (19) and (20) are 
representative of each other or of the same population. 
 
Condition 4 requires that the SWB impact of Q (g′Q) has a well-defined treatment 
effect. 
 
Next I will discuss how 3S-WV addresses these four main technical criteria at a 
theoretical level. Having set out the theoretical foundations and rationale I will then 
proceed to discuss issues related to interpretation in 3S-WV. In the final part of this 
chapter I will focus on estimation of the income model in Step 1 of 3S-WV. Then in 
Chapter 6 the 3S-WV method is used to value employment-related outcomes.  
 
5.2.1. Causal total derivatives in 3S-WV (Technical conditions 1 and 2) 
 
The key first step is to estimate unbiased causal estimates for the SWB impact of 𝑄 
and 𝑀. One benefit of the division in to two steps of the wellbeing model is that it 
allows us to employ a mix of any statistical methods that can provide unbiased causal 
estimates. Following the statistics and econometrics literature the gold standard here 
STEP 2: THE NON-MARKET GOOD MODEL  
 
(20) 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑄𝑖) 
 
STEP 3: MONETARY VALUE ESTIMATION 
 
Calculate 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑄,𝑀 from the income and non-market goods models 
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would be to estimate 𝑔′𝑄 and 𝑓′𝑀 from two separate studies where treatment (𝑄 and 
𝑀) are randomised. Assuming that the standard assumptions are met, randomised 
trials (RCTs)5 provide unbiased causal estimates with well-defined treatment effects – 
the ATE and ATT. Further, the non-parametric difference in means estimated from an 
RCT represents the total derivative of the treatment because no other mediating 
variables need to be controlled for. Even if some baseline factor is controlled for in an 
RCT it cannot be a mediating factor because it is measured at baseline. To ensure 
sample matching we can run two RCTs on two non-overlapping random samples of 
the same population. If we were to suspect that SWB outcomes are not independent 
across 𝑖 in these trials bootstrap standard errors should be used for inference. 
 
Clearly experimental evidence provides the best approach for WV since it provides 
unbiased causal estimates that represent the full effect of the treatment on SWB, 
encompassing both the direct and indirect effects. However, the current WV 
methodology cannot accommodate information from two experimental studies 
because it has exclusively been based on single-equation models with observational 
data. The traditional single-equation approach can only be used to assess the results of 
random assignment for one variable (either 𝑄 or 𝑀), unless an experiment were to 
randomly assign both variables together across the same sample, which would be 
problematic. Only a multi-model approach, like the one set out in 3S-WV, can 
incorporate results from two different trials or studies.  
 
So a two-step estimation process for the wellbeing model allows us to use optimal 
methods for estimating causal total derivatives for income and the non-market good. 
In practice, however, in policymaking random assignment may not always be possible 
and it is unlikely that we will be able to randomise income in large samples in order to 
estimate the income model in Step 1 due to financial and ethical constraints. This is 
problematic because of the central role that income plays in the WV approach.  
 
 
5 I use the term ‘RCT’ to include any study where treatment has been randomised, such as 
field experiments. 
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However, in 3S-WV we can employ other statistical methods that will still produce 
unbiased causal estimates. These are methods that must be able to deal with selection 
on observable and unobservable factors as well as being able to account for selection 
on gains to treatment, which creates heterogeneity in impacts on SWB and will have 
implications for sample matching and the interpretation of values for policy. Under 
the right conditions methods such as difference-in-difference methods, synthetic 
control, and regression discontinuity design (RDD) would all provide sufficiently 
robust results (Angrist et al., 1996) for the income and non-market good models. 
Instrumental variables can also be used but with the appropriate fixes to allow us to 
extrapolate the results to well-defined sample populations rather than the complier 
sub-group. One such technique is the control function method, which I shall discuss in 
detail below. 
 
Again the two-step process is key here. This is because methods that can produce 
casually robust estimates from observational data (eg, difference-in-difference, 
synthetic control and RDD methods) can only look at one treatment at a time and as 
has already been discussed 2SLS with two instrumented variables cannot be used in 
WV, which means that estimates for the causal impact of 𝑄 and 𝑀 can only be 
derived separately from different models (data and assumptions permitting). 3S-WV 
allows for this and a key point to note about 3S-WV is that because the income and 
non-market good models have been separated it accommodates a variety of statistical 
methods - any mix of experimental and non-experimental techniques can be used to 
estimate the three steps, provided that the modelling criteria are adhered to.  
 
It should also be noted that if a selection on observables assumption holds then we 
can use methods such as matching techniques and regression adjustment models. 
Under these selection assumptions (which will rarely hold), simple matching and 
propensity score matching techniques will provide unbiased estimates of the total 
causal derivatives of 𝑀 and 𝑄, with well-defined treatment effects, such as the ATT. 
As for regression adjustment methods, these are regression models which account for 
heterogeneous impacts through interactive terms and again under these selection 
assumptions it would be possible to estimate the total causal derivatives of 𝑀 and 𝑄, 
with well-defined treatment effects provided that only pre-treatment controls are 
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included in the model. However, as discussed above the assumptions underlying 
selection on observables methods are unlikely to hold true for wellbeing models and 
hence experimental methods or non-experimental methods that are robust to selection 
on unobservable factors, such as IV, are preferred in 3S-WV.  
 
5.2.2. Sample matching and interpreting treatment effects in 3S-WV (Technical 
conditions 3 and 4) 
 
I have touched on these issues in the discussion in the previous section (5.2.1). They 
are related more to the methodology involved in implementing the 3S-WV model as 
they relate to how the results from specific methods are to be interpreted and so I 
cover the issues of sample matching and interpreting treatment effects in section 5.3. 
on the 3S-WV methodology.  
 
5.3. Interpreting and understanding values derived from wellbeing valuation 
(Criterion (D)) 
 
This section is set within the context of 3S-WV and as such assumes that the values 
discussed have been derived robustly from 3S-WV. I cover a list of separate issues 
concerning interpretation of the wellbeing valuation approach and its results:  
 
5.3.1. Comparing wellbeing values to preference-based values 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 wellbeing valuation represents the most direct form of 
valuation in terms of alignment with the general theory of valuation. It derives values 
for non-market goods without recourse to data on preferences. This has implications 
for how values derived from wellbeing valuation should be interpreted.  In Chapter 3 I 
argued that values from WV should not be seen as direct complements or comparators 
to WTP/WTA values. This is contrary to most of the WV literature to date (e.g. 
Luechinger, 2009; Kountiuris and Remoundou, 2011; Ambrey and Fleming, 2011; 
Menz and Welsch, 2012; Levinson, 2009; Frey et al, 2004; Ferreira and Moro, 2009). 
There are some exceptions to this trend – for example, Frijters et al. (2011) and 
Carroll et al. (2009) respectively use the terminology income compensation values 
and income equivalence values – but the general attitude seems to be to view 
wellbeing values as being qualitatively identical to preference values. This is not 
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surprising given that a lot of economists are happy to equate SWB measures to utility 
in economics.  
 
Evidence to support my approach of making a clear differentiation between SWB and 
preference here comes from a handful of studies that have compared SWB values 
with values derived from preference-based methods for the same good and have found 
that in general SWB values differ quite significantly from preference-based values. 
This has been found in the cases of valuing urban regeneration (Dolan and Metcalfe, 
2008) and environmental goods (Levinson, 2012; Luechinger, 2009). Interestingly, 
Dolan and Fujiwara (2012) find that for the case of valuing free adult learning courses 
SWB values align quite closely with stated preference values when the stated 
preference question asks people their WTP for a course that explicitly leads to an 
improvement in life satisfaction. This suggests, therefore, - as per Adler’s argument - 
that preferences entail something different (or in addition) to SWB, although we note 
that some of the difference in reported values may be driven by econometric problems 
associated with the wellbeing valuation approach, which are discussed at length in 
this thesis.  
  
5.3.2. What do wellbeing values mean? 
  
Wellbeing values are linked to changes in people’s SWB. The values themselves are 
different in nature to values derived using preference-based valuation methods and the 
specific interpretation of a given value depends entirely on the interpretation of the 
coefficient on the non-market good in the SWB model. There are two types of non-
market good that I shall discuss here (the discussion assumes that the models and 
valuations highlighted here have been derived in a robust fashion using the 3S-WV 
approach). 
 
(i) Non-market goods measured through binary outcomes 
Many of the non-market goods that have been analysed in the wellbeing valuation 
literature are binary in terms of their possible outcomes. For example, good health, 
employment, suffering from a disease or illness, living in a safe area, being a victim 
of crime, achieving an educational qualification and so on.  
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The coefficient on such a variable in the non-market good model will represent the 
SWB impact of the outcome that has been coded as “1”. For example, if the non-
market good is health and the health variable takes on a value of “1” if the individual 
suffers from the illness and “0” otherwise, the SWB coefficient will represent the 
impact of the illness on wellbeing (in this case likely to be a negative coefficient). 
 
The actual interpretation of the value (cost) associated with this health condition will 
depend on two factors in wellbeing valuation: (i) severity, and (ii) duration. Severity 
refers to how severe the illness is and duration refers to the length of time of suffering 
which will change due to how quickly people can adapt to the health condition. All 
binary non-market good variables will depend on these two factors, whereby for 
positive outcomes we would refer to benefits rather than severity. So for example, for 
employment – which has a positive effect on SWB – the value would depend on the 
‘goodness’ of the job and the duration of the job to date. 
 
Since wellbeing valuation uses aggregated data severity (benefits) and duration will 
be determined by the average levels in the sample of the analysis. For example, for a 
given health condition the coefficient on that variable in the non-market good model 
shows the impact of the condition measured at the sample average level of severity 
and adaptation. Some people will have severe symptoms whilst others have very 
trivial ones. And some people will have been living with the condition for a long time 
which may mean that they have adapted to it more and hence the negative impact on 
SWB for them will be lower. 
 
Clearly it would be possible in the 3S-WV analysis to focus on people with particular 
levels of severity and adaptation to the illness by segmenting the sample and focusing 
on people that meet these conditions. In general, though, wellbeing values should be 
interpreted as the value derived at the sample average level of severity and adaptation. 
For some applications this may be too general and hence problematic if we do not 
know what the average level of severity or adaptation is from the data. Often a sense 
of adaptation can be garnered from an assessment of the length of time people have 
been in that state, but severity is impossible to know unless the survey contains data 
on severity (e.g. through a self-reported ranking on a Likert scale). However, in many 
cases the sample average impact and value are sufficient in WV. In which case the 
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interpretation on severity/benefits and duration/adaptation should be noted in the 
results.   
 
(ii) Non-market goods measured through continuous outcomes 
Some non-market goods are measured on a continuous or non-binary scale in the 
wellbeing valuation literature. These include outcomes like pollution levels or CO2 
emissions. Many of the non-market goods assessed as binary outcomes in the 
literature could also be assessed using a continuous outcome variable using the levels 
of severity.  
 
Using a scale for the non-market good reduces or eradicates uncertainty about the 
interpretation of severity (or benefit), but still leaves open the issue of duration and 
adaptation.   
 
For example, if we were to now assume that the health condition discussed above 
were measured on a severity scale where 0 = ‘does not have the condition’ and 100 = 
‘worst possible severity of the condition’ then we can move away from sample 
average levels of severity to focus on the value (costs) associated with each level of 
severity, or a (one unit) change in severity. This may provide a more meaningful 
interpretation of the value (cost) associated with that health condition. Two things to 
note here are that this approach only really solves for the issue around interpretation 
of severity if the categories on the scale are narrow enough. If, for example ,the health 
condition were measured on a three-point scale from 1 to 3 then actual experienced 
severity levels may differ quite substantially even among those people that report the 
same level on the three-point scale and therefore we would run into the problem of 
producing values (costs) for sample average severity levels again. The second issue to 
note is that this approach will require assumptions around the functional form of the 
relationship between unit changes in the non-market good and SWB (which was not 
required in the binary non-market good approach). 
 
The issues of duration and adaptation still apply with continuous non-market good 
variables. This is because people will have experienced the non-market good (at 
different levels of severity or benefit) for different periods of time. If there is 
adaptation involved then those who have experienced it for longer will experience less 
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impact on their wellbeing. Therefore, even with continuous non-market good 
variables the interpretation on duration is still the same: it is the impact of the non-
market good at a given level of severity/benefit for the sample average level of 
adaptation. 
 
5.3.3. Time-horizons  
 
A key question about interpretation posed by Metcalfe (2009) relates to the time 
frame against which we can measure wellbeing values. Wellbeing valuation studies to 
date have tended to use large annual survey data whereby people respond to the life 
satisfaction question once per year (either in a repeated cross-section or panel design). 
Do these responses signify the SWB for that point in time, or for that whole year, or 
do they include much more than that such as future expectations? There is 
unfortunately nothing we can ascertain from the question itself as it is vague on this 
point. For example, in two of the key wellbeing data sets in the UK the life 
satisfaction question is posed as follows: 
 
• How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall? (Understanding 
Society). 
• Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays? (Annual Population 
Survey). 
 
Neither question has a time reference point and thus could be interpreted in many 
different ways. The consensus seems to be that wellbeing values represent annual 
values (for the past year) (e.g. Luechinger and Raschky, 2009; Oswald and 
Powdthavee, 2008; Powdthavee, 2008; Welsch, 2008b; Helliwell and Huang, 2005; 
Levinson, 2009) probably mainly for the reason that the data are taken each year or 
that some of the questions which are used in the wellbeing analysis ask about the past 
12 months (e.g. employment status over the past 12 months).  
 
Frijters et al. (2011) is an example of a study that digs a little deeper to move away 
from assuming simple annualised values. They use quarterly life event data to map 
out a longer-term impact of the non-market good to include anticipation and 
adaptation effects. They claim that their wellbeing valuations - based on life 
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satisfaction - therefore represent a multi-year value for the effect of the event over a 
number of years, rather than a one-off annual value. However, caution must be 
applied to these findings. Whilst Frijters et al. (2011) have accounted for anticipation 
and adaptation effects they still use a time-independent life satisfaction question 
which means that we cannot say for certain that the values are multi-year annualised 
values. The problem of interpretation of duration still exists in their paper.   
 
Life satisfaction scores can include expectations about an individual’s future 
wellbeing. For example, if a significant event such as an illness, an accident, or 
divorce by coincidence happened a few weeks before the survey the individual’s life 
satisfaction response is probably driven mainly by how they feel about the future 
given the life-changing event and may not take into account much about what had 
happened over the past year. On the flipside a life satisfaction response is likely to be 
more reflective of the past 12 months if at the start of the period the individual had 
experienced some significant event which has impacted on their lives for the past year 
in many ways, which makes the focus of their evaluation (at the time of the survey) 
the past year or so. The timeframe for the life satisfaction question is, therefore, likely 
to be driven to some extent by the timing of significant events before the survey. It 
could also be driven by upcoming future events on the horizon. A 17 year old’s life 
satisfaction response during, say, early summer is likely to reflect to a large degree the 
anticipation of going to university from October, and not just recent events or the 
events of the past 12 months.  
 
The upshot is that - using the example of employment - the statistical association 
between being employed and life satisfaction will not necessarily reflect the impact of 
employment on SWB over the past year. It could be entirely driven by people’s recent 
experiences of the job and/or thoughts about the future. A wellbeing value derived 
from this impact estimate, therefore, may not reflect the annual value of employment 
to the individual.  
 
In sum, wellbeing values could reflect (i) the value of 𝑄 over the past 12 months (or 
since the last survey); (ii) the value of 𝑄 for a sub-period in the past 12 months (or 
since the last survey); (iii) the value of 𝑄 now and in the future. We can make a 
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number of hypotheses about what wellbeing values may be picking up, but in reality 
this issue cannot be resolved without recourse to a change in the survey instrument, 
whereby the time period for the life satisfaction question is specified. For example, to 
derive annual values we could ask respondents to rate their overall life satisfaction 
over the past 12 months. For now and for the purposes of this thesis I will assume, as 
many previous papers have done, that since life satisfaction ratings are usually taken 
annually (and they are in the data sets that I use here) and that the determinants of 
SWB used in statistical modelling apply to the past 12 months that wellbeing values 
represent annual values with the caveat that future research is required to understand 
this better. 
 
5.3.4. Wellbeing valuation and cost-benefit analysis 
 
5.3.4.1. Aggregation of values 
An important conclusion from all this is that since we have argued that SWB values 
are not WTP/WTA amounts, CBA under the WV methodology must rely on the social 
welfare function approach rather than the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test approach. 
This means that wellbeing values need to be distributionally weighted in CBA if 
individual-specific income levels are used in the calculation of values and indeed the 
weight itself can be estimated from SWB data. Layard et al. (2008) find that the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of income estimated from SWB data tends to be 
higher than the unity values often derived from consumer demand analysis (Blundell 
et al., 1994; Evans et al., 2005; Evans and Sezer, 2002) and from revealed social 
values embodied in the taxation system (Cowell and Gardiner, 1999), which implies a 
higher weight for lower income groups. CBA under WV may therefore be more 
redistributive or progressive than preference-based CBA. 
 
5.3.4.2. Total economic value (TEV) and wellbeing valuation 
TEV provides an all-encompassing measure of the economic value of any non-market 
good. It was originally developed in the field of environmental valuation, but is a 
generic framework that can be applied to any good, although some definitions of 
value may not be applicable to some goods. WV can be and has been used with non-
market goods that encompass an array of values under TEV (e.g. environment) and so 
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it is important to discuss the extent to which WV can measure TEV. TEV is divided 
in to use and non-use value.  
 
Use value relates to the benefits derived from actual use, planned use or possible use 
of the good.  
 
Non-use value relates to the attachment of value to a good although there is no actual, 
planned or possible use. There are three types of non-use value: (i) existence value, 
(ii) altruistic value, and (iii) bequest value. " Existence value refers to the WTP to 
keep a good in existence in a context where the individual expressing the value has no 
actual or planned use for his/herself or for anyone else. Motivations here could vary 
and might include having a feeling of concern for the asset itself (e.g. a threatened 
species) or a “stewardship” motive whereby the “valuer” feels some responsibility for 
the asset. Altruistic value might arise when the individual is concerned that the good 
in question should be available to others in the current generation. A bequest value is 
similar but the concern is that the next and future generations should have the option 
to make use of the good." (OECD, 2006. p.86).  
 
Figure 5. The total economic value (TEV) framework 
 
 
Source: OECD (2006) 
 
An issue that has been picked up in the wellbeing valuation literature concerns the 
ability of wellbeing valuation to estimate non-use value. In the revealed preference 
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literature it is a commonly held belief that non-use values cannot be estimated 
because revealed preference relies on there being some behavioural ‘trace’ or ‘trail’ 
on the individual’s market behaviour and so generally revealed preference methods 
are not used to ascertain non-use values. Stated preference methods are generally seen 
as the best (and only) method for estimating non-use value (OECD, 2006). 
 
This mindset has translated over to wellbeing valuation and there seems to be a 
general consensus that wellbeing valuation cannot shed any light on non-use value 
(Frey et al., 2004; Levinson, 2009) for similar reasons to those stated in the revealed 
preference literature that there needs to be some ‘trace’ or impact on SWB which non-
use type outcomes might not have. It is clear from Figure 2 and equations (11), (12) 
and (13) that in wellbeing valuation, we do need the non-market good to demonstrate 
some kind of impact on SWB. This will allow us to estimate the derivative of SWB 
with respect to the non-market good. Thus, whereas in revealed preference, the non-
market good must impact on market prices, in wellbeing valuation it must ultimately 
impact on SWB in some way. Where people use some non-market good or service 
this should show up in their SWB ratings (if the good/service is important enough) 
and so use value can clearly be assessed in the wellbeing valuation method. 
 
We should note, however, that contrary to the general belief in the literature the 
wellbeing valuation approach actually does not preclude the possibility of measuring 
non-use value. The issue regarding non-use value measurement in wellbeing valuation 
is a data-related issue rather than a technical point. If the following three conditions 
hold then the non-use value of some non-market good (𝑄1) can be estimated in 
wellbeing valuation: 
 
i. There exists variation in 𝑄1 either across time or across individuals. 
ii. The variation in 𝑄1 is picked up in the data. 
iii. People are aware of this variation in 𝑄1. 
 
If these three factors are true then 𝑄1 will impact on SWB regardless of whether this 
is use or non-use in nature. For example, if 𝑄1 is the number of rhinos in existence, 
then if people care about the existence of rhinos and there is variation in 𝑄1 which we 
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can pick up in data and introduce in the SWB function then there is no technical or 
theoretical reason why non-use value would not be picked up. A different issue is 
whether we would find a statistically significant impact on SWB for 𝑄1 in this case. 
Thus, non-use value can in theory be picked up in the wellbeing valuation approach 
and so the question is more about whether in reality the statistical analysis would do 
so. 
 
There is some empirical evidence to support this claim that I make; a number of 
studies have shown that large-scale human or natural disasters impact on the SWB 
scores of people who were not involved in any way. For example, Metcalfe et al. 
(2011) found that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US had large negative causal 
impacts on the wellbeing of people in the UK. And Rehdanz et al. (2015) find that the 
impacts of the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster can be traced to people in 
other areas of Japan too. Whilst some of this impact could be from people fearing that 
it could happen to them, it would be plausible to think that some of the negative 
impact is due to people feeling sorry and concerned about those that have been 
affected, which is non-use in nature (altruistic value). 
 
Non-use values or costs can therefore be ascertained in wellbeing valuation where 
data allow, but this is likely to be rare outside of a few cases (natural disasters and 
wars are some example areas where non-use related values could be estimated in the 
data). If, for example, we were interested in the non-use value associated with a 
cultural institution such as a national museum this could only be estimated in 
wellbeing valuation if the institution were to suddenly cease operating or if the 
services that provide the non-use value (such as research activities that are undertaken 
by the museum) are stopped. These types of cases are unlikely to happen with any 
frequency which makes estimating non-use value difficult in some cases in wellbeing 
valuation. In sum, wellbeing valuation can derive non-use value in some areas where 
there is significant change, but generally speaking stated preference methods are still 
more comprehensive in their coverage of non-use value than the wellbeing valuation 
method. 
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5.3.4.3. Discounting future impacts in wellbeing valuation  
A key question related to the use of wellbeing values in CBA is the issue of 
discounting future wellbeing impacts. CBA uses the social discount rate, which is 
made up of pure time preference and catastrophe risk plus the value attached to 
economic or GDP growth by future generations. The latter term is not applicable to 
wellbeing valuation since wellbeing values only encompass welfare impacts and do 
not include income or economic impacts. So the question then is whether people 
discount future SWB gains by the rate of pure time preference and catastrophe risk, 
but on this topic the wellbeing literature has been pretty silent. I am unaware of any 
evidence to suggest that people place a (present) time preference on SWB like they do 
for money and consumption and intuitively there does not seem to be a strong 
rationale why they would. The work on SWB that uses a discount rate is normally just 
based on assumptions rather than on any empirical evidence (e.g. Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004; Frijters et al., 2011). Hence, in line with Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2004) I assume that future wellbeing values should not be discounted, although 
further research can shed more light on this topic going forward. 
 
5.3.4.4. Ex-ante wellbeing valuation versus ex-post wellbeing valuation 
As currently practiced wellbeing valuation is an ex-post method, whereby values are 
estimated from the impacts that non-market goods have had on people, which relies 
on people having experienced the non-market good. 
 
It would, however, be possible to undertake wellbeing valuation in an ex-ante mode 
as well by asking people to project the SWB impacts of a future policy, which would 
provide estimates of 𝛽𝑄in Figure 2. For example, this could entail the following type 
of question,  
 
“Imagine that under programme X the government will provide more of Y. How 
satisfied would you be with your life overall if this were to happen?” 
 
The individual’s current level of life satisfaction could be subtracted from the 
projected level of life satisfaction. This would provide an estimate of the impact of the 
non-market good on life satisfaction (𝛽𝑄). This, in effect, is equivalent to the non-
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market good model and after these results are estimated for an ex-ante change the 
remaining processes of 3S-WV can be carried out to derive an ex-ante  value for 𝑄.  
 
The ex-ante wellbeing valuation approach, although never to have featured in any 
discussion or analysis in the wellbeing valuation literature to date, is potentially 
important for two reasons. First, it allows us to derive values for non-market goods 
where data does not exist. This could be, for example, for a new type of project or 
programme. Up to now valuation of future non-market goods was restricted entirely 
to stated preference methods. Second, ex-ante wellbeing valuation would provide a 
potential framework for assessing non-use values by asking people to project their 
SWB scores under the scenario where the good with non-use value is destroyed or its 
provision is ceased. For example, the ex-ante life satisfaction question could ask about 
the impact on life satisfaction due to the loss of wildlife or a cultural institution such 
as a museum. For non-users this would extract the non-use value of these non-market 
goods (if there were projected changes in life satisfaction scores).  
 
The ex-ante method, which could also be labelled the hypothetical wellbeing 
valuation method has many theoretical benefits, but in practice there are a number of 
important issues. First, hypothetical wellbeing valuation relinquishes one of the major 
advantages of wellbeing valuation – the ability to estimate values based on people’s 
actual experiences.  
 
Second (and relatedly), because impacts are not based on actual experiences then a 
number of problems emerge. The non-market good model – whether it is estimated 
from pre-administered survey data or from projected life satisfaction impacts – needs 
to derive causal estimates for 𝑄, that is that 𝛽𝑄 must be unbiased. Projected impacts 
can suffer from a large number of biases as can statistically-estimated impacts (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). As people are asked to estimate the impact of a change in 
some outcome on their life satisfaction they may struggle if the non-market 
good/service is not something they are familiar with. And they may be encouraged to 
provide socially-desirable answers. As discussed people may mis-report their levels of 
wellbeing depending on the context and to whom they are reporting their ratings. If 
asked about the impact of some environmental cause or event on life satisfaction 
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people may overstate the impact on life satisfaction (eg, say that the impact of a loss 
in wildlife or damage to the environment on their life satisfaction is much greater than 
it actually is) in order to portray oneself as an environmentally-friendly or ethical 
person. This will clearly lead to over-stated estimates in hypothetical wellbeing 
valuation.  
 
The example survey question given above is a within-person survey design. It would 
also be possible to run a between-person survey design, whereby one group is asked 
for their SWB scores now and another is asked for their SWB scores if the policy 
were to take place. The people selected into the different surveys should be done so 
on a random basis so that the two groups are identical on average. This between-
person method is the approach usually taken in the psychological sciences to remove 
the effect of salience effects and focussing illusions. Whatever survey design is used 
the problems related to causal inference discussed above will need to be 
acknowledged. This should be an area for future research. 
 
5.4. Estimation methodology for the Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation approach 
 
The key to the 3S-WV approach is to estimate the income model and the non-market 
good model in a robust way that adheres to the four technical criteria for wellbeing 
valuation. From this, step three (estimating a monetary value) can be undertaken. The 
methodology related to this final third step has been sufficiently discussed above and 
therefore I focus on methods for estimating the income model and the non-market 
good model here.  
  
There is one methodological aspect in 3S-WV that is a constant requirement across 
any study. This is the estimation of the income model. The income model is therefore 
the crucial component of 3S-WV and I will start with this model and derive an 
optimal method for its estimation. I will show how the methodology and results from 
this model can be applied to other 3S-WV studies that use UK data. The methodology 
can also be replicated using other data from different countries.  
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The non-market good model is more varied because a given wellbeing valuation study 
could look at any non-market good. It is, therefore, not possible to produce a single 
best-practice model. Instead in Chapter 6 I will use a case study looking at 
employment outcomes and show one possible modelling approach that would adhere 
to the four technical criteria of wellbeing valuation. 
 
5.4.1. The income model 
 
The income model (equation (18) of 3S-WV) is problematic because of the near 
impossibility of running large experiments with income and the difficulties associated 
with previous methods (all have used IVs) for assessing the causal effect of income on 
SWB, which have been discussed above. As discussed 2SLS methods are problematic 
for wellbeing valuation and statistical methods that employ non-exogenous income 
variables are vulnerable to a range of problems in the form of measurement error bias, 
endogeneity bias and the issue of indirect effects (people who earn more money 
generally have to work harder to earn it and these indirect dis-benefits or costs (eg, 
work-related stress) are also captured in the income variable).  
 
In this section I will derive an unbiased estimate of the total derivative of income with 
respect to SWB for a well-defined sample group - the general UK population. This 
estimator will be broad enough to actually be used as an 'off the shelf' estimate of the 
income model in other 3S-WV studies that focus on the same population and life 
satisfaction variable. Producing the methodological framework and results for a 
generalizable income model in 3S-WV - which can be widely applied in terms of the 
framework or the actual results in other 3S-WV studies - is one of the central 
contributions of this thesis.  
 
5.4.1.1. The relationship between income and wellbeing 
There has been a significant amount of work on income and SWB – indeed it is one of 
the most studied research questions in the wellbeing economics literature. Estimation 
of an income model needs to take this literature into account. 
 
The role of income in wellbeing came to prominence with the early work by Easterlin 
(1974) who found that over time wellbeing does not continue to rise with income or 
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GDP (the Easterlin paradox). However, work since then has tended to refute the idea 
of an Easterlin paradox. As we shall see in the literature reviewed below income has 
consistently been found to have a statistically significant relationship with various 
measures of SWB using a number of data sets from across the world. And work by 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) that focuses directly on the issue of the Easterlin 
paradox finds strong evidence from large and newer world data that the paradox does 
not exist and that absolute levels of income matter for people’s wellbeing at all levels 
of income. This thesis takes as a given the assumption that income matters for 
wellbeing. This is, of course, a fundamental assumption in economics and the theory 
of monetary valuation (for example the non-satiation assumption relies on the 
proposition that income improves welfare). 
 
The main questions, therefore, relate to how we should model the relationship 
between income and wellbeing in an empirical sense. Firstly, the evidence is in favour 
of assuming a non-linear relationship between income and wellbeing, which accounts 
for the well-documented diminishing marginal utility of income. Certainly nearly all 
empirical models in the SWB literature in economics make this assumption (Layard et 
al., 2008) and I will follow best-practice here. 
 
Second, as already discussed in detail, exogenous changes in income should be used 
to evidence the relationship between income and SWB. Here I will use exogenous 
changes in income due to lottery wins to estimate the causal effect of income on 
SWB. I argue that lottery wins are likely to be the best source of exogenous income 
changes that we will be able to find in non-experimental data because by law lottery 
wins have to be randomly assigned across the pool of lottery players.  
 
5.4.1.2. Estimating the causal effect of income on SWB from lottery wins data 
A small literature has used lottery wins in the past to identify causal effects of income 
on wellbeing and health. Apouey and Clark (2010) and Gardner and Oswald (2007) 
use lottery wins from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) as an explanatory 
variable and they find positive impacts on health and wellbeing. Lindahl (2009) uses 
data on Swedish lottery winners in 2SLS and finds positive impacts on health and also 
in Sweden (Lindqvist et al., 2018) use a primary data set of Swedish lottery players 
and found that compared to matched controls, “large-prize winners experience 
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sustained increases in overall life satisfaction that persist for over a decade and show 
no evidence of dissipating with time” (p.12). As Apouey and Clark (2010) say, in the 
health and wellbeing literature “Lottery wins are an arguably under-exploited source 
of exogenous variation in income”. Outside of the health and wellbeing literature 
lotteries have been used in research related to labour market and economic decisions 
(see Apouey and Clark (2010) for examples). 
 
The conclusion is that lottery wins are seen as an acceptable source of exogenous 
income changes (from a technical perspective), but their use has been limited in the 
wellbeing literature. This is potentially due to a lack of data. I focus on the studies by 
Apouey and Clark (2010), Gardner and Oswald (2007) and Lindahl (2009) as they are 
the most relevant here. 
 
5.4.1.2.1. Problems 
The fundamental problem with all three studies is that data in the BHPS and from 
Sweden only provide information on the size of annual lottery wins. We do not know 
how often people play and so annual lottery wins are not strictly exogenous: people 
who play more are more likely to win more money and this is problematic as those 
who play more are also likely to have different levels of potential income and 
wellbeing to start off with. This means that in a standard regression setting (as per 
Apouey and Clark, 2010; Gardner and Oswald, 2007), lottery win income is not 
exogenous and in relation to 2SLS (Lindahl, 2005) lottery win income will be 
endogenous in the first stage and so in this case neither regression nor 2SLS provide a 
solution. And this is demonstrated by Lindahl (2005) and Apouey and Clark (2010), 
who show that annual lottery wins in both datasets are correlated with a host of 
socioeconomic variables and this is why all of the papers hold these variables constant 
in an attempt to ensure exogeneity in the lottery prize variable. In other words, the 
papers rely on a conditional exogeneity assumption for lottery wins.  
 
However, the fact that a range of socioeconomic variables are found to be 
determinants of lottery win size means that there are also likely to be a host of other 
unobservable confounding variables. Hence, only controlling for some of the 
observable characteristics that determine winnings is unlikely to produce unbiased 
causal estimates for income.  
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The second problem with previous 2SLS lottery wins studies (for the purposes of 
wellbeing valuation) is that the localised complier estimates from 2SLS are too vague 
for use in wellbeing valuation. In other words, it is impossible to do sample matching 
with 2SLS outputs as discussed above. This problem is not dealt with sufficiently by 
OLS regression either since OLS produces vague and uninterpretable treatment 
effects that lie somewhere in between the ATT and the ATNT (Humphreys, 2009). 
 
Finally, one other problem with OLS is that we cannot eradicate the problem of 
measurement error in the lottery wins variable, which would lead to a downward bias 
in the coefficient size when wellbeing is simply regressed onto lottery win amounts. 
 
5.4.1.2.2. Solutions 
The favoured approach here is to employ an IV framework since this eradicates the 
issue of measurement error, which we know is problematic for income variables, 
whilst also dealing with the other issues highlighted above such as endogeneity. 
However, an approach is required whereby we are able to derive a causal effect with a 
clear interpretation regarding to whom the estimates apply, and which addresses the 
issue around endogeneity of the lottery wins variable. This cannot be the 2SLS 
estimator. 
 
The approach taken here is therefore different to the rest of the lottery wins literature. 
I use lottery wins data from the BHPS with the control function approach. The control 
function is an alternative method for estimation using IV that can be used instead of 
2SLS or the Wald estimator. The control function approach allows us to derive 
estimates of the sample average partial effect (APE) for income, whilst also dealing 
with the issue of measurement error in the same way that 2SLS does. The control 
function estimator represents the effect of income on life satisfaction that we would 
expect for anyone in the sample, which is a much clearer and broader treatment effect 
than that obtained from 2SLS. This simplifies the task of sample matching in 
wellbeing valuation and makes the control function approach ideal for 3S-WV. 
 
To address the issue of endogeneity I hypothesise that the amount of previous lottery 
wins will capture lottery playing preferences and hence current playing frequency 
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more accurately than observable socioeconomic factors - on the assumption that 
people who played a lot in the past will always tend to play a lot, unless they win very 
large amounts, but large winners are excluded from the analysis. I find that 
controlling for previous wins leaves all other observable background variables 
statistically insignificant in determining annual lottery win size (see Table 3) - 
evidence that controlling for previous wins will ensure exogeneity in the lottery wins 
instrument. Previous lottery win amounts have a positive statistically significant effect 
on current lottery win amounts as would be predicted from my hypothesis. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of annual lottery wins size 
Independent variables Coefficient S.E. 
low education 136.903 117.398 
age -2.066 -3.457 
male 129.526 112.586 
poor Health -154.732 -200.634 
unemployed -98.941 -446.597 
no. of children 81.733 70.75 
lagged income -0.001 -0.002 
previous lottery wins 0.07*** 0.014 
constant 249.086 228.99 
Observations 5,269   
Notes: Dependent variable: annual lottery win amounts. Variable descriptions in Table 4. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level.  
 
Below I will discuss how the 3S-WV approach with the control function addresses the 
technical criteria set out in Chapter 4. 
 
5.4.1.3. Data 
Data comes from the BHPS, which is a nationally representative sample of British 
households, containing over 10,000 adults, conducted every year since 1991. Life 
satisfaction (measured on a scale of 1 – 7) was added in 1997 and so we analyse the 
period 1997- 2009, excluding 2001 which did not include life satisfaction questions. 
The BHPS asks respondents whether they have won money on lotteries or football 
pools and how much they have won in total during the year. In the UK there are a 
large number of lottery players (Provencher et al., 2012) and these swamp the football 
pool players in the BHPS dataset (Gardner and Oswald, 2007). I will therefore refer to 
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this group simply as lottery winners as Gardner and Oswald (2007) do. Table 4 shows 
the descriptions for all variables used in the analysis.  
 
Table 4. Variable descriptions  
Variables Descriptions 
Life satisfaction 
 
 
Job satisfaction 
Life satisfaction score, coded on a seven-point scale so 
that 1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = completely satisfied 
Job satisfaction score, coded on a seven-point scale so 
that 1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = completely satisfied 
 
Leisure satisfaction Leisure time satisfaction score, coded on a seven-point 
scale so that 1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = completely 
satisfied 
 
Health satisfaction Health satisfaction score, coded on a seven-point scale 
so that 1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = completely satisfied 
 
Social life satisfaction Satisfaction with social life score, coded on a seven-
point scale so that 1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = completely 
satisfied 
 
GP visits Number of GP visits 
Household income 
Household size 
House ownership 
Annual equivalised gross household income 
Number of people living in the home 
= 1 if respondents owns their home 
Unemployed 
Spouse employed 
Redundant unemployed 
 
Retired 
Job hours 
Male 
= 1 if not employed or self-employed 
= 1 if spouse is employed or self-employed 
= 1 if respondent was made redundant (and is still 
unemployed)  
= 1 if retired 
Hours worked per week 
= 1 if male 
Age Age of respondent 
Low education =1 if left education after minimum compulsory 
Poor health 
 
Carer 
= 1 if respondent assesses own health as 'poor' or ' very 
poor' 
= 1 if respondent provides care of others 
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Previous lottery wins 
Lottery win 
 
No. of children 
Sum of previous lottery wins (£) 
= 1 if respondent won between £100 - £50,000 in 
lotteries over the year 
Number of children under age 16 in the household 
Married = 1 if married) 
Divorced = 1 if divorced 
Widowed = 1if widowed 
Separated = 1 if separated  
Never married = 1 if never married 
Winter interview = 1 if survey was taken in winter 
Living in safe area = 1 if respondent does not live in an area where they 
perceive vandalism and crime to be a problem. 
Debt burden = 1 if repayment of debt and associated interest is a 
'heavy burden' or 'somewhat of a burden' 
 
 
5.4.1.4. Methodology 
The control function uses some of the basic set up from 2SLS, but explicitly accounts 
for impact heterogeneity in the model so that sample average (rather than complier 
average) effects can be measured. Following Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) I run a 
correlated random coefficient (CRC) model using lottery wins as an IV (𝑍) for 
household income and controlling for previous lottery wins. For previous wins, I sum 
annual lottery wins over all years in which the respondent was present in the data up 
to and including 𝑡 − 1. The model is set up as follows (dropping the time and 
individual subscripts for simplicity): 
 
(22) 𝐿𝑆 = 𝜋 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑀) + 𝛽2𝑋 + 𝜀    
 
(23) 𝛽1 = 𝛼1 + 𝜗1        
 
(24) ln (𝑀) = 𝜋 + 𝛾𝑍 + 𝜗2     
 
so that,  
 
(25) 𝐿𝑆 = 𝜋 + 𝛼1 ln(𝑀) + 𝛽2𝑋 + 𝜗1 ∙ ln(𝑀) + 𝜀     
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Here the impact of income on life satisfaction is made up of a constant term and an 
individually unique term (𝜗1). This is the unobserved heterogeneity and in essence, 
the term 𝜗1 ∙ ln(𝑀) in (25) removes the complier effect so that 𝐸(𝛽1) = 𝛼 = the 
average effect of income for the sample. Equation (24) is equivalent to the first stage 
in 2SLS as it shows the relationship between the instrument (lottery wins) and 
income. Since 𝑀 is endogenous in (22), 𝜀 and 𝜗2 are correlated, and under the 
assumption of heterogenous treatment effects 𝜗1 and 𝜗2 are also correlated. Therefore, 
𝜗1 and 𝜀 in (25) are estimable from the error term from equation (24): 𝐸(𝜗1|𝑋, 𝑀) =
𝜃1𝜗2, 𝐸(𝜀|𝑋, 𝑀) = 𝜌1𝜗2. Equation (25) then becomes: 
      
(26) 𝐿𝑆 = 𝜋 + 𝛼1 ln(𝑀) + 𝛽2𝑋 + 𝜃1?̂?2 ∙ ln(𝑀) + 𝜌1?̂?2    
 
where ?̂?2 is the predicted error term from (24).  
 
The assumptions underlying the control function are somewhat more restrictive than 
those for 2SLS. In addition to the standard assumptions for valid instruments, we 
assume that 𝐸(𝜀|𝜗2)  and 𝐸(𝜗1|𝜗2) (respectively unobserved self-selection and 
unobserved selection on gains) are linear functions as is standard in the control 
function approach. Also, we note that the composite error term in (25) ( 𝜗1 ∙ ln(𝑀) +
𝜀) has a non-zero heteroscedastic mean and so heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors are used. It is noted that we do not require the monotonicity assumption in this 
set-up because we can assume that we have one-sided non-compliance to the 
instrument – in other words, it is reasonable to assume that the subject pool comprises 
of compliers and always-takers for the lottery wins instrument. Never-takers would be 
people that do not cash in on winning lottery tickets, which seems unlikely.  
 
Under these assumptions 𝛼1 in (26) represents the causal effect of a log-point change 
in household income on life satisfaction for the average person in the sample.  
 
In equation (24) I use the following conditional independence assumption:  
 
(27) (𝐿𝑆0, 𝐿𝑆1, 𝐷0, 𝐷1) ⊥ 𝑍 | previous wins    
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where the “treatment” (𝐷) is an increase in household income and 𝑍 is lottery wins. 
This implies that (conditional on previous win amounts) lottery wins cannot be 
correlated with other determinants of household income (exogeneity) and that lottery 
wins can only affect life satisfaction through the impact on income (exclusion 
restriction). Proof for the exogeneity assumption under this set up is demonstrated in 
Table 3. Now, it could be argued that the exclusion restriction could fail here as 
lottery winners may also be happier because of euphoria experienced at winning the 
lottery. Therefore, here I compare lottery winners of different amounts as in Gardner 
and Oswald (2007) and Imbens et al. (2001). So 𝑍 = 0 for people with (small) annual 
wins of under £100 and 𝑍 = 1 for people with medium sized annual wins of £100 to 
£50,000. Wins are restricted to a maximum of £50,000 since sample sizes get very 
low after this point, which makes extrapolation shaky. Here both groups are winners 
and will feel some happiness due to having won. Is there still a problem that larger 
winners (the 𝑍 = 1 group) may feel more euphoria than smaller winners (the 𝑍 = 0 
group)? This is will be undoubtedly true, but it suggests that the level of euphoria 
experienced at winning the lottery is correlated with win size, which suggests that it is 
the money prize that causes happiness; precisely the effect we are interested in for the 
instrument. Second, the euphoria felt from the act of winning itself may only be 
temporary anyway and not picked up in the life satisfaction responses at the time of 
the survey. Hence, I argue that the exclusion restriction assumption is satisfied for 
lottery wins under this set up. 
 
By comparing the sample of small to medium-sized lottery winners the control 
function will derive the causal effect of income for the average lottery player in the 
UK. This has implications for the task of sample matching, which is discussed in 
more detail below.  
 
The control function approach is preferred here to other methods in the literature that 
attempt to extrapolate localised IV effects (LATE) to population average effects. 
Examples of such studies are Aronow and Sovey (2010), Follmann (2000) and 
Angrist and Fernandes-Val (2010). The basic premise of these methods is to explain 
heterogenous impacts through differences in observable characteristics across the 
sample, an assumption also used by regression adjustment techniques. Sub-group 
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differences in LATEs are estimated (eg, for a certain age group) by restricting the 
sample in 2SLS by this characteristic and then this is extrapolated to other sample 
groups based on the breakdown of age and other characteristics.  
 
These methods are problematic because it is assumed that differences in impact size 
can be explained solely by observable characteristics and because proper 
extrapolation requires knowledge of the characteristics of non-compliers’ (always-
takers and never-takers) who, like compliers cannot be observed in the data. The 
control function approach does not rely on these tenuous assumptions and explicitly 
models and controls for the heterogeneity instead.  
 
5.4.1.4.1. The control function and the conditions underlying 3S-WV 
I focus on the parts relevant to the income model here. The first three conditions are 
relevant for the income model.  
 
5.4.1.4.2. Estimating the full causal (direct + indirect) effects of the non-market 
good and income on SWB (Condition 1 and Condition 2) 
In respect to income in the control function model provided that the conditional 
independence assumption holds along with the other assumptions that are also made 
in the first stage of 2SLS, then 𝛼1 in equation (23) will represent the causal effect of 
income on life satisfaction. The only control variable we use in the control function is 
previous lottery win amounts in order to ensure exogeneity of the lottery wins 
variable. In other words, the only other variable in the control function regression 
model is a pre-treatment variable and so income can still have indirect effects on 
wellbeing. Hence  𝛼1 represents the total derivative of wellbeing with respect to 
income (d 𝑆𝑊𝐵 d 𝑀ൗ ) and therefore, we can go one step further and claim that 𝛼1 in 
equation (23) will represent the full causal effect of income on life satisfaction. 
 
5.4.1.4.3. Sample matching (Condition 3) 
The control function provides a clear treatment effect interpretation for the total 
derivative and hence makes the task of sample matching possible. 𝛼1 in equation (23) 
represents the full causal effect of income on life satisfaction for the average lottery 
player in Britain. For the purposes of sample matching this means that we would have 
to either estimate the impact of the non-market good on life satisfaction (𝑔′𝑄 from 
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equation (20)) for the average lottery player in Britain or find a way of converting the 
causal estimate (𝛼1) for lottery players to a general population effect. The latter is 
preferable and since the evidence suggests that a large proportion of the UK 
population (over 70%) play lotteries (Telegraph, 2014)6 we will assume here that the 
causal effect of income for the sample of lottery players from the control function is 
equivalent to the causal effect of income for the general population in Britain.  
 
In other words, the control function approach allows us to derive an estimate of the 
average effect of income on life satisfaction for anyone in the British population. This 
is a broad treatment effect which can be used with results from a generalised non-
market good model or the control function could be re-estimated for different 
population groups (eg, different age and socio-economic groups) to more closely 
match the sample profile of a specific non-market good model. Given the 
generalizability of the results from the control function it would also be possible to 
use the results as an 'off the shelf' estimate for the income model in any 3S-WV study 
pertaining to the UK that uses the same life satisfaction variable: we can use the 
results from (26) with any non-market good model that can derive UK population 
average estimates for 𝑔′𝑄 in equation (20). In the results section I will present a table 
of value estimates for different impact sizes of the non-market good. 
 
5.4.1.5. Control function results 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the control function for income. The first stage 
(shown in Table 5) is equation (24). I find that winning the lottery has a highly 
significant positive effect on household income after controlling for previous win 
amounts.  
 
  
 
6 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/11228989/National-Lottery-20-amazing-facts-
from-20-years-of-creating-millionaires.html 
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Table 5. Control function: first stage regression 
Dependent variable: log(household income) 
 
Independent variables Coefficient S.E. 
lottery win 0.102*** 0.015 
previous lottery wins 6.82e-06*** 0.000 
constant 9.999*** 0.007 
observations 10,461   
Notes: Model estimated using equation (24). Variable descriptions in Table 4.  
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level.  
 
I find that income then has a statistically significant effect on life satisfaction in the 
second step of the control function as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Control Function: the causal effect of income on life satisfaction  
Dependent variable: life satisfaction 
 
Independent variables Coefficient S.E. 
log (household income) 1.103*** 0.252 
previous lottery wins -0.00001*** 0.000 
 ?̂?2 -1.108*** 0.260 
 ?̂?2 ∙ ln(𝑀) 0.011* 0.006 
constant -5.777** 2.530 
Observations 10,328   
Notes: Model estimated using equation (26). Variable descriptions in Table 4.  
Predicted error term (?̂?2) estimated from first stage regression (Table 5).  
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
 
The sample average effect of a log-point change in household income on life 
satisfaction is 1.1, which is also highly significant. This represents the causal effect of 
income on life satisfaction for any lottery player chosen at random in the BHPS, 
which we can assume to represent the average effect for the UK population. No post-
treatment variables are included in the model and hence this is the total derivative of 
household income on life satisfaction: 
 
(28) 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑀
= 1.1    
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A comparison of this coefficient against an income coefficient derived using OLS can 
be made by reference to Table 11 in Chapter 6. The OLS models in that table, which 
use log of household income from the same BHPS data, show a coefficient size of 
around 0.1, significant at the 1% level (the mean for the two OLS models is 0.1035). 
This indicates that in comparison to an income coefficient estimated using a non-
exogenous income variable (household income) the results from the control function 
using a lottery wins instrument for income are around 10 times higher. This is in line 
with findings from previous studies in the literature that have employed instrumental 
variables for income which on average find a 10-12 fold increase in the size of the 
income coefficient when using an instrument (see section 4.4.3.2.2.). 
 
We note that the interactive term (?̂?2 ∙ ln(𝑀)) is significant at the 10% level, showing 
some evidence for heterogeneous impacts of income. Also, ?̂?2 is significant which is 
proof that the income variable is endogenous in the life satisfaction equation and is 
likely that standard OLS would generate biased estimates of the causal effect of 
income. The coefficient is negative implying that in cases where income is not 
exogenously determined we will see downward bias in the income coefficient in 
regression models.  
 
Table 7 offers a quick-reference chart of values (compensating surplus) for 
hypothetical impact sizes based on the causal effect of log of income of 1.1 and an 
average income of £23,000. This gives an idea of the values associated with different 
coefficient sizes for non-market goods or ‘bads’. The values are based on life 
satisfaction models where life satisfaction is measured on a seven-point scale. 
 
Table 7. Monetary values for hypothetical wellbeing impacts 
Hypothetical impact 
size for 𝑸  
CS for welfare 
gain 
Hypothetical impact 
size for 𝑸  
CS for welfare loss 
0.0001 £2 -0.0001 £2 
0.0005 £10 -0.0005 £10 
0.001 £21 -0.001 £21 
0.005 £104 -0.005 £105 
0.01 £208 -0.01 £210 
0.05 £1,022 -0.05 £1,070 
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0.1 £1,999 -0.1 £2,189 
0.25 £4,676 -0.25 £5,869 
0.5 £8,401 -0.5 £13,235 
0.75 £11,369 -0.75 £22,482 
1 £13,733 -1 £34,087 
1.5 £17,118 -1.5 £66,939 
2 £19,267 -2 £118,695 
 Notes: CS and ES values for different impact sizes on life satisfaction based on seven-point scale. 
Calculations made based on SWB impact of log (household income) of 1.1 and average income level  
of £23,000.   
 
The issue of unconstrained CS values in welfare losses has been discussed above and 
is demonstrated empirically in Table 7. The CS for large negative impacts on welfare 
(life satisfaction) quickly exceeds the income constraints in this particular example 
(£23,000). The reasons that explain why the CS for a welfare loss is greater than the 
CS for the equivalent welfare gain (which is detectable for non-trivial levels of 
welfare change in Table 7) have been discussed in section 4.4.1.1. 
 
5.5. Summary 
 
This chapter is the key chapter in this thesis. I start by developing a new technical 
framework for assessing the validity and rigour of WV studies, culminating in a set of 
four key conditions and criteria. I demonstrated that the current WV methodology 
does not adhere to these criteria in a number of ways and that because of this the 
results are likely to be biased.  
 
Based on these new criteria I developed a new approach to WV, the Three-Step 
Wellbeing Valuation (3S-WV) method and estimated the key parameters in the 
model. In the next chapter I apply the new 3S-WV approach to employment outcomes 
and compare how 3S-WV performs relative to the current WV methodology. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6. Application of the Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation 
method to employment outcomes 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 set out the technical conditions for estimating monetary values using the 
wellbeing valuation approach together with a discussion on interpreting wellbeing 
values. The main contribution of the section was the development of a new approach 
to wellbeing valuation, known as 3S-WV which provided a solution to the main 
technical criteria. I produced a generalizable income model for 3S-WV. It was noted 
that a similarly generalizable model for the non-market good was not possible given 
the variety in the types of non-market goods assessed and the availability and format 
of the relevant data. 
 
In Chapter 6 I apply the 3S-WV methodology to the case of valuing employment 
outcomes. I will look at the values associated with the non-pecuniary aspects of 
employment, which will form the non-market good in this case study. The study will, 
therefore, provide a practical example of using 3S-WV. I choose employment because 
many government departments and labour ministries, such as the UK Department for 
Work and Pensions have struggled to quantify and evidence the benefits of 
employment beyond the wage salary. As discussed in Chapter 1 the non-financial 
benefits of employment should be considered in valuation and CBA and so the thesis 
makes an important contribution in this respect. 
 
The labour market has long been an area of great interest and enquiry for economists 
and following in this tradition, a key research question for economists now working 
with SWB data concerns the impact of employment status and different aspects of the 
job itself on people's wellbeing. In this chapter I seek to identify the causal effect of 
unemployment on life satisfaction for different population groups. This will allow me 
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to value employment status from the perspective of different people in society broken 
down by factors such as age, gender, educational status and so on.  
 
I contribute to the literature by using a natural experiment exploiting data on job 
redundancies to estimate the casual effect of unemployment on life satisfaction. I 
develop a model that can be used to provide for the first time the full causal effect 
(total derivative) with a clear treatment effect interpretation and a clear sample for 
sample matching. This ensures that the particular non-market good model (for 
employment) developed here aligns with the four technical criteria of 3S-WV in order 
to deliver unbiased estimates of monetary value in wellbeing valuation.  
 
In section 6.2. I start with a review of the literature on employment and wellbeing 
before developing the statistical model in section 6.3. 
 
6.2. Literature review 
 
There has been a large amount of literature devoted to the topic of employment and 
wellbeing within the social sciences, but as Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew 
(2009) explain much of the previous literature is limited in terms of its ability to 
attribute causality. The main focus of this literature review is on studies that use 
methodologies that can provide causal estimates for employment, but I shall also 
touch on general themes in the employment and wellbeing literature.  
 
6.2.1. Theoretical literature 
 
Work could impact on wellbeing in a number of potential ways - both positively and 
negatively. We can think of there being pecuniary and non-pecuniary impacts. In 
terms of pecuniary effects, in work people receive a wage income and possibly other 
monetary rewards, such as employer contributions to a pension scheme. On the flip-
side there may also be some unavoidable monetary costs, such as travel costs and 
childcare costs (Greenberg and Knight, 2007).  
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In addition, employment may have positive impacts on an individual’s wellbeing over 
and above the effects of the pecuniary benefits. These are the non-pecuniary benefits 
of employment and the theoretical framework that has traditionally underpinned much 
of the work in this area derives from Jahoda’s (1982) Latent Deprivation Theory, 
which proposes that employment provides access to five categories of experience that 
are important to health and wellbeing. These are i) structured time use; ii) activity; iii) 
social contact; iv) collective purpose and v) status. Similar theoretical models include 
Warr’s Vitamin Model for employment (Warr, 1987; Warr, 1994). 
 
People may also incur some non-pecuniary costs in employment as they have to 
substitute leisure and/or home production time for time at work. Leisure and home 
production may have a positive value to the individual and so there could be a loss to 
the individual from forgoing this time (Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg and Robins, 
2008). There may also be dis-amenities associated with the job, such as stress and 
fatigue (Waddell and Burton, 2006).  
 
6.2.2. Studies that use endogenous employment variables  
 
Based on these theoretical frameworks, there has been a proliferation of empirical 
work looking at the variety of ways in which work can impact on wellbeing. A major 
review of the evidence was conducted by Waddell and Burton in 2006 and 
subsequently meta-reviews of the literature on different aspects of employment and 
wellbeing have been conducted by for example Erdogan et al. (2012) and Joyce et al. 
(2010).  Like Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) Waddell and Burton 
(2006) also recognise the dearth of studies that are able to adequately attribute 
causality.  
 
In Waddell and Burton’s (2006)  review of approximately 400 studies they are clearly 
conscious of not attributing causality too readily and much of the language they use 
refers to ‘relationships’ and ‘associations’.  
 
A wide range of methods have been used with endogenous employment variables. 
These are methods that do not use random assignment in some form or attempt to 
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apply methods such as IV to solve for the endogeneity problem. There are two types 
of methods:  
 
(i) Quasi-experimental methods that apply statistical ‘fixes’ to control for 
confounding factors. Here methods that have been used include, regression analysis 
using cross-sectional and panel data (for example Clark and Oswald, 1994; Tella et 
al., 2003), where in the latter fixed effects may be used to control for time-invariant 
factors (for example Gerlach and Stephan, 1996; Korpi, 1997; Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann, 1998); and structural equation modelling (for example Barnett and 
Brennan, 1995; de Jonge et al., 2001; de Jonge and Schaufeli, 1998; ter Doest and de 
Jonge, 2006).  
 
(ii) Non-experimental methods that make no attempt to control for differences and 
confounding factors. This includes t-test analysis; follow up studies which track 
people over time as they change employment status (see Murphy and Athanasou, 
1999 for a meta-analysis) and qualitative analysis such as semi-structured interviews 
(van den Berg et al., 2015). 
 
The main messages and findings from these types of studies are as follows. There is 
an overall finding that employment is associated with wellbeing measured as 
happiness, job satisfaction and life satisfaction (Andersson, 2008; Berger, 2009; 
Binder and Coad, 2012; Booth and Ours, 2012; Bowling et al., 2010. p.201; Brereton 
et al., 2008; Clark, 2010; Cuyper et al., 2008; Khattab and Fenton, 2009; Maennig and 
Wilhelm, 2012; Ryan et al., 2010; Zeng et al., 2012). 
 
The happiness impact seems to depend on the type of job and the context of the job, 
with the self-employed generally happier than the full-time employed (Benz and Frey, 
2008; Binder and Coad, 2012; Brereton et al., 2008), and the full-time employed 
happier than part-time employees (Booth and Ours, 2012). Non-participation in the 
workforce, either through unemployment or unpaid family work are commonly 
associated with lower life satisfaction compared to those who are working (Berger, 
2009; Clark et al., 2010; Maennig and Wilhelm, 2012). Informal jobs have been found 
to have no worse effect on life satisfaction than employment by formal contracts 
(Aistov et al., 2012). Generally there is no difference in life satisfaction between 
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private and public sector employees, although private sector employees’ subjective 
wellbeing is more sensitive to fluctuations in unemployment rates than that of public 
sector workers (Luechinger et al., 2010). Men are more negatively affected by 
regional unemployment rates than women (Clark et al., 2010). 
 
A number of studies have analysed the association between work-life balance and 
wellbeing (Booth and van Ours, 2009; D’Addio et al., 2007; Gröpel and Kuhl, 2009; 
Pouwels et al., 2008). Flexibility of working hours is associated with higher levels of 
happiness (Atkinson and Hall, 2011; Torka and Schyns, 2007). In contrast mandatory 
overtime has been found to be associated with lower levels of happiness (Golden and 
Wiens-Tuers, 2006). Booth and van Ours (2009) find that part-time women are more 
satisfied with working hours than full-time women, and that women’s life satisfaction 
is increased if their partners work full-time. Relative salary has been found to affect 
satisfaction, with satisfaction levels dependent on the rank of an individual’s wage 
within a comparison group (Clark et al., 2009; Wyld, 2011). 
 
A large number of studies have analysed the characteristics which increase life 
satisfaction and happiness in the workplace. These include engagement and security 
(Pouwels et al., 2008; Siu et al., 2007), perceived control (Håkansson et al., 2011; 
Khattab and Fenton, 2009), and trust (Helliwell and Huang, 2010; 2011). 
Opportunities for promotion, supervisory roles and union membership are also 
associated with higher life satisfaction (Campione, 2008; Chaiprasit and Santidhiraku, 
2011; Cuyper et al., 2009). A large number of such studies focus on job satisfaction 
(Altinoz et al., 2012; Bernhard-Oettel et al., 2008; Bilgin and Demirer, 2012; Brown 
et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Kristensen and Johansson, 2008; Lévy-Garboua et al., 
2007; Origo and Pagani, 2009), with a subset of studies linking job satisfaction to job 
performance and productivity (Bowling, 2007; Cornelissen et al., 2011; Jones, 2006; 
Judge et al., 2010). 
 
These studies are generally problematic from the point of view of inferring causality. 
None of the quasi-experimental methods discussed here can fully account for 
endogeneity biases such as selection bias, reverse causality and measurement error. 
These biases have been discussed at length elsewhere in this thesis. Some of the 
studies that have used panel data methods such as fixed effects have been highly cited 
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in the literature, but they are still susceptible to the problem of reverse causality and 
selection on unobservable time-variant factors such as motivation and ability. And we 
must not forget that fixed effects modelling can lead to attenuation bias in that by 
taking out between-individual variation, it increases the ratio of measurement error to 
actual variation in variables that are measured with error (Deaton, 1993). This can 
lead to a downward bias in the coefficients on employment variables in fixed effects 
regression models. Most of the discussion regarding problems of inferring causality 
that was presented in the section on income above is relevant to the issue of the causal 
effect of employment. 
 
Non-experimental studies are also highly problematic for inferring causality. Simple 
t-test analysis allows for all confounding factors to influence the difference in mean 
estimates for SWB. Before and after trend studies do not control for history effects 
and other potential biases such as the impact of regression to the mean. Qualitative 
approaches are problematic because people are unable to predict what the 
counterfactual would have been like, people may provide socially desirable answers 
(it will seem ungrateful if an employed person says he is unhappy, especially during 
times of economic hardship), and cognitive dissonance may play a part in that people 
re-align their beliefs to fit their behaviour and could say they are happier with a job 
than without a job, or how else would they explain the fact that they go to work every 
day (for example see Gangl, 2010; McGill, 2000).  
 
6.2.3. Studies that use exogenous employment variables or that exploit methods 
that permit better inferences of causality 
 
Much of the past literature is not directly relevant to the study here since we cannot 
directly infer causality. It is fair to say that much of the literature on employment and 
wellbeing is at a conceptual or theoretical level (e.g., Bartley, 1994; Shortt, 1996) or 
uses non-exogenous changes in employment status (Kassenboehmer and Haisken-
DeNew, 2009).  
 
However, there do exist a handful of studies that seek to use methods that allow for 
better inferences about causality. Randomisation is clearly very difficult to use when 
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we are interested in employment status per se as it would involve randomly assigning 
jobs to people. Most randomised trials or experiments in this area have focussed on 
the random assignment of job training advice and employment programmes (e.g., 
Hendra et al., 2011; Caplan et al., 1996), or work-related conditions such as flexible 
working (Joyce et al., 2010), rather than employment per se. These types of trials do 
not estimate the effect of employment on SWB, but could feasibly do so through an 
instrumental variable methodology provided that the assignment of the employment 
training itself does not impact on SWB through channels other than employment 
status, but this would be a highly questionable assumption.  
 
Instead, an alternative strategy is to find naturally occurring exogenous changes in 
employment status. This drove some of the early work on factory closures and health, 
which would find large factories that were about to go out of business and measure 
health status of the employees before and after compared to control groups. They 
tended to find large negative effects of job loss on objective measures of health, such 
as medical usage rates and mortality (Beale and Nethercott, 1987; Iversen et al., 1989; 
Studnicka et al., 1991; Burgard et al., 2005; Keefe et al., 2002). These studies, 
however, have been criticised for small sample sizes, the lack of  generalisability of 
the results and for not using appropriate control groups (Morris and Cook, 1991). The 
study designs used in factory closures, despite these criticisms, are of theoretical 
interest to this current study although the earlier work on factory closures was 
focussed on physical health outcomes rather than wellbeing.  
 
As far as this author is aware, Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) is the only 
study to date that employs a large nationally representative dataset and aims to use 
exogenous changes in employment status to identify the impact of unemployment on 
SWB. They use 15 years of the GSOEP and look at the reasons respondents reported 
for leaving their previous job. In the survey people can choose: ‘quit for personal 
reasons’, ‘transferred by firm’, ‘transferred on own account’, ‘reaching retirement 
age’, ‘wanting to look for another job’, ‘personal reasons’, ‘time-limited work 
contract’, ‘quit on one’s own’, ‘giving up working’, ‘fired by employer’, ‘on leave or 
sabbatical’, ‘company closing’ and ‘other reasons’. The authors use the ‘company 
closing’ response to proxy for exogenous moves in to unemployment. They run OLS 
and logit models (where in the latter the life satisfaction responses are set as a binary 
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variable indicating high or low wellbeing). Models are run with and without fixed 
effects and with a standard set of controls, including marital status, education, 
household size, health and income. They also control for being unemployed and entry 
into unemployment due to being sacked.  
 
Schmitz (2011) in many ways replicates the Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew 
(2009) study by using the same unemployment variables and GSOEP dataset, but 
instead looking at unemployment and health outcomes rather than wellbeing. 
 
This chapter focuses on causality and the creation of a model that aligns with the main 
technical conditions of 3S-WV. It, therefore, relates more closely to the much smaller 
literature on employment and wellbeing which attempts to exploit data on exogenous 
changes in employment status. I employ the same basic structure and assumptions as 
the Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) study and the factory closure studies 
to run an employment-related non-market good model which adheres to the four 
technical conditions of 3S-WV. In sum, this study derives the total causal effect of 
employment status on SWB with a clear treatment effect, which allows for sample 
matching and an unambiguous interpretation of the monetary value in wellbeing 
valuation.  
 
6.3. Methodology 
 
6.3.1. Strategy  
 
The study presented here develops from the Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew 
(2009) paper in a number of important ways using redundancy data from the BHPS 
for the UK rather than the German GSOEP. First, I test whether redundancies are 
exogenous by looking at balance tests across those made redundant and those that 
keep their jobs. Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) did not test this and 
hence their paper relied on assumed exogeneity of the company closure variable. But 
there is evidence within the paper that company closures as measured in the GSOEP 
are endogenous to some degree, because Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew show 
very large changes in the size of the unemployment coefficient when fixed effects are 
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included in the model and on many occasions ‘company closing’ becomes 
insignificant. If ‘company closing’ were truly exogenous it should be robust to the 
inclusion of other control variables including fixed effects. 
 
Second, Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew include a large set of standard control 
variables for SWB models. It is not clear why this is necessary if the company closure 
variable is truly exogenous, but aside from that it makes it highly likely that some 
indirect effects, such as the impact of employment on SWB through health, are 
controlled for when other control variables are included in the model. The model 
developed here fully acknowledges the indirect effects of employment on SWB. This 
is because exogeniety of the redundancy variable permits a comparison of the non-
parametric difference in means in SWB scores across the employed and unemployed 
groups. In this framework we can capture any indirect effects that unemployment may 
have on SWB (for example, unemployment shocks may lead to reductions in health 
and increased likelihood of divorce or separation which are themselves determinants 
of SWB). This is the first study that assesses the full effect of unemployment on 
wellbeing capturing all of the possible indirect effects. Therefore the results will 
represent the total (causal) derivative of life satisfaction with respect to 
unemployment and this can be used directly in 3S-WV. 
 
Third, Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) and other highly-cited papers 
such as Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) have tended to use conditional logit 
models where a marginal effect for unemployment cannot be estimated, and even 
where marginal effects can be computed (e.g., Korpi’s (1997) OLS fixed effects 
model), a clearly defined treatment effect does not exist because the regression 
estimates are conditional on variables taken from the whole sample. If we use the 
term ‘treatment’ for the state of unemployment, then the study presented in this 
chapter will derive the sample average treatment effect (ATE)7 of unemployment with 
clear implications for labour market policy and for how we interpret the results for 
3S-WV.  
 
 
7 Although unemployment has a negative connotation I will use the term ‘treatment’ to align with the 
treatments effects literature. 
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Fourth, I analyse potential moderating factors in the unemployment-SWB 
relationship. The main analysis (as described above) will estimate the full impact of 
unemployment on life satisfaction, but I am also interested in breaking down the 
sample average effect to assess whether the magnitude of unemployment impacts (and 
hence the value of employment) differs by demographic and socio-economic group as 
defined by gender, marital status, age, and educational attainment. Since we have an 
exogenous change in employment status we can assess the impact of these moderating 
factors on life satisfaction in a causal framework.  
 
These differences can be seen as some of the unique contributions associated with this 
chapter of the thesis. 
 
6.3.2. Data  
 
The analysis uses the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the life satisfaction 
question: “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?” Life 
satisfaction was added in 1997 and so I analyse the period 1997- 2009, excluding 
2001 which did not include life satisfaction. 
 
In the BHPS, respondents are asked about their previous three job moves during the 
sampling year. They can select one of 13 different options for terminating their 
previous employment: ‘promoted’, ‘left for better job’, ‘made redundant’, ‘dismissed 
or sacked’, ‘temporary job ended, ‘took retirement’, ‘stopped health reasons’, ‘left to 
have baby’, ‘children/home care’, ‘care of other person’, ‘moved area’, ‘started 
college/university’ and ‘other reason’. In the data I look at only the most recent job 
move and define someone to be ‘redundant unemployed’ if they were made redundant 
from their previous job and are still unemployed now (when the survey was 
undertaken). As far as this author is aware this is the first time that the redundancy 
data in the BHPS has been used in analysis of unemployment and SWB. 
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6.3.2.1. Redundancy and exogenous unemployment 
 
In the BHPS we may observe redundancies for people from a wide range of previous 
jobs and industries. Figure 6 describes the typical types of groups we might observe in 
the data at any point in time. The shaded group are the people who have been made 
redundant and continue to be unemployed at the time of the survey and the non-
shaded group are people that kept their jobs and did not quit for other reasons. 
 
Figure 6: Potential patterns of redundancy across different types of 
organisations 
 
  
 
In the example we have four different firms or organisations, where Firm 1 stops 
trading and makes everyone redundant, Firm 4 runs business as usual and makes no 
redundancies and Firms 2 and 3 make different levels of redundancy. If we think of 
unemployment being the ‘treatment’ then the treated group consists of A+B+D and 
the control group consists of C+E+F. It may be the case that the characteristics of 
group (A+B+D) differ from those of group (C+E+F) before redundancy, which would 
result in biased causal estimates if these characteristics also impact on wellbeing. 
 
It could be argued that redundancy is more likely for some groups in companies like 
Firm 2 and Firm 3. For example, less productive and less motivated people, those 
with caring duties or other commitments and those in poor health may be more likely 
to be made redundant. Furthermore, there could be reverse causality in the sense that 
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the less 'happy' or less ‘satisfied’ may be more likely to be made redundant. In this 
case groups C and E will be distinct from groups B and D. 
 
There may also be differences across Firm 1 and Firm 4 if risk-averse people tend to 
select into the more established Firm 4 (think of Firm 1 being the high-risk blue-chip 
and Firm 4 being the public sector) or if more productive people selected into Firm 4 
(hence it survived). This would mean that groups A and F would also be considerably 
different from each other making direct comparison between the treatment group 
(A+B+D) and control group (C+E+F) impossible. In effect we might have no area of 
common support between the two groups. 
 
The way that the question about previous jobs is asked in the BHPS could help to 
solve for this because in the question itself people can state that they finished their last 
job because of health reasons or caring duties or because they were sacked. Therefore, 
if the job termination question is answered properly this would help to remove the 
carers and the less healthy, less productive and unmotivated people from the 
redundancy group, which would help to increase the exogeneity of the redundancy 
variable. It is of note that the structure of the job termination question in the BHPS 
may be more helpful to the present enquiry (in terms of creating an exogenous 
unemployment variable) than the equivalent question in the GSOEP, since in the 
GSOEP respondents cannot say that they quit for health or caring reasons.  
 
We have hypothesised that if redundancy were not random groups (A+B+D) and 
(C+E+F) may differ in pre-redundancy variables like productivity, motivation, health, 
life satisfaction and risk aversion. Although some of these variables are not 
observable, Table 8 shows the results from balance tests for redundancy and for 
unemployment. The balance tests use the following regressions to test whether pre-
unemployment factors are associated with becoming unemployed: 
 
(29) 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑖𝑡) 
 
(30) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔(𝐹𝑖𝑡) 
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The models are run using logit models. 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
individual 𝑖 has been made ‘redundant unemployed’ in time 𝑡 (and was employed at 
time 𝑡 − 1); and equals 0 if the individual is employed continuously at times 𝑡 − 1 
and 𝑡. 𝑈𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if individual 𝑖 has become unemployed 
(for any reason) at time 𝑡 (and was employed at time 𝑡 − 1), and equals 0 if the 
individual is employed continuously at times 𝑡-1 and 𝑡. 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡 is a vector of pre-redundancy/pre-unemployment factors covering 11 different pre-
redundancy/unemployment characteristics: life satisfaction; job satisfaction; 
satisfaction with leisure time; health satisfaction; satisfaction with social life; caring 
duties; household size; age; average number of hours worked; level of education; 
medical services usage. These factors were chosen as all of them would intuitively 
and plausibly be associated with the likelihood of falling into unemployment. 
 
The hypothesis is that redundant unemployed (𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡) is exogenous and in which case 
the coefficients on 𝐹𝑖𝑡 in equation (29) should be statistically insignificant. This would 
show that these 11 pre-redundancy variables do not differ between those who go on to 
become unemployed and those that stay employed at baseline (ie, before redundancy). 
It is expected that the coefficients on 𝐹𝑖𝑡 in equation (30) will be statistically 
significant for some variables at least as the general unemployment variable will be 
endogenous. 
 
This kind of test replicates a typical sample balance test that is usually conducted with 
randomised trials to check whether the randomisation has been carried out effectively. 
 
The descriptions and descriptive statistics of these variables can be found in Table 2.  
 
The results, presented in Table 8, are very encouraging. First, looking at Panel (i) 
none of the pre-redundancy variables are statistically significant. Average number of 
hours worked has a p-value of 9%, but it is not significant at the 5% level. This states 
that there are no statistical differences in these variables between people that become 
redundant and those that stay in employment before redundancy. Factors that we 
would usually be concerned with, such as health, caring duties, age, job satisfaction 
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and education levels, are statistically independent of the redundancy decision. I note 
that the main outcome variable, life satisfaction, does not differ between the 
redundant unemployed and employed groups in the period before redundancy.  
 
The analysis covers a wide range of important pre-redundancy factors and it would 
suggest that since these factors are not significantly different other factors measured at 
baseline (if we were to observe them) are also unlikely to be significantly different. 
The results we find for the balance tests for the redundant unemployed are typical of 
what one would expect from a setting where the treatment (employment status) is 
exogenous and hence these results suggest that we can be confident that redundancy 
(as defined and measured in the BHPS) is for all intents and purposes exogenously 
determined and hence analysing differences in wellbeing between the redundant 
unemployed group and the employed group is likely to derive estimates with a robust 
causal interpretation.  
 
Second, a number of these factors are statistically significant in equation (30) for 
people who become unemployed. Lower job satisfaction, lower age and lower levels 
of education are all associated with a greater probability of falling into unemployment 
as we would expect intuitively. Importantly job satisfaction and education levels were 
lower for people that go on to become unemployed. This is as we would expect from 
a non-exogenous unemployment variable. It suggests that if we were to collect further 
pre-unemployment data we would probably find a large number of factors that differ 
between people who become unemployed and people who stay in employment at 
baseline. 
 
Since these factors are also important determinants of life satisfaction then this 
strongly confirms that a simply measured unemployment variable is likely to be 
endogenous in a life satisfaction model, meaning that we have to apply considerable 
caution to the literature that uses non-exogenous employment variables.  
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Table 8: Balance tests for redundancy and unemployment 
Independent variable 
Panel (i) 
Redundant unemployed 
Panel (ii) 
Unemployed 
  Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
lag life satisfaction -0.061 0.125 -0.047 0.07 
lag job satisfaction -0.047 0.076 -0.086** 0.042 
lag leisure satisfaction -0.122 0.108 -0.044 0.06 
lag health satisfaction -0.001 0.094 -0.086* 0.052 
lag social life satisfaction 0.057 0.114 0.041 0.063 
lag caring duties 0.421 0.532 0.413 0.311 
hhsize 0.089 0.085 0.056 0.048 
lag age 0.008 0.01 -0.028*** 0.006 
lag job hours -0.017* 0.01 -0.009 0.006 
lag low education 0.307 0.232 0.753*** 0.138 
lag GP visits -0.040 0.111 0.040 0.061 
Constant -2.964*** 0.935 -1.023* 0.532 
Observations 3,492   3,676   
Pseudo R-squared 0.016   0.043   
Notes: Dependent variable in Panel (i): redundant unemployed. Dependent variable in Panel (ii): unemployed. 
Variable descriptions in Table 4. *** Significance at 0.01 level; ** Significance at 0.05 level; * Significance at 0.1 
level. Variables are measured in the period (year) preceding redundancy or unemployment when both groups are 
still employed.  
 
6.3.3. Econometric methods 
 
Given the strong evidence of exogeneity of redundancy (see Table 8) it is possible to 
estimate the causal effect on life satisfaction by a simple difference-in-means 
estimator (t-test) between the employed and redundant unemployed groups. However, 
here I prefer to use ordinary least squares (OLS), which (in a reduced form model) 
provides the exact same results as the difference-in-means estimator, because it allows 
us to include other controls in the model to run a further check on the exogeneity of 
the redundant unemployed variable. If redundancy is truly exogenous then OLS 
estimates of the effect of unemployment on life satisfaction should not be affected by 
the inclusion of other control variables in the model provided that they are not 
measured post-redundancy. 
 
In order to assess the internal validity of the results I run two different models in 
stepwise fashion: 
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(31)          𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡+𝛽2 ln(𝑀𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐸𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
     
(32)          𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡+𝛽2ln (𝑀𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐸𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  
   
                 
where 𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 is life satisfaction at time 𝑡 for individual 𝑖, 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the individual is ‘redundant unemployed’ and equals 0 otherwise. In 
𝐸𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 I control for all other employment status categories (‘self-employed’; 
‘student’; ‘retired’; ‘maternity leave’; ‘long term sick and disabled’; ‘government 
training schemes’; and ‘other job status’). This is done in order to make the employed 
the reference group for the analysis. 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is household income and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
other (pre-redundancy) covariates. In other words, I start with the reduced form model 
(31) and add to it a set of other determinants of life satisfaction in equation (32). If the 
redundant unemployed variable is exogenous we would expect there to be little 
change in the size of the coefficients on 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 across the two models. 
 
Income is included for two reasons: (i) because I want to focus on the non-pecuniary 
impacts of unemployment over and above the loss in wage income and (ii) 
redundancy is likely to come with a financial package and so for a period of time 
people may be unemployed but their household income may not have changed. In this 
scenario being unemployed may not have such a negative impact on wellbeing and so 
it will be important to control for income in all of the models.  
 
To assess the moderating factors in the relationship between unemployment and life 
satisfaction I run an additional set of models where the ‘redundant unemployed’ 
variable is interacted with some socio-demographic factors: 
 
(33) 𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡+𝛽2ln (𝑀𝑖𝑡)+𝛽3𝐸𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∙
𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the moderating variable and 𝛽4 tells us whether there are 
heterogenous impacts from unemployment. Since 𝑅𝑈 is exogenous then the estimates 
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of the impacts of the moderating factors (𝛽4) will have a causal interpretation as well. 
The four categories that I assess in 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 are: 
 
i. Gender 
ii. Age (under 30/30-50/over 50) 
iii. Educational attainment (degree/no degree)  
iv. Marital status (married/not married) 
 
These categories were chosen out of interest as they test a number of hypotheses and 
intuitions. If the traditional male-female responsibilities still exist then we would 
expect to see men suffer more from unemployment as expectations regarding work 
would be higher for them (Warr, 1994; Warr, 1987; Waddell and Burton, 2006). Over 
the life course people will face different levels of responsibility and hence age 
interactions should show this (Waddell and Burton, 2006). Note here that the age 
interaction would cover parental responsibilities and so parental status has not been 
included as a separate interactive factor in 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡. Unemployment may have a smaller 
negative impact for more highly educated people because they may feel that they can 
find another job again quickly. On the other hand, unemployment may be less worse 
for the less educated if they generally tend to be employed in less enjoyable jobs or if 
the stigma of unemployment is low due to higher prevalence of unemployment in 
their reference/peer groups (Waddell and Burton, 2006; Warr, 1987). Finally, 
unemployment may be less detrimental to wellbeing if the unemployed person is 
married and hence can receive support (Waddell and Burton, 2006). Note that all 
models still control for household income meaning that any interactive effect that we 
find to be significant will represent a heterogenous effect of unemployment over and 
above any impact on household finances. 
 
Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models.  
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Life satisfaction Satisfaction with life on a scale of 1-7 5.16 1.21 1 7 
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Health satisfaction Satisfaction with own health on a 
scale of 1-7 
5.17 1.43 1 7 
Social satisfaction Satisfaction with social life on a scale 
of 1-7 
4.92 1.43 1 7 
Spouse satisfaction Satisfaction with spouse/partner on a 
scale of 1-7 
4.16 3.48 1 7 
Leisure satisfaction Satisfaction with use of leisure time 
on a scale of 1-7 
4.74 1.46 1 7 
Redundant 
unemployed 
= 1 if made redundant from previous 
job and still unemployed; 0 = 
otherwise 
0.02 0.14 0 1 
Unemployed =1 if unemployed; 0 = employed or 
self-employed 
0.11 0.31 0 1 
Log (household 
income) 
Logarithm of annual household 
income 
9.98 6.68 1.61 14.06 
Age  Age of respondent 33.53 11.80 16 78 
Married = 1 if married; 0 = otherwise 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Male =1 if male; 0 = otherwise 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Carer = 1 if cares for someone; 0 = 
otherwise 
0.04 0.19 0 1 
Non-degree = 1 if less than university-level 
education; 0 = otherwise 
0.50 0.50 0 1 
Wales = 1 if lives in Wales; 0 = otherwise 0.13 0.37 0 1 
Scotland = 1 if lives in Scotland; 0 = otherwise 0.16 0.37 0 1 
N. Ireland = 1 if lives in Northern Ireland; 0 = 
otherwise 
0.08 0.27 0 1 
Live in safe area = 1 if feels that living in a safe area; 0 
= otherwise 
0.82 0.38 0 1 
Debt burden = 1 if feels burdened with debt; 0 = 
otherwise 
0.40 0.49 0 1 
House owned = 1 if house owned; 0 = otherwise 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Number of children Number of children in the household 0.60 0.96 0 8 
Wave Year of the interview N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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6.4. Results 
 
6.4.1. The causal effect of unemployment on life satisfaction  
 
The results from the two models are set out in Table 10. Column (I) shows the 
reduced form model (31) with employment status variables and income as the only 
independent variables. It shows that the non-pecuniary aspect of being unemployed 
reduces life satisfaction by -0.352 points (95% confidence interval:   
-0.468 to -0.236) on a scale of 1-7 compared to being employed. Column (II) presents 
equation (30) with a set of pre-redundancy control variables added to the model. In 
this model I provide further evidence of the exogeneity of the redundant unemployed 
variable by showing that the coefficient for 𝑅𝑈 does not change significantly from the 
result in the reduced form model (-0.352). The important point here is not to include 
post-redundancy variables, such as current health status, in (30). This would in effect 
control for the mediating factors associated with unemployment and would impact on 
the coefficient on 𝑅𝑈. Therefore in column (II) the aim was to include a set of lagged 
variables for the main determinants of life satisfaction, such as health. However, due 
to the nature of the BHPS dataset – which is not a balanced panel (many individuals 
do not have complete year-on-year records in the panel and will hence fall out of the 
regression model) – there was a large loss in sample size when using lagged variables. 
The sample size fell from over 26,000 observations in the reduced form model to 
around only 5,000 observations when adding lagged variables to the reduced form 
model. This significantly changed the composition of the sample which would make 
the results from models (31) and (32) incomparable.  
 
Since redundancy has already happened when the survey is administered (because the 
redundancy variable comes from historic data about moves from previous jobs), then 
any variable measured in the survey at the time has the potential of being a post-
redundancy variable. Therefore, in model (32) I restrict the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 to a set of 
variables that would not change as a consequence of the first year of being made 
unemployed. These are gender, age, education level, region and number of children. 
These variables are entered for the current time period 𝑡 rather than for the period 𝑡 −
1 in equation (32). 
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It should be noted that the fact that I have not been able to control for all other 
determinants of life satisfaction should not be seen as a serious deficiency of the 
methodology since all I am trying to do in model (30) (column (II)) is provide some 
further support that the redundant unemployed variable is to all intents and purposes 
exogenous to life satisfaction as Table 8 has already strongly demonstrated. 
 
Table 10: The causal effect of unemployment on life satisfaction 
  
Independent variable (I) (II) 
  Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Redundant unemployed -0.352*** 0.059 -0.337*** 0.059 
Log (household income) 0.153*** 0.011 0.173*** 0.012 
Self-employed 0.118*** 0.031 0.144*** 0.032 
Retired 0.385*** 0.038 0.137*** 0.049 
Student 0.011 0.04 -0.002 0.041 
Maternity leave 0.397*** 0.087 0.379*** 0.089 
Sick leave -1.078*** 0.083 -1.076*** 0.084 
Government training -0.092 0.142 -0.149 0.145 
Other job status -0.165* 0.09 -0.188** 0.092 
Male     -0.031** 0.015 
Age      -0.048*** 0.004 
Age-squared      0.001*** 0 
Non-degree     -0.020 0.016 
Wales     -0.026 0.023 
Scotland     -0.063*** 0.021 
N. Ireland     0.134*** 0.029 
Number of children     0.034*** 0.009 
Constant 3.634*** 0.111 4.269*** 0.126 
Observations 26,849   26,394   
R-squared 0.030   0.036   
Notes: Dependent variable: life satisfaction. Model in column (I) estimated using equation (31). 
Model in column (II) estimated using equation (32). Variable descriptions in Table 9.  
*** significance at 0.01 level; ** significance at 0.05 level; * significance at 0.10 level. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Employed is the reference case for the employment 
status variables. 
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The coefficient on 𝑅𝑈 remains stable and robust to the inclusion of the other control 
variables in equation (32).  Adding the set of control variables to the reduced form 
model in column (I) marginally shifts the coefficient on ‘redundant unemployed’ from 
-0.352 to -0.337 which comfortably lies within the 95% confidence interval for the 
coefficient on ‘redundant unemployed’ from the reduced form model. There is, 
therefore, no statistical difference between the coefficients on 𝑅𝑈 across the two 
models even after including a range of control variables. This is as we would expect if 
‘redundant unemployed’ is exogenous to life satisfaction as I have argued in this 
chapter.  
 
An interesting question that is sometimes posed in studies like this is whether 
statistical methods that impose a selection on observables assumption with 
endogenous variables, like regression analysis or matching techniques, can replicate 
the results from a model with exogenous variables. And if they cannot this is 
generally seen to provide further support for the models that use the exogenous 
variable. However, although such an analysis is clearly intuitively appealing it may 
not necessarily shed much important light on the analysis here. This is because when 
working with observational (ie, non-experimental) data we invariably will include 
some control variables in our models that are measured post-treatment (or post-
unemployment in our case). This means that we could have conflicting biases. For 
instance, in an SWB model the unemployment variable may be biased upwards 
because people who are likely to fall into unemployment are the ones that would be 
unhappy anyway. But at the same time we may control for post-unemployment health 
status, which would then serve to reduce the unemployment coefficient, offsetting the 
endogeneity bias to some extent. By pure chance there will be occasions when the 
offsetting effects balance out to leave a coefficient estimated under a selection on 
observables assumption, using say regression analysis, to mimic the robust causal 
effect we derive from a study where the variable of interest is exogenous, but clearly 
it would be wrong in such a circumstance to conclude that conditioning on a set of 
control variables ensures exogeneity in the variable of interest. Under multivariate 
analysis it is hard to keep track of all of these possible conflicting effects making it 
difficult to compare the methods.  
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Nevertheless, for completeness I present here estimates derived from OLS with a 
standard unemployment variable and a full set of control variables.  Column (I) in 
Table 11 shows the results of a reduced form model using the standard (endogenous) 
unemployed variable, rather than the ‘redundant unemployed’ variable. Column (II) 
presents the OLS results for a typical life satisfaction model which controls for a wide 
range of factors. The model is representative of the types of models used frequently in 
the wellbeing literature. 
 
Table 11. Estimating the effect of unemployment on life satisfaction using OLS 
regression  
 
Independent variable (I) (II) 
  Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Unemployed -0.589*** 0.033 -0.517*** 0.033 
Log (household income) 0.125*** 0.011 0.082*** 0.011 
Self-employed 0.068** 0.031 0.073** 0.031 
Retired 0.315*** 0.038 0.102** 0.048 
Student -0.065 0.04 -0.030 0.04 
Maternity leave 0.334*** 0.088 0.391*** 0.089 
Sick leave -1.152*** 0.083 -0.807*** 0.084 
Government training -0.166 0.141 -0.107 0.141 
Other job status -0.229** 0.09 -0.176* 0.091 
Male     -0.104*** 0.015 
Age      -0.068*** 0.005 
Age-squared     0.001*** 0.000 
Non-degree     0.014 0.015 
Wales     -0.021 0.023 
Scotland     -0.031 0.02 
N. Ireland     0.163*** 0.029 
Number of children     -0.032*** 0.01 
Wave     -0.004* 0.002 
Health (GP visits)     -0.154*** 0.007 
Married      0.112*** 0.022 
Divorced     -0.363*** 0.043 
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Widowed     -0.377*** 0.081 
Separated     -0.559*** 0.063 
Never married     -0.282*** 0.023 
Live in safe area     0.197*** 0.02 
Constant 3.967*** 0.109 6.015*** 0.136 
Observations 26,849   26,195   
R-squared 0.045   0.092   
Notes: Dependent variable: life satisfaction. Model in column (I) estimated using equation 
(31) and substituting the unemployed variable in place of redundant unemployed. Model in 
column (II) estimated using equation (32) and substituting the unemployed variable in place 
of redundant unemployed. Variable descriptions in Table 9. *** significance at 0.01 level; ** 
significance at 0.05 level; * significance at 0.1 level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. Employed is the reference case for the employment status variables. 
 
The coefficient on unemployment in column (I) is upwardly biased in comparison to 
the results from models using the ‘redundant unemployed’ variable. The coefficient 
estimate of -0.589 is statistically significant with a 95% confidence interval of -0.654 
to -0.524.  Once all of the main determinants of life satisfaction have been added to 
the model the coefficient on unemployment falls to -0.517, with a 95% confidence 
interval of -0.581 to -0.453.  
 
Note that the reduced form model is not robust to the inclusion of control variables 
when an endogenous unemployment variable is used. This downward shift in the size 
of the coefficient on unemployment is as we would expect for an endogenous variable 
that a-priori is expected to be upward biased. Controlling for a range of other 
determinants of life satisfaction reduces the negative effect of unemployment on life 
satisfaction as there are likely to be a host of factors that jointly make people more 
likely fall out of employment and at the same time less satisfied with their lives as 
well.  
 
However, even controlling for a wide range of confounding factors that are used in 
the empirical wellbeing literature does not reduce the size of the coefficient on 
unemployment to level found in the model using the ‘redundant unemployed’ 
variable.  
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The two models that use an endogenous unemployment variable produce very 
different estimates of the impact of unemployment on life satisfaction compared to the 
redundant unemployed model. The 95% confidence intervals for the two models with 
unemployment do not contain the value of the coefficient on ‘redundant unemployed’ 
from Table 11 (-0.352). In this instance the OLS models, therefore, correctly predict 
the direction of impact for unemployment (negative), but they produce upwardly 
biased estimates of the causal effect of unemployment on life satisfaction, as we 
would expect for an endogenous unemployment variable.  
 
In sum, the results from Tables 8, 10 and 11 are stark and important. They all point to 
the same conclusion: that the evidence suggests that the ‘redundant unemployed’ 
variable is exogenous to life satisfaction in the BHPS data. Table 8 showed no 
significant differences for a number of important variables between the ‘redundant 
unemployed’ and 'employed' pre-redundancy. Table 10 showed that in regression 
analysis the redundant unemployed variable is robust to the inclusion of a range of 
other control variables. And Table 11 shows that the standard unemployed variable is 
not robust to the inclusion of other control variables in regression analysis. These 
results are very encouraging, strongly suggesting that the estimated effect of 
unemployment on life satisfaction for those made redundant is highly likely to have a 
causal interpretation. 
  
The preferred model here is the reduced form model in column (I) (equation (29)) as 
the coefficient on ‘redundant unemployed’ is equivalent to the non-parametric 
difference-in-means estimator, which here is averaged over different income-level 
cells since income is held constant. The reduced form model has a number of 
desirable properties for the purposes of wellbeing valuation. 
 
First, it eliminates concerns relating to indirect effects. As far as this author is aware 
this study presents the first reduced form model for unemployment and wellbeing. 
The results represent the total causal derivative of life satisfaction with respect to 
unemployment.  
 
Second, moving away from models that require conditioning on other variables allows 
us to derive treatment effects with a clear interpretation.  Where conditioning on other 
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covariates is necessary, they will be measured from the treated and non-treated 
populations and as Humphreys (2009) shows, this results in poorly-defined estimators 
that lie somewhere between the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) and the 
average treatment effect for the non-treated (ATNT), where in this case the ATT 
would be the retrospective effect of unemployment on people who become 
unemployed and the ATNT would be the prospective effect of unemployment if 
someone in employment were to be made unemployed. In effect, results from 
multivariate analyses that require conditioning on a large set of variables cannot tell 
us whether the estimated impact was for those who fell into unemployment or is what 
it would be like for someone in employment now to lose their job.  
 
On the other hand, the difference-in-means estimator in the reduced form model (31) 
tells us the expected effect of unemployment on life satisfaction (over and above the 
loss in income) for any employed individual chosen at random from the sample (akin 
to the sample average treatment effect (ATE)8): for any employed person in our 
sample we would expect unemployment to lead to a 0.35 point reduction in life 
satisfaction and since the BHPS is a nationally representative sample this is a very 
generalisable result. This has a much clearer interpretation and meaning for policy-
making purposes as it allows us to estimate the loss in wellbeing that can be prevented 
by keeping someone in work. For the purposes of wellbeing valuation the clarity of 
the estimator allows for sample matching and allows us to make a full interpretation 
of the wellbeing values.  
 
This estimate should be interpreted as the impact for the first year in unemployment 
and it is the impact of both entry into unemployment and being unemployed since the 
‘redundant unemployed’ are people that have remained unemployed. There may be 
adaptation (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Kahneman and Sugden, 2005; 
Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008) to unemployment in subsequent years, which would 
reduce the impact on life satisfaction. I ran a second version of equation (29) using a 
one-year lag for the ‘redundant unemployed’ variable to test for adaptation effects, 
but the sample size became too small to provide meaningful results. 
 
8 Note that it also represents the average treatment effect for the treated, but we shall focus on the ATE 
interpretation throughout this paper. 
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6.4.2. Moderating factors in the effects of unemployment on life satisfaction  
 
Column (I) shows the results of the preferred reduced form model (Base model) with 
‘redundant unemployed’ and the other columns incorporate interactive terms 
separately to account for heterogeneous effects. The effects estimated in Table 12 
represent the causal effect of unemployment for groups categorised by gender, age, 
previous education, and marital status.  
 
Table 12. Moderating effects of unemployment on life satisfaction  
 
Independent variable Base Gender 
  
Age Education Marital 
status 
Redundant unemployed -0.352*** -0.315*** -0.194* -0.342*** -0.529*** 
  (0.059) (0.090) (0.104) (0.062) (0.086) 
Log (household income) 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Redundant unemployed*male   -0.062   
 
  
    (0.118)   
 
  
Redundant unemployed*30-49 age   
 
-0.356** 
 
  
    
 
(0.139) 
 
  
Redundant unemployed*50+ age   
 
-0.075 
 
  
    
 
(0.151) 
 
  
Redundant unemployed*degree   
 
  -0.049   
    
 
  (0.203)   
Redundant unemployed*married   
 
  
 
0.357*** 
    
 
  
 
(0.116) 
Constant 3.634*** 3.636*** 3.630*** 3.637*** 3.642*** 
  (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) 
N 26,849 26,849 26,849 26,540 26,849 
R-squared 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Notes: Dependent variable: life satisfaction. Model estimated using equation (33). All other independent 
variables from Table 10 included as control variables. The following labour force status categories are dropped 
from the analysis: 'retired', 'maternity leave', 'student', 'long term sick', 'disabled', 'family care', 'government 
training scheme'. Variable descriptions in Table 9. *** significance at 0.01 level; ** significance at 0.05 level;  
* significance at 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  
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There were no differences in the impact of unemployment on life satisfaction by 
gender or previous educational attainment. In other words, males and females 
experience unemployment equally badly as do people with degrees compared to those 
without university education.  
 
There are, however, some marked differences by age and marital status. People in the 
30 to 50 year old age group are impacted on much greater than other age groups. For 
30 to 50 year olds, when financial responsibilities are probably at their highest, 
unemployment has a negative causal effect of -0.55 life satisfaction points. For people 
under 30 or over 50 years of age the negative impact of unemployment on life 
satisfaction is -0.194 points.  
 
The results also show that the negative impact of unemployment is softened 
considerably for married people. The causal effect of unemployment on life 
satisfaction for married people is -0.172. For the non-married, which includes people 
who are widowed, separated, divorced and co-habiting, the causal effect of 
unemployment on life satisfaction is much higher at -0.529. 
 
6.4.3. Summary of findings  
 
This chapter analyses the causal effect of unemployment on life satisfaction using the 
BHPS dataset for the UK by exploiting random variation in employment status due to 
redundancy. I provide strong evidence that the redundancy variable in the BHPS is 
exogenous. 
 
I find that unemployment has a large detrimental causal effect on life satisfaction over 
and above the loss in wage income and including all the possible channels through 
which unemployment impacts on wellbeing, such as through health. Unemployment is 
worse for people of ages 30 to 50 (probably due to larger relative financial 
commitments during this period in life) and for people who are not married (possibly 
because a partner offers financial and emotional support for someone made 
unemployed).  
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6.5. Estimating the cost of unemployment using Three-Step Wellbeing Valuation 
 
Section 6.4. of this chapter provided a set of results for the non-market good 
(employment) model (Step 2 of 3S-WV). Chapter 5 provided results for the income 
model (Step 1 of 3S-WV). This allows me to now undertake Step 3, the final stage of 
the 3S-WV process. It is useful to recap the findings from Step 1 and Step 2 first.  
 
6.5.1. Step 1: The income model 
 
The lottery wins data permitted estimation of the full causal effect of income on life 
satisfaction. Since no post-intervention (post-lottery) variables were controlled for 
(only lottery wins in previous years was included in the model) the estimate from the 
control function model represents the total causal derivative of life satisfaction with 
respect to income (This adheres to Technical Conditions 1 and 2). 
 
The control function approach permitted estimation of the total causal derivative of 
income for the general UK population of lottery players. Since most of the population 
play lotteries in the UK, it can be assumed that the results from the control function 
model are generalizable to the whole UK. Since the results of the reduced form 
unemployment model are also representative of the UK using the same BHPS dataset 
the results from the income and non-market good models can be used together as the 
two samples match (This adheres to Technical Condition 3). 
 
The results of the income model are as follows: 
 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d ln (𝑀)
=  1.1  
 
6.5.2. Step 2: The non-market good model  
 
The reduced form of the redundant unemployed model produces the total causal 
derivative of life satisfaction with respect to unemployment. It is the effect of 
unemployment on life satisfaction over and above the financial consequences and 
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includes all indirect effects of unemployment such as through the adverse effects on 
health (This adheres to Technical Conditions 1 and 2).  
 
The total causal derivative of unemployment has a clear interpretation, as the 
negative effect of unemployment on life satisfaction for any employed person in the 
UK. This permits a full interpretation of the meaning of the wellbeing value estimates 
(This adheres to Technical Condition 4).  
 
There are a number of results from the non-market good model that can be used in the 
3S-WV analysis: 
 
(i) Average impact of unemployment: 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
= − 0.352 
 
(ii) Impact of unemployment (under 30 age group): 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
= − 0.194 
 
(ii) Impact of unemployment (30-50 age group): 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
= − 0.55 
 
(iv) Impact of unemployment (over 50 age group): 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
= − 0.194 
 
(v) Impact of unemployment (married people): 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
= − 0.172 
 
(vi) Impact of unemployment (not married people): 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
= − 0.529 
 
6.5.3. Step 3: Deriving wellbeing values for unemployment  
 
I estimate the compensating surplus (CS) and equivalent surplus (ES) for 
unemployment, which is a welfare loss. The CS for a change in the non-market good 
(∆𝑄) where the impact of ∆𝑄 is negative for welfare can be presented in terms of total 
derivatives for 𝑄 and 𝑀: 
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(34) 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 
[
− 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
 ∙ ∆𝑄
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑀
 + ln (𝑀0)]
− 𝑀0 
 
Similarly the ES for a change in the non-market good (∆𝑄) can be derived as follows: 
 
(35) 𝐸𝑆 = 𝑀0 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 
[ln(𝑀0) + 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
 ∙ ∆𝑄
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑀
]
  
 
As the welfare impact of ∆𝑄 is negative the CS will represent the amount of money 
required to compensate people such that their life satisfaction is left unaffected by (the 
move into) unemployment. As discussed the value relates to the compensation related 
to the non-pecuniary aspects of employment. Another way of putting it is that the CS 
is the amount of extra annual household income that would be required in order to 
keep a randomly chosen employed person just as satisfied with life if he/she were 
made unemployed (in addition to accounting for the loss of wage income). This is the 
cost associated with the first year of unemployment only.  
 
The ES represents the amount of money that would have to be taken off someone in 
employment such that their life satisfaction would reduce to the level that would 
pertain had they been made unemployed (in addition to accounting for the loss of 
wage income). This could be translated in some ways as the value of employment as it 
is the amount of money people would ‘pay’ to stay in employment (I have put ‘pay’ in 
inverted commas here to make clear that since these are not values based on 
preferences people may not actually be willing to pay this amount). As with the CS, 
the ES is the value associated with the first year of unemployment only.  
 
The various estimates for 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑄
 from section 6.4. can be used in equation (34) when 
estimating CS. The figure for 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑀
 will come from the income model estimated in 
Chapter 5 such that 
d 𝑆𝑊𝐵
d 𝑀
 = 1.1. 𝑀0 is estimated as the sample average level of annual 
income, which I set to £26,000 here. The higher the level of 𝑀0, the higher the value 
of 𝑄 as discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, ∆𝑄 = 1 since unemployment is a binary 
variable. 
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6.5.4. The non-pecuniary costs of unemployment  
 
Table 13 sets out the estimates of CS and ES for the range of employment outcomes 
estimated in the non-market good model. 
 
Table 13. Values associated with employment status using 3S-WV 
 
Employment outcome Causal effect 
(life satisfaction) 
Compensating 
Surplus 
Percentage of 
annual income 
Equivalent 
Surplus 
Percentage of 
annual 
income 
Unemployed -0.352 £9,805 37.71% £7,120 27.39% 
Unemployed (under 30) -0.194 £5,015 19.29% £4,204 16.17% 
Unemployed (30-50) -0.550 £16,867 64.87% £10,230 39.35% 
Unemployed (over 50) -0.194 £5,015 19.29% £4,204 16.17% 
Unemployed (married) -0.172 £4,401 16.93% £3,764 14.48% 
Unemployed (not married) -0.529 £16,056 61.75% £9,926 38.18% 
Notes: Values estimated using results from Table 12. Percentage of annual income calculated as percentage to £26,000. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, ES < CS for a given welfare loss due to the curvature of 
the life satisfaction-to-income function. The ES represents movements down the life 
satisfaction-income function and the curvature of the function (ie, the marginal utility 
of income) is steeper from any point when one moves downwards rather than 
upwards. Also it should be noted that ES measures for a welfare loss are constrained 
by income, whilst CS for welfare losses is not.  
 
6.5.4.1. Compensating wellbeing value 
The amount of money required to compensate someone for being unemployed 
for the first year of unemployment such that their life satisfaction stays at the level 
it would be had they been in employment (CS) is £9,805 in addition to the loss in 
wage income. This is equivalent to around 38 per cent of their salary when in 
employment. 
 
The equivalent annual CS figures for 30-50 year olds (£16,867) and for people who 
are not married (£16,056) are higher.  
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These values are applicable to any person who is employed in the UK. 
 
6.5.4.2. Equivalent wellbeing value 
The amount of money that would have to be taken away from someone in 
employment for a year such that their life satisfaction would fall to the level they 
would experience in unemployment (ES) is £ 7,120 in addition to the loss in wage 
income. This is equivalent to about 27 per cent of their salary. 
 
The equivalent annual ES figures for 30-50 year olds (£10,230) and for people who 
are not married (£9,926) are higher.   
 
These values are applicable to any person who is employed in the UK. 
 
6.5.5. Comparing 3S-WV against traditional wellbeing valuation methods  
 
The CS and ES estimates derived in 6.4.1. and 6.4.2. have been estimated using the 
3S-WV approach. They come from a methodology that adheres to the four technical 
criteria of wellbeing valuation – in other words, they are based on robust estimates of 
the total causal derivatives of the SWB function with respect to the non-market good 
and income; they adhere to sample matching since all results represent impacts for the 
general UK population and they have a clear interpretation.  
 
The analysis in this section compares the results derived from 3S-WV with the 
method that is commonly used in the wellbeing valuation literature.  
 
The most frequently used statistical method in wellbeing valuation is OLS regression 
with one single life satisfaction function as set out in equation (9) (set out again here). 
 
(9) 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽2ln (𝑀𝑖) + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     
 
Partial derivatives from the single equation model in (9) are used to estimate the value 
(here CS) of 𝑄 as follows: 
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(15) 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑀0 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 
[ln(𝑀0)− 
𝛽1(∆𝑄)
𝛽2
]
     
 
Examples of studies that have used this approach are numerous and were discussed in 
section 3.3.2. . 
 
A typical model for (9) would be the full regression model estimated in column (II) of 
Table 11. Here 𝛽1 = -0.517 and 𝛽2 = 0.082. With 𝑀
0 set to £26,000 as before this 
leads to implausibly high estimates of value for employment status. 
 
The CS for unemployment is £14 million for the first year and the ES for 
unemployment is right up against the income constraint at £25,952 for the first year.   
 
This astronomical increase in wellbeing values is being driven by the downward bias 
in the income coefficient and the upward bias in the unemployment coefficient in the 
standard approach. Nearly all of the increase, however, is being driven by the 
difference in the income coefficient in the standard model (if we use the coefficient 
for unemployment of 𝛽1 = -0.517 in a 3S-WV model where the income model is 
derived from lottery wins such that 𝛽2 = 1.1 then the CS for unemployment is 
£15,600, and the ES for unemployment is £9,750, which are upwardly biased 
estimates of monetary value but the bias is far less significant than the bias observed 
when the income coefficient also comes from the standard model.   
 
The standard OLS model with an endogenous income variable derives a coefficient 
for log of household income of 0.082, whereas the control function model with an 
exogenous income variable derives a coefficient for log of household income of 1.1.  
The OLS model tells us that a log-point increase in household income which is 
equivalent to about a 130% increase in income (ie, for a household with an annual 
income of £50,000 this represents a £65,000 increase in income to a total income of 
£115,000), is associated with a very trivial increase in life satisfaction of 0.082 index 
points, which seems much too low intuitively for such a major change in life 
circumstances. The implausibility of this estimate is even more clear when we see that 
the same model predicts that the life satisfaction impact of such a large increase in 
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income is equivalent only to about the impact of a one year increase in age (in 
absolute terms).  
 
These results are in line with intuition as we would expect certain individuals to be 
more likely to become unemployed and be less satisfied with life anyway. The bias in 
the income coefficient is much more severe. The causal estimate derived from lottery 
winners is more than ten times larger than the OLS estimate. This direction of change 
is expected given that instrumenting for income generally tends to result in an 
increase in coefficient size (Pischke, 2010). The size of the income coefficient may 
have increased using the lottery wins instrument for a number of reasons:  
 
(a) People who would be happy anyway may tend to earn less money; 
(b) Income is measured with error; 
(c) There are costs associated with earning more money such as more stress and time 
at work which are not controlled for in OLS regression; and  
(d) Many of the indirect effects of income (such as health status) are controlled for in 
this OLS model.  
 
The upward bias observed in the estimates from the traditional wellbeing valuation 
method reflects many of the findings from the previous WV literature, which as 
discussed has generally found wellbeing values to be implausibly too high and 
magnitudes larger than preference-based valuation methods. The results here suggest 
that this is being driven by a severe downward bias in the coefficient on income in 
the traditional wellbeing valuation models. 
 
In addition to this bias I note that there are further problems with the estimates 
derived from the traditional wellbeing valuation method. The first relates to 
interpretation. The treatment effect estimates in OLS are vague and as discussed 
above lie somewhere in between the traditional ATT and ATNT, which prevents us 
from deriving a clear interpretation of the wellbeing value for policy purposes as I did 
in 3S-WV. The second issue is sample matching. Since treatment effects are 
ambiguous in OLS with a selection on observables assumption we cannot be sure 
whether we are matching similar people when deriving wellbeing values. 
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In sum, the empirical analysis lends support to the theoretical hypotheses that were 
generated in Chapter 4 regarding the problems associated with traditional wellbeing 
valuation methods undertaken with single-equation models. The theoretical analysis 
suggested that wellbeing values would be over-stated and this was clearly borne out 
in the analysis. The theory and evidence suggest that the traditional single-equation 
methods should not be used to value non-market goods in wellbeing valuation. 
 
6.6. Summary 
 
In this chapter I applied the new 3S-WV methodology to value the non-pecuniary 
benefits of employment. I used redundancy data as a natural experiment to estimate 
the causal effect of unemployment on life satisfaction. I find that unemployment has a 
large detrimental causal effect on life satisfaction over and above the loss in wage 
income and that the negative impact is larger for some groups in society.  
 
Using the 3S-WV approach I find that the value of employment is between £7,120 
and £9,850 per person per annum depending on whether we estimate compensating or 
equivalent surplus. These values seem reasonable and plausible at around a third of 
national average salary in the UK and are much lower than the values estimated by 
the current WV methodology. This demonstrates the improvement in estimation and 
results we get from the new 3S-WV method. I will discuss some of the policy 
implications as well as possible future avenues of research in the next and final 
chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
7.1. Summary of the thesis 
 
Valuing non-market goods, services and outcomes is critical to policy evaluation in 
the UK and many other countries and increasingly to the social value agenda in the 
private sector. The HM Treasury Green Book is the core policy evaluation manual for 
the UK Government and it stipulates that all projects, programmes and policies be 
evaluated using Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). CBA requires the valuation of all 
outcomes of the policy, including hard to measure non-market outcomes such as 
education, health, the environment and heritage. Traditionally this has been 
undertaken using preference-based valuation methods, namely revealed preference 
and stated preference methods.  
 
However, subjective wellbeing (SWB) data and analysis are topics of growing interest 
in economics and policy evaluation. One key use for SWB data is in the wellbeing 
valuation (WV) method to estimate values for non-market goods and services. These 
values, if estimated robustly, have the potential to be used in CBA in the Green Book 
and other related policy evaluation frameworks in order to appraise, evaluate and 
inform policy decisions and investments. Since the data used in WV usually comes 
from pre-administered national data sets, the method is relatively a lot cheaper and 
less resource-intensive than the more traditional stated preference method, but at the 
same time it has a wide application to a large number of sectors and policy areas. WV, 
therefore, has the potential to transform CBA and how governments and other 
organisations evaluate their policies.  
 
Since the first application of this method in 2002, there has been a large number of 
studies that have employed the method to a range of outcome areas to value for 
example, environment, employment, crime, health, education and natural disasters. 
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The WV literature to date has been primarily interested in extending the methodology 
developed in the first studies in 2002 in to other policy areas. There have been no 
studies devoted entirely to the development of the methodology although some 
studies have discussed the problems inherent to WV and have offered some relatively 
minor adjustments in the method. As discussed in this thesis the methodologies 
currently used in WV are somewhat crude and unfortunately do not derive values 
according to Hicks’ value theory. A number of technical problems lead to bias in 
many of the estimates to date, rendering the results from the WV methodology not 
robust enough for use in CBA and policy evaluation. In addition to this, as I have set 
out in Chapter 3, the interpretation and use of wellbeing values has also been 
problematic in the literature to date.  
 
The aims of this thesis were to provide for the first time a full assessment of the WV 
methodology and its current problems and limitations and from that to develop a new 
and improved theoretical approach and methodology for wellbeing valuation such that 
it is able to produce robust values in line with economic theory which can be used in 
CBA and policy evaluation. A final key contribution of the thesis is to provide a more 
detailed and robust approach to interpreting the values derived from wellbeing 
valuation.  
 
The core development and contribution of the thesis is the Three Step Wellbeing 
Valuation approach, which takes a completely different statistical approach to the 
current WV methodology by separating the estimation process into three different 
steps, thereby allowing each parameter in the models to be estimated more robustly. 
The method allows us to derive better estimates of the impacts of income and the non-
market good on wellbeing leading to more robust value estimations. The results of the 
new 3S-WV method in the case study for employment were strong and demonstrated 
significant benefits over the current WV methods when the results were compared. I 
generally find that for a given outcome, like pollution or education, values estimated 
using the new 3S-WV methodology are lower than values estimated using the current 
WV approach. This is primarily because the impact of income on SWB is 
significantly higher in the 3S-WV method which means that for any given impact on 
wellbeing the monetary amount required to have the same effect on the individual is 
lower as each additional £1 has a higher value. This is a very positive outcome from 
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the new approach as the key criticism of WV to date has been the tendency for it to 
produce very high and unrealistic values. The 3S-WV method can be used with any 
SWB variable and is thus flexible and robust, an improvement on the current 
methodology.   
 
7.2. Policy implications  
 
I finish with a discussion of the main policy implications of the developments and 
contributions made in this thesis.  
 
A key advantage of the WV method is its ability to produce values from secondary 
data sources rather than requiring expensive and time-consuming primary data 
collection. SP methods always require primary data collection and RP methods also 
often do so as well. This makes the WV method a highly cost and resource efficient 
method in comparison to alternative approaches. The key stumbling block to date 
which I believe has made it difficult and almost impossible to use WV values in 
policy evaluation has been the size of the values derived in the literature to date using 
the current methodology, which as discussed in this thesis have generally been seen 
by most commentators as being unrealistically high.  
 
I have demonstrated that the method developed in this thesis, 3S-WV, provides a 
robust theoretical approach and is capable of deriving much more plausible and 
realistic values which are in line with economic theory. The implications of this are 
significant since it now means that policy makers have access to a highly cost-
effective method for valuing goods. A typical stated preference study can cost 
upwards of £50,000 to conduct. WV values can be estimated at a fraction of that cost 
at around 10% of the cost of a SP study. A major implication is that policy makers can 
conduct more valuation studies and will have access to a larger range of values for 
non-market goods and services to include in CBA and policy evaluation leading to an 
improvement in the data inputted into these evaluations and the decisions that are 
made on the basis of it. Currently, it is common in the UK and in many other OECD 
countries to exclude from the evaluation any policy outcomes that cannot be valued 
and for there to be a qualitative assessment or discussion of the outcome (see for 
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example the UK’s Department for Transport’s WebTAG guidance9). This ensures that 
the issue does not fall out entirely from the assessment but it means that it is unlikely 
to have any meaningful impact on the policy decision if it is not included in the full 
CBA assessment. 
 
A second important implication for policy is that the WV approach allows us to value 
some outcomes that are inherently difficult to value using preference-based methods. 
This was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Some outcome areas such as health and the 
environment are difficult to value using people’s preferences, but WV allows us to get 
around these issues as we do not need to ask anyone their preferences for these types 
of outcomes, which can be an ethically challenging thing to do. WV, therefore, 
provides the opportunity now (under this more robust method) to provide values for 
these areas and to incorporate them fully into the policy evaluation process. For 
example, the WV method can be used to derive values for different health states and 
conditions allowing health to be assessed using CBA rather than through the QALY 
method and cost-effectiveness analysis. This would allow governments to compare 
health interventions and policy in the same terms as all other policy areas that already 
use CBA. 
 
A case in point is the specific case study example for employment used in this thesis. 
It is not possible to use preference-valuation methods to derive a value for the non-
pecuniary aspects of employment. Using the new 3S-WV method I have demonstrated 
how the WV method can be applied to employment outcomes and have derived robust 
values for the non-pecuniary aspects of employment. To my knowledge this is the 
first time that such values have been estimated and it allows labour ministries such as 
the UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to incorporate the wider benefits 
and value of employment in their CBA assessments. In the UK Government there has 
been a long history of promoting and advocating the wider non-financial benefits of 
employment; that employment is important for communities and society and for 
people’s sense of purpose and wellbeing has been a key message across the whole 
political spectrum. They can now evidence this in their evaluations of different labour 
market policies and programmes. 
 
9 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transport-analysis-guidance-webtag 
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7.3. Future research  
 
Valuation of non-market goods has relied almost entirely on stated preference and 
revealed preference methods to date. The new 3S-WV method developed here in this 
thesis provides a rigorous framework for using SWB data in valuation. There is now 
an alternative valuation method to sit alongside stated and revealed preference 
methods. Using the new 3S-WV framework, future research should focus on how we 
can derive robust estimates of impact for the non-market good/service being valued. It 
would also be useful to further explore the relationship between income and SWB. 
This thesis has set out a model for the impact of income on SWB using lottery wins 
for the UK population. The BHPS is the only large national data set in the UK that 
contains lottery wins and wellbeing data. The results from the BHPS should be 
compared to the results we would obtain from other countries using the same 
econometric method. In due course the lottery wins estimate derived here will need to 
be re-estimated using more recent data since the BHPS data only go up to 2002. A 
final interesting area for future research which would impact on the wellbeing 
valuation methodology would be to get a better understanding of whether the impact 
on life satisfaction of gains in income differ to losses in income due to loss aversion. 
This will require exogenous losses in income to be compared to the exogenous gains 
in income for which we have data from lottery wins. Although this would not impact 
on the 3S-WV methodology overall, if there are differences then this would mean that 
we would need to take a different coefficient for income (𝛽𝑀) in Step 1 of 3S-WV 
depending on whether we were estimating CS or ES. 
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Corrections and additions to Chapter 1  
 
None. 
 
 
Corrections and additions to Chapter 2 
 
1. The thesis uses a range of terminology related to the concept of wellbeing and 
so I provide further clarification here on how I define and use the terminology 
throughout the thesis: 
• Welfare is an overall term for quality of life or how one’s life is going. I 
use the term Welfare and its definition interchangeably with the terms 
Wellbeing and Quality of life in this thesis; all terms are used to refer to 
how one’s life is going overall. 
• Within the concept of Welfare/Wellbeing/Quality of life there are various 
specific metrics and I discuss three such metrics in the thesis. These 
represent three different ways in which we can measure 
Welfare/Wellbeing/Quality of life: 
i.  Subjective wellbeing (also termed as Mental states in this thesis), 
which refers to people’s self-reports about how their lives are 
going; 
ii. Preferences which assume that wellbeing consists of the extent to 
which one’s preferences are satisfied - “what would be best for 
someone is what would best fulfil his desires” (Parfit, 1984. P.4).   
iii. Objective list accounts of wellbeing, which are based on 
normative assumptions about basic human needs and rights.  
• Preference is related to the economist’s term utility: utility is what is 
generated through the satisfaction of preference – the more preferences 
you satisfy, the higher your level of utility. Therefore, under this 
definition, utility is equivalent to welfare/wellbeing/quality of life.  
• Utility maximisation is the act of satisfying as many of one’s preferences 
as possible given a budget and resource constraint. In the economist’s 
terminology it is therefore the maximisation of welfare/wellbeing/quality 
of life. 
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• The term Preference realisation refers to the satisfaction of preferences 
(e.g. consuming things that you want), which in turn leads to higher utility 
and wellbeing. 
 
2. The figure below illustrates Compensating surplus (CS) and Equivalent 
surplus (ES) for a non-market good (𝑄). The change 𝑄0 to 𝑄1 represents a 
positive impact on utility from the non-market good which moves the 
individual from indifference curve 𝑈0 to indifference curve 𝑈1. 𝑀0 is the 
initial level of income. Here CS is equivalent to the WTP for the good and ES 
equals the WTA compensation to forgo the non-market good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corrections and additions to Chapter 3 
 
1. I add to the list of first papers published on wellbeing valuation (WV) in 2002 
to also include Clark and Oswald (2002) and Welsch (2002). Alongside 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2002) these were the first papers to be 
published on the WV method. 
 
It should also be noted that various working papers used the WV method in 
the 1990s and that the method was first presented in 1993 at the Economics of 
Happiness conference at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science.   
 
2. I provide a discussion on how WV compares and relates to the hedonic pricing 
method. Broadly speaking as hedonic pricing is limited in terms of the types of 
non-market goods it can value (only non-market goods that impact on house 
𝑀0 
𝑀0 − 𝐶𝑆 
𝑀0 + 𝐸𝑆 
𝑈0 
𝑈1 
𝑄0 𝑄1 
𝑬𝑺 
𝑪𝑺 
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prices) WV has a wider scope. However, there are some interesting areas of 
overlap. A key issue for hedonic pricing is the extent to which the house 
market is functioning - if there are market imperfections, house prices will not 
reveal the true value of non-market goods like air quality and safety (Welsch 
and Ferreira, 2013). Problems include government regulation in housing 
markets, lack of information (e.g. about air quality) when people purchase 
their homes and transaction costs. In these cases, WV can be used to estimate 
the surplus value of the non-market good, i.e. the value over and above any 
impact on house prices (compensation received through housing prices) of the 
non-market good (Ferreira and Moro, 2009; Luechinger, 2009; Levinson, 
2012; Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005; Cohen, 2008) because WV can capture 
all impacts of things like air quality even if people are not consciously aware 
of them (Welsch and Ferreira, 2013). This is achieved by not controlling for 
house prices in the wellbeing regression, allowing them to vary and for the 
effect of the house price change to be internalised such that the coefficient on 
the non-market good represents the surplus effect on subjective wellbeing 
(SWB). In this sense WV can complement the hedonic pricing method when 
there are housing market imperfections and the degree of complementarity is a 
positive function of the level of market imperfection. 
 
3. Chapter 3 discusses at length the issues related to measuring SWB and 
provided evidence to support the use of the life satisfaction measure. An 
interesting recent study to add here is Bond and Lang’s (2019) critique of 
happiness measures. They state that if happiness is not reported/scaled in the 
exact same way across individuals it is impossible to rank groups based on 
their mean levels of happiness, unless the distribution of happiness in one 
group stochastically dominates the distribution of the other. This relates to the 
broader issue of interpersonal comparability of wellbeing measures, which 
was discussed at length in the thesis and I presented arguments in favour of 
interpersonal comparability (e.g. Kahneman, 2000; Diener et al., 1999; 
Duncan, 2010). In particular van Praag et al. (2003) and van Praag (1991) find 
that there is a common reporting function for wellbeing measures across 
society.  
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This discussion is a relative issue since interpersonal comparability is 
something that is important for all valuation methods. Whilst there are issues 
related to interpersonal comparability for wellbeing measures, the same can 
also be said for preferences and indeed as argued in section 4.3.2, 
interpersonal incomparability issues may even be more serious in preference-
based valuation methods such as stated preference. Preference-based valuation 
methods like contingent valuation do not use or recommend methods for 
addressing interpersonal comparability such as Harsanyi’s extended 
preference method (see Hausman and McPherson, 2006) and hence are just as 
susceptible to interpersonal comparability issues as WV. These types of 
critique are therefore important but they are not something that should dismiss 
the WV method per se, rather it is an important area for future research in 
WV. A particularly useful question to address for the purposes of non-market 
valuation would be which form of welfare measure - SWB or preferences – is 
more interpersonally comparable? 
  
4. Section 3.3.4.2.3 (SWB measurement issues) discusses the problems of 
interview mode effects and priming and question order effects for the 
measurement of life satisfaction. I noted there that recent studies have been 
unable to replicate the results from Schwarz and Strack's seminal work on 
these types of contextual biases, hinting that these issues may not be such a 
concern as first thought (Haybron, 2010; Diener and Suh, 1997). Therefore, it 
is my assessment that WV is unlikely to be prone to these issues, however, we 
should be aware of the consequences when/if these types of biases arise in life 
satisfaction surveys.  
 
If the interviewer mode and question ordering are constant for all respondents 
in the survey then this should not be a problem for WV since we would expect 
the effect of question ordering to even out over large surveys as previous 
questions will invoke positive memories for some people and negative ones 
for others. And the constant interviewer mode will have the same effect on all 
people either increasing or decreasing their life satisfaction scores but this is 
not a problem since it is the ratio of impacts (coefficients) that we are 
interested in rather than the absolute values and the ratio of coefficients will 
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remain constant under a monotonic change in life satisfaction ratings. 
However, where interviewer mode and priming biases exist this will 
potentially cause problems if interviewer mode and question ordering were not 
constant across the sample. This would potentially invalidate WV studies that 
use, for example, samples that come from different interviewer modes unless 
the mode was randomly assigned or unless we control for the variable with 
which interviewer mode is correlated (e.g. elderly populations may be more 
likely to do surveys over the phone or face-to-face rather than online). We can 
also control for question ordering in the statistical analysis if priming is an 
issue in the survey. In summary, there seems to be a low risk of WV studies 
being affected by interviewer mode and priming effects, but where they are 
there are ways to nullify the impact and so these biases should not pose a 
serious threat to WV. 
 
Additional References (for papers not already included in thesis bibliography) 
BOND, T. & LANG, K. 2019. The sad truth about happiness scales. Journal of 
Political Economy, 127, 1629-1640. 
WELSCH, H. & FERREIRA, S. 2013. Environment, well-being and experienced 
preference. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 7, 205-
238.  
 
 
Corrections and additions to Chapter 4 
 
1. Equation (13) (p.110) requires further clarification. It does not make sense to 
multiply a discrete change by a derivative (the numerator term in equation 
(13)) unless the derivative is from a linear functional form (where the change 
in the dependent variable is constant for all levels of change in the 
independent variable), or is from a model where the variable 𝑄 is binary such 
that two discrete changes are in effect being multiplied together. As explained 
on p.115 the focus of the thesis is on binary 𝑄 variables (i.e. the presence or 
not of the non-market good), and in equation (10), which is a precursor to 
equation (13), I explain that the equation is intended as a basic format and that 
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it becomes more complex when the 𝑄 and 𝑀 variables take on a non-linear 
format.  
 
To be clear, therefore, equation (13) is not applicable when the non-market 
good variable 𝑄 is a non-binary (for example continuous) variable that has a 
non-linear relationship with SWB. For example, this could be levels of air 
pollution which have higher marginal impacts on SWB the higher the initial 
levels of pollution. The non-market good that is used in the case study in the 
thesis (unemployment) is binary and hence equation (13) can be applied to it. I 
do not provide an exposition of equation (13) here for the case of non-binary 
non-linear 𝑄 variables because (a) there are numerous ways in which the non-
linear relationship between 𝑄 and 𝑆𝑊𝐵 can be estimated and so it is not 
possible to set out a generic functional form for this here, and (b) the focus of 
this thesis is on binary 𝑄 variables. 
 
2. The income coefficient in wellbeing regressions that use an endogenous 
income variable tends to be small due to a number of reasons. First, findings 
from the literature that instruments for income (or uses exogenous changes in 
income) would suggest that people who are less satisfied with life to begin 
with tend to earn more, potentially with the aim of improving their lives 
(reverse causality) or that there are factors that we cannot fully control for, 
such as personality traits, that make some people less satisfied with their lives 
and more likely to earn higher incomes (endogeneity). This would result in a 
downward bias in the income coefficient. Second, income is hard to measure 
in surveys because of all of the different sources of income that people have, 
often leading to measurement error in the income variable. Measurement error 
in independent variables in regression analysis leads to downward bias in the 
coefficient. Third, people adapt to higher incomes causing a diminishing 
marginal utility of income and since the wellbeing regressions I review and 
estimate in the thesis have generally come from high income countries such as 
the UK, absolute changes in income will generally have smaller effects on life 
satisfaction and it may be that relative changes in income take greater 
importance. A final problem in wellbeing regressions is that income impacts 
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on wellbeing through various channels, for example through health, education 
and housing quality, but often these factors are controlled for in the same 
regression model which nullifies these indirect effects, leading to a reduction 
in the size of the coefficient for income. 
 
3. To provide context for the income analysis and results in the thesis, the 
following table provides a review of income coefficient results for a range of 
studies that focus on life satisfaction. I focus only on studies that are directly 
comparable to the methods used here – models that use multivariate regression 
analysis and where income is defined as log of household income and life 
satisfaction is used as the measure of wellbeing. This narrows down the range 
of possible comparison studies as a wide range of methods and variable 
definitions are used. Studies come from the UK and other developed countries 
and I focus only on studies that use large secondary national data sets and 
exclude small primary data studies. The response scale to the life satisfaction 
question varies across surveys. To make the results comparable to the BHPS I 
have rescaled the coefficients to a seven-point scale by dividing by the number 
of points on the original scale and multiplying by 7. These figures can be 
compared to the results presented in Chapter 6. 
Author(s) Country Data set Income 
coefficient 
Life 
satisfaction 
scale 
7 point 
scale 
conversion 
Frey et al. (2009) UK Euro-Barometer 0.168 4 0.294 
Powdthavee (2010) UK BHPS 0.105 7 0.105 
Garcia-Mainar et al. 
(2015) 
Spain Quality of Working Life 
Survey 
0.140 11 0.089 
Schneider and 
Kleindienst (2015) 
Europe SHARE 0.171 11 0.109 
Murtin et al. (2017) World Gallup 0.480 11 0.305 
Knoll & Pitlik (2016) Europe ESS 0.147 11 0.094 
Brenig & Proeger 
(2016) 
Europe ESS 0.486 11 0.309 
Maccagnan et al. 
(2019) 
England & 
Wales 
Crime Survey for England 
and Wales 
0.217 11 0.138 
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Barrington-Leigh & 
Behzadnejad (2017) 
Canada Canadian Community 
Health Survey 
0.173 6 0.202 
Ólafsdóttir et al. (2017) USA Health and Retirement 
Study 
0.006 5 0.008 
Ambrey et al. (2014) Australia HILDA 0.184 11 0.117 
Kuehnle & Wunder 
(2014) 
UK BHPS 0.183 7 0.183 
Danzer & Danzer 
(2011) 
Ukraine ULMS 0.169 5 0.237 
        AVERAGE 0.168 
 
The mean coefficient size for log of household income in OLS models is 0.168 
across these studies. This is comparable to the income coefficient estimated 
using the BHPS in this thesis of 0.104 (see Chapter 6). Incidentally, this is 
almost identical to Powdthavee’s (2010) estimate using the BHPS of 0.105.  
 
The size of the income coefficient in the literature varies depending on 
whether OLS, fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) models are used and 
they tend to be lower in FE and RE models. A small number of the above 
studies also ran FE and RE models with the mean coefficient size for log of 
household income estimated at 0.059 (based on 4 studies). 
 
4. I clarify here that hedonic pricing methods for valuation do not solely pick up 
use values. For example, house prices will reflect so-called option value for 
things like nearby parks, beaches, museums and other amenities. This is the 
value that people place on the option of using/visiting a site in the future 
although they don’t use it now. 
 
Additional References (for papers not already included in thesis bibliography) 
AMBREY, C., FLEMING, C. & CHAN, A. 2014. Estimating the cost of air pollution 
in South East Queensland: An application of the life satisfaction non-market 
valuation approach. Ecological Economics, 97, 172-181. 
BRENIG, M. & PROEGER, T. 2016. Putting a price tag on security: Subjective well-
being and willingness-to-pay for crime reduction in Europe. CEGE Discussion 
Papers, 278. 
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Workplace environmental conditions and life satisfaction in Spain. Ecological 
Economics, 119, 136-146. 
KNOLL, B. & PITLIK, H. 2014. Who benefits from big government? A life 
satisfaction approach. WWW For Europe Policy Paper, 14. 
ÓLAFSDOTTIR, T., ÁSGEIRSDOTTIER, T. & NORTON, E. 2017. Valuing pain 
using the subjective wellbeing method. NBER Working Paper Series, 23649. 
MACCAGNAN, A., TAYLOR, T. & WHITE, M. 2019. Valuing the relationship 
between drug and alcohol use and life satisfaction: Findings from the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales. Journal of Happiness Studies.  
MURTIN, F., BOARINI, R., CORDOBA, J. & RIPOLL, M. 2017. Beyond GDP: Is 
there a law of one shadow price? European Economic Review, 100, 390-411. 
 
 
Corrections and additions to Chapter 5 
 
1. The equations (19) and (20) that are set out in section 5.2 in reference to the 
3S-WV approach suppressed the other determinants of SWB, which was not 
clearly stated in the text. Therefore, I rectify the equations to read as follows 
(so that they are in line with previous equation (8) in the text): 
 
(19) 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖 = 𝑓(ln (𝑀𝑖), 𝑋𝑖
𝑀) 
Where 𝑀𝑖 is the income of individual 𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖
𝑀 is a vector of other 
determinants of SWB that are correlated with 𝑀𝑖. Note that 𝑋𝑖
𝑀 may contain 
the non-market good variable 𝑄𝑖.  
 
(20) 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑄𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖
𝑄)  
Where 𝑄𝑖 is the non-market good as experienced by individual 𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖
𝑄
 is a 
vector of other determinants of SWB that are correlated with 𝑄𝑖. Note that 𝑋𝑖
𝑄
 
may contain the income variable 𝑀𝑖. 
 
2. I find that using the lottery wins IV in the control function approach leads to a 
10-fold increase in the size of the coefficient on income (p.160), which is in 
 229 
 
line with previous IV studies in the literature which find a 10-12 fold increase. 
I provide further clarification here as to why, therefore, my estimation 
procedure and results contribute to the literature. There are two reasons why 
the method used in the thesis is novel and adds to the literature: 
 
i. As explained in the thesis the rationale for some of the previous 
instruments used for income is not clear and there are reasons to argue 
that the core identifying assumptions may not hold in many cases. I 
have argued that lottery wins, although not perfect, represents the most 
robust instrument for income in current data sets. Therefore, I would 
argue that although it is useful to compare my lottery wins results with 
the wider IV literature we should note that some of the results in the 
other IV literature may have come about through chance where the 
instrument used is not robust. Using a robust instrument in lottery wins 
has demonstrated that we can be confident that the increase in the 
income coefficient is around 10-fold when using an IV, so at the lower 
end of findings in the wider literature.  
ii. Secondly in this thesis I use the control function method rather than the 
more traditional two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, which 
means that the estimated impact of income on SWB is for the sample 
average rather than for the narrower complier subset as per 2SLS. It is 
therefore not possible to directly compare my results with the wider IV 
literature and so any comparison should be made with these caveats. 
The results of the income instrument using the control function here 
are more generalisable than 2SLS models which is a contribution to the 
literature.  
 
Overall for these reasons the findings from the wider literature are used to 
provide context rather than a test of the results in the thesis. 
 
3. As I set out on p.151 unless we know how often people play the lottery, lottery 
wins do not represent exogenous changes in income with respect to SWB. The 
BHPS data set does not contain data on how often people play lotteries and so 
my solution is to adjust for past lottery win amounts, which is claimed will 
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more accurately reflect current lottery playing frequency than observable 
socioeconomic factors/variables which have been used as control variables in 
the lottery IV literature to date. I reiterate that this is an assumption and that 
previous lottery win amounts is not a perfect indicator of current lottery 
playing frequency and hence it is a partial fix for this issue. 
 
4. I provide here more details in relation to the euphoria effect of lottery wins 
and why it is not an issue for the lottery wins instrument I use in the thesis. As 
I set out on p.156 the euphoria experienced from winning in a lottery has the 
potential to invalidate the exclusion restriction in the IV set up since lottery 
wins would impact directly on SWB through a channel other than through 
income. I hypothesise that this is not a problem in my analysis as following 
Gardner and Oswald (2002) and Imbens et al. (2001) I compare lottery 
winners of different amounts and exclude entirely people who do not win or 
play lotteries. The IV (𝑍) =  0 for people with £1-£99 of lottery wins and 𝑍 = 1 
for people with lottery wins of £100 and over (restricted to a maximum of 
£50,000).  
 
Here both groups are winners and will feel some happiness due to having won. 
Larger winners (the 𝑍 = 1 group) may feel more euphoria than smaller 
winners (the 𝑍 = 0 group), but this would be because the level of euphoria 
experienced at winning the lottery is correlated with win size, which suggests 
that it is the money prize that causes happiness - precisely the effect that we 
are interested in for the instrument. A second important point to note is that 
the euphoria felt from the act of winning itself may only be temporary anyway 
and not picked up in the life satisfaction responses at the time of the survey. 
Hence, I argue that the exclusion restriction assumption is satisfied for lottery 
wins under this set up. 
 
In the table below I present sensitivity analysis of the control function model  
with the lottery winnings instrument (from p.160) with different cut-off  
thresholds for definitions of small versus medium/large-sized lottery wins. I  
present the original results with the £100 threshold against models where the  
threshold is doubled to £200; then £400 and then a final large threshold of  
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£1,000. Of the sample of lottery winners in the BHPS only 3.1% of people  
have higher annual lottery wins than £1,000, which will make the regression  
results less stable and reliable. The original threshold of £100 was chosen as it  
allowed me to retain a large sample of winners in the 𝑍=1 instrument category  
(over 20% of the lottery winning sample had annual winnings higher than  
£100).  
 
Table 1 sets out the key results from the second stage of the control function,  
which shows the impact of income on the dependent variable life satisfaction.  
The key result used in WV in the thesis is the coefficient on log (household  
income) of 1.103 from the £100 threshold model. Moving the lottery winnings  
threshold to £200 or £400 does not have a material impact on the results with  
the income coefficient staying at around 1.0 to 1.1, which is well within the  
90% confidence interval of the result from the original £100 threshold model  
(C.I. = 0.609 – 1.598). There is, however, an increase in the income  
coefficient in the £1,000 threshold model to 1.563. This model, however,  
should be ignored as the sample size with 𝑍=1 for the instrument category is  
very low which makes the results less robust as can be seen by the  
substantially lower level of statistical significance; the income coefficient is  
now only significant at the 10% level in this model. The results here suggest  
that the coefficient on income from the control function using lottery wins as  
an instrument are robust to changes in the lottery winnings threshold for the  
lottery instrument. 
 
Table 1. Sensitivity analysis of the control function results  
  
£100 
threshold 
£200 
threshold 
£400 
threshold 
£1,000 
threshold 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Coefficient 
(S.E) 
 log (household   
 income) 
 1.103***  1.028***  1.141** 1.563* 
      (0.252)     (0.334)     (0.483)        (0.803) 
 previous lottery wins  -0.00001***  -0.00001**  -0.00001**   -0.00001* 
      (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
   -1.108***  -1.032***  -1.145** -1.566* 
      (0.26)     (0.34)     (0.488)        (0.807) 
       0.011*      0.011*      0.012*  0.012* 
      (0.006)     (0.006)     (0.006)        (0.006) 
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 constant     -5.777**     -5.017      -6.152 -10.380 
      (2.53)     (3.349)     (4.847)        (8.05) 
Observations     10,328     10,328     10,328        10,328 
Notes: Significance: *** 0.01 level; ** 0.05 level; * 0.1 level. Results of the second 
stage of the control function model from equation (26). Huber-White heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. 
 
A second issue related to use of lottery wins is that a pound (£1) of lottery 
wins may not have the same effect as a pound (£1) generated through other 
mechanisms such as earned income. This, however, is also not a problem for 
the WV approach because valuation in economic theory is interested with how 
exogenous changes in income/wealth can compensate people in place of the 
non-market good and so we would want to estimate the effect of unearned 
income shocks on wellbeing rather than the wellbeing effect of changes in 
earned income. 
 
 
Corrections and additions to Chapter 6 
 
1. It is difficult to measure the causal effect of unemployment on wellbeing 
because there are many factors that will drive both likelihood of 
unemployment and wellbeing, which may be hard to measure (e.g. motivation, 
ability, work ethic) which will lead to endogeneity bias. There is also the 
potential problem of reverse causality, whereby people with lower initial 
levels of wellbeing become unemployed rather than the other way around.  
 
I use a self-reported redundancy variable to measure the causal effect of 
unemployment on wellbeing. As discussed in section 6.3.2.1. there are a 
number of reasons why redundancy may not be exogenous in some 
circumstances. In relation to the variable and methods used in this thesis the 
exogeneity assumption would be violated if (i) the likelihood of being made 
redundant was driven by factors that also impact on an individual’s life 
satisfaction (and these factors are not controlled for in the analysis), which 
would lead to endogeneity bias; and/or (ii) the redundancy variable was 
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reported with error leading to a downward bias in the coefficient on 
redundancy.  
 
Arguably, since becoming unemployed is a significant event the reasons for 
unemployment should be clear to people and so measurement error should be 
minimal. The main challenge for exogeneity in the redundancy variable here 
will therefore be around unobservable or hard to measure confounding 
variables. This will include factors such as productivity, motivation, work 
ethic, risk aversion, how likeable the individual is at work and their soft skills. 
However, the balance tests conducted in Table 8 of the thesis (which also 
tested for reverse causality by including a lagged life satisfaction variable) 
provide support for the exogeneity assumption for the redundancy variable as 
measured in the BHPS.    
 
2. In Table 2 below I also run the redundant unemployed model in equation (31) 
with individual fixed effects. Even with fixed effects included in the model 
there is essentially no change in the size of the coefficient on the redundant 
unemployed variable which is -0.352 in the original OLS model and -0.349 in 
the fixed effects model, both significant at the 1% level. However, there is 
considerable change in the coefficients on all other variables including the 
income coefficient which reduces significantly as expected. 
  
Table 2. Redundant unemployed model (original OLS and fixed effects) 
Independent variable (OLS) (Fixed Effects) 
  Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Redundant unemployed -0.352*** 0.059 -0.349*** 0.061 
Log (household income) 0.153*** 0.011 0.030* 0.016 
Self-employed 0.118*** 0.031 0.070* 0.038 
Retired 0.385*** 0.038 0.098 0.065 
Student 0.011 0.04 -0.044 0.047 
Maternity leave 0.397*** 0.087 0.270*** 0.101 
Sick leave -1.078*** 0.083 -0.774*** 0.107 
Government training -0.092 0.142 -0.191 0.163 
Other job status -0.165* 0.09 -0.229** 0.092 
Constant 3.634***          0.111 4.869***     0.163 
Observations 26,849   26,849   
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R-squared 0.030   0.024   
Notes: Significance: *** 0.01 level; ** 0.05 level; * 0.1 level. Equation (31) estimated 
using OLS and with fixed effects. Huber-White heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. Employed is the reference case for the employment status variables. 
 
Although not requested in the examiners’ comments I also ran equation (32) 
(with the full set of control variables) with individual fixed effects and found 
the same result: there was no significant change in the size of the coefficient 
on redundant unemployed (-0.337 in the original OLS model and -0.328 in the 
fixed effects model, both significant at the 1% level), but there were 
significant changes in the coefficients on all other variables.  
 
The results of the fixed effects models provide further support for the 
exogeneity of the redundant unemployed variable. 
 
3. In equation (33) there is an interactive term to assess whether some variables 
moderate the impact of unemployment on life satisfaction. This is the term 
(𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡). 𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a vector of four moderating variables - gender, age, 
educational attainment and marital status – which are interacted with the 
redundant unemployed variable 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡. As (33) is an interactive model (𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∙
𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡) is added as a separate variable and the four moderating variables 
(gender, age, educational attainment and marital status) are also included in 
the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 so that we can estimate the additional effect of the moderating 
term (𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡). 
 
Huber-White robust standard errors are used in the model due to potential 
heteroscedasticity in the data. 
 
 
Corrections and additions to Chapter 7 
 
None. 
